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The broad outlines of the monumental injustices involved in
the Duke lacrosse rape-that-never-happened case are well known. An
unethical local prosecutor, Michael B. Nifong,1 for partisan political
reasons, 2 pursued the Duke lacrosse team3 and ultimately indicted
Regents Professor of Law, Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky
University, Highland Heights, Kentucky. L.L.M., Columbia University, 1973; J.D., Saint
Louis University School of Law, 1972; B.A., Bellarmine College, 1969. The author would
like to thank the professional staff of the College of Law library for their extraordinary
conscientiousness and creativity in responding to my requests for arcane and often
inaccessible materials. You are a scholar's dream team!
1.
See infra text accompanying notes 378, 379, 435-442, 457, 461-510; see also
STUART TAYLOR, JR. & K. C. JOHNSON, UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT: POLITICAL CORRECTNESS
AND THE SHAMEFUL INJUSTICES OF THE DUKE LACROSSE CASE 77-89, 96-105, 118-19, 152206, 219-35, 239-41, 244-68, 270-72, 278-80, 282, 285-357, 367-70, 379-80, 382, 438-442,
461-511 (2007).
2.
See infra text accompanying notes 379-384,438-442, 463-466, 473, 484-488; see
also supra note 1.
3.
The three ultimately charged were readily identified by the media or otherwise
easily recognizable. See infra note 4. The other forty-six members of the Duke lacrosse
team were often defamed as an entity. However, that poses no problem under the small-
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three of its members 4 based almost solely on the accusations of a
wholly unreliable, self-proclaimed victim. 5 Nifong received generous
support and sustenance from many left-leaning, politically active
Duke faculty, 6 an extraordinarily inept 7 (or worse 8) Duke
administration, and almost the entirety 9 of the mainstream media. 10
Ultimately, following a detailed analysis by his office, North Carolina
Attorney General Roy A. Cooper 1 publicly excoriated Nifong in

versus-large-group defamation rule. Recognizability exists in the Durham locale, and
perhaps beyond, as the team's pictures were widely disseminated on the Duke campus and
within the City of Durham. See DAVID A. ELDER, DEFAMATION: A LAWYER'S GUIDE §§ 1:30:33 (2003 & Supp. 2008) [hereinafter ELDER, DEFAMATION]; TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra
note 1, at 104, 145, 275 (noting that the campus was "flooded" with "wanted" posters that
illustrated the pictures and names of the forty-six white players); id. at 118 (noting USA
Today's express reference to this poster); id. at 212-13 (including a picture insert of the
"vigilante" poster); id. at 344 (noting that the forty-six white lacrosse players had been
identified as felony suspects by Nifong and his office, the police department of Durham,
and Durham Crime Stoppers).
4.
See infra text accompanying note 342.
5.
See infra text accompanying notes 412-429, 434-435, 472-483, 488-498.
6.
TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 103 (noting that the Duke faculty's
remarks "topped" even those of Nifong); id. at 103-17; id. at 371-401; see also infra note 8.
7.
TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 131 (concluding that the president of
Duke, Richard Brodhead, "acquiesced without a peep of protest in a' pattern of
prosecutorial abuse" directed towards his institution's students for over eight months).
Brodhead later apologized for "causing the families to feel abandoned when they were most
in need of support." Duke's PresidentApologizes Over Lacrosse Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30,
2007, at 1.
8.
TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 132 (stating that Brodhead was complicit
in following Nifong and the activist Duke faculty "in publicly and repeatedly assailing the
lacrosse players, albeit in more muted ways . . . [and] entering an alliance of convenience
with the oppressor [Nifong] of forty-six of Duke's own students in order to appease activist
professors and black Durhamites"); id. at 161 (suggesting that Brodhead, like Nifong,
engaged in "willful blindness" by "avoiding direct exposure to evidence of innocence"); id. at
255 (noting that Brodhead "deliberately cultivated ignorance of the overwhelming
documentary evidence of innocence and of Nifong's abuses that were offered him while
continuing to defer" to Nifong in public communications).
9.
There were a few noteworthy exceptions. For example, Nifong's most forceful
antagonist was Joe Neff, an investigative reporter with the News & Observer in Raleigh.
TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 202. Others included CBS's Ed Bradley, 60 Minutes
producer Michael Radutzky, id. at 24-28, 109, 117, 175, 182, 193, 224, 282-83, and
MSNBC's Dan Abrams. Id. at 86, 100, 123, 205-06, 271; see also text accompanying note 21.
10.
See TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 119-28; id. at 118 (noting that at the
end of March 2006, "the journalistic echo chamber quickly spread the image of drunken,
disorderly, publicly urinating lacrosse thugs around the world"); Evan Thomas, A Rush to
Judgment; 'Until Proven Innocent' is Harshly Critical of the City and Campus Response to
the Duke University Rape Case, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 10, 2007, at 34 ("By and large, the press
did not let the facts get in the way of a good race-class-sex-violence morality play.").
11.
Duff Wilson & David Barstow, All Charges Dropped in Duke Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 12, 2007, at 1-2 (quoting the detailed report of North Carolina Attorney General Roy
A. Cooper's official statements following a thorough investigation) [hereinafter Wilson &
Barstow, All ChargesDropped].
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concluding that the three students wrongfully accused by a "rogue
prosecutor" 12 were innocent; there had never been any credible
evidence to support the charges. 13 Nifong was disbarred and generally
disgraced.14
The Duke lacrosse fabricated rape case has since entered the
annals of legal history1 5 and will doubtlessly be analogized for decades
to come as a modern, reverse "Scottsboro Boys"1 6 epic, with the
accused white students being railroaded by an African American
"victim" 17 in cahoots with a race-baiting prosecutor.18 Indeed, being
"Nifonged" has become synonymous with being "railroaded." 19 The
authors of Until Proven Innocent, Stuart Taylor, Jr. and K. C.
Johnson, have written an exceptionally thorough and riveting account
of the Duke lacrosse case that exposes and eviscerates the actions of
the multiple complicit actors in this perversion of justice. Many have
reviewed this account and universally praised its professionalism.
None have questioned its basic conclusions. 20
As a defamation scholar, I will take a different track. Until
Proven Innocent, with modest exceptions, 21 presents the mainstream
print and electronic media, as a class, as politically predisposed and
non-skeptical, if not institutionally reckless 22 in their rush to adopt
the race/sex/privilege angle hyped by the media elders. 23 This is
12.
TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 351-52 (quoting Cooper's press conference
on April 11, 2007).
13.
Id.; see also Wilson & Barstow, All ChargesDropped, supra note 11, at 1-2.
14.
TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 404-05 (finding that Nifong had
repeatedly and deliberately violated rules of professional conduct in making prejudicial

public statements, and lied to the court, the bar, and defense counsel).
15.
See infra text accompanying notes 399-400, 435.
16.
The analogy was often drawn by commentators. See, e.g., infra note 457;
TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 239, 297; see also Street v. National Broadcasting Co.,
645 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir. 1981) (involving a libel litigation arising from a docudrama
portraying the prosecutrix as a prostitute). Mrs. Street died the following year. An article
about her demise noted the libel suit was "settled out of court." Victoria P. Street Dies at 77;
A Figure in Scottsboro Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1982, at B7.
17.
See supra note 5.
18.
See supra text accompanying note 2.
19.
TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 334.
20.
See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 10; infra text accompanying note 364.
21.
See supra text accompanying note 9; infra text accompanying notes 364, 379,
396, 399, 429, 441-42, 470-71, 503, 520, 540, 542-544.
22.
See infra text accompanying notes 363-544.
23.
See infra text accompanying notes 364-65, 372, 379-80, 384, 385, 466, 470, 508,
540, 541. This was particularly well-illustrated by the "basically fair" absolution of the
Times by its ombudsman/public editor Byron Calame. He offered a recommendation if the
felony charges fell through: the Times should magnify its efforts to investigate "racial
insults by various players" and the team's "seemingly flawed culture." Byron Calame,
Covering the Duke Lacrosse Team Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2006, at 2 [hereinafter
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particularly true of that supposed pillar of respectability, the New
York Times, 24 which Taylor and Johnson treat in an especially critical
fashion. 25 As I read and re-read the book, it became apparent that the
Times had, as had most of its emulators, largely ignored the law of
Chestdefamation in its reportage on the Duke lacrosse case.
Calame, Covering]. But see TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 197 (critiquing Calame's
piece).
24.
Iza Wojciechowska, Times' Lax Coverage Comes Under Scrutiny, THE
CHRONICLE, Apr. 25, 2007, at 2 (Duke University's independent daily newspaper)
(paraphrasing Slate editor-at-large Jack Shafer as saying, "[B]ecause of the Times' broad
audience and established reputation, it was the paper's attention to the case that exploded
); see also infra text accompanying notes 364,,
the story into a nationwide sensation.
374, 375-385, 396-544.
25.
See, e.g., TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 120-21 (comparing this case to
the "prolonged crusade" of several dozen articles for elimination of the Augusta National
Golf Club's sexist admission policy and concluding that sports writers' handling of the
Duke case was "very much in character: politically correct politics without the scrupulous
attention to facts" of the Times' best reporters, and that it "spoke volumes" that the editors
left the story with the sports division for so long); id. at 122 ("Now at the head of the guiltpresuming pack," the Times "vied in a race at the journalistic bottom with trash-TV talk
...); id. at 166-67 (citing the Times' refusal to disclose the accuser's criminal
shows.
record); id. at 197 (detailing the "highly exculpatory revelations" the paper's readers would
not have seen); id. at 233 (noting that the co-dancer's statement that the accuser's rape
allegations were a "crock" was not reported until August 25, 2006), see infra text
accompanying note 423-424); id. at 235 (noting that moderate conservative David Brooks's
criticism of media handling of the Duke lacrosse scenario, see infra text supported by note
470, was ignored within the Times because he was "far to the right of almost every other
writer and editor"); id. at 303 (noting that the Times ignored a series of defense motions
filed over a three-day period, which included information that outside DNA tests possessed
by Nifong had revealed the DNA of several non-identified males from the accuser or her
clothing that did not belong to her boyfriend/driver with whom she later informed police
she had sex within the days prior to the alleged rape; that the identifications were
"constitutionally flawed," had resulted in "flawed results" (which included a detailed
analysis of the accuser's contradictions), and must be suppressed, barring any
identification relying thereon by the accuser; and that a change of venue must be granted
because of the highly inflammatory attacks by Duke professors, segments of the local
African American community, and the media); id. at 305-12, 317 (noting that the Times
minimized the December 15 hearing where the private testing laboratory owner admitted
to what was a conspiracy by him and Nifong-described as "a defense triumph with
dramatic elements enough to catch the attention of most [other] big media groups"-to
conceal the unidentified male DNA discussed above by including it in a cryptic reference in
a December 16, 2006, story on the accuser's pregnancy and only doing a major story
thereon (the major focus of which was the dropping of the rape-but not the othercharges, and the reasons therefore) on December 24, 2006, with the "unfailingly politically
correct editorial page" still silent while other major newspapers demanded that the
remaining charges also be rescinded); id. at 323 (noting that by the end of 2006, Nifong,
under ethics charges, had been "scorned by virtually every editorial board except" the
Times and the equally, if not more, slanted local Herald-Sun); id. at 354 (noting that Duff
Wilson posted a reference to the attorney general's dropping of remaining charges on the
Times website but only referenced the "innocent" conclusion in the second paragraph, and
noting the editorial page's continuing silence); id. at 377 (noting that the Times, as in other
cases, continued to protect the accuser's anonymity even where said accuser was
demonstrated to be a "vicious liar[] bent on sending innocent men to prison").
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thumping newsworthiness 26 or news creation 27 became its mantra, if
not its mode of operations. Maybe this is the unfortunate true legacy
of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the most important defamation
decision in Anglo-American legal history:28 that the media may largely
act unconstrained by defamation liability concerns because of the
practical difficulty of litigation and the huge obstacles to actually
29
collecting an award.
So far no one has sued the Times or other media entities for
libel. 30 Maybe no one will. Nonetheless, media misfeasance and
malfeasance, viewed through the microcosm of the Times coverage,
raises some basic issues of libel law that future litigants in parallel

26.
27.

See infra text accompanying notes 458-461, 540-542.
See supra text accompanying notes 23-25; infra text accompanying notes 363-

544.

FLOYD ABRAMS, SPEAKING FREELY 4 (2005) (describing New York Times Co. v.
28.
Sullivan as "the most significant First Amendment case of his era . . . which rewrote
American libel law").
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) ("Plainly many
29.
deserving plaintiffs, including some intentionally subjected to injury, will be unable to
surmount the barrier of the New York Times test."); see also RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET AL.,
THE RIGHT TO SPEAK ILL: DEFAMATION, REPUTATION, AND FREE SPEECH 246 (2006)

(stating that New York Times Co. has "changed the culture" of defamation suits and
"effectively stifled" such suits by public persons and most private persons, providing "little
protection for reputation" and "a remarkable platform" for freedom of expression); id. at
250 ("[The New York Times Co. rule] appears to significantly deter almost all defamation
litigation."); David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA.L.REV. 487, 488
(1991) (stating that New York Times Co. and its progeny make the libel remedy "largely
illusory" with "the likelihood of success ... miniscule"); id. at 525-26 ("[N]o major legal
system in the world provides as little protection for reputation as the United States now
provides."); id. at 545 ("[M]edia defendants, as a class, have the means and the incentive to
spend what it takes to make sure libel does not become an effective remedy."); Gerald G.
Ashdown, Journalism Police, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 739, 739, 750-51 (2006) (noting that New
York Times Co. and its offspring have "effectively eliminated" defamation and privacy
liability as a media control by the "virtual impossibility" of plaintiff recovery); David A.
Logan, Libel Law in the Trenches: Reflections on Current Data on Libel Litigation, 87 VA. L.
REV. 503, 520 (2001) (stating that under New York Times Co. and Gertz, the media has
"something approaching an absolute privilege to defame; a reasonable publisher should
worry about having to pay substantial libel damages as much as she worries about being
struck by lightning").
The mistreated and fired coach, Mike Pressler, and the wrongfully accused,
30.
David Evans, Reade Seligmann, and Collin Finnerty, initially settled with Duke for
undisclosed sums. TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 403. Pressler later broke the
settlement by filing suit against Duke for allegedly defamatory statements by a Duke vicepresident. Former Duke Lacrosse Coach Files Suit Against University, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14,
2007, at 1. After settlement negotiations fell through, David Evans, Collin Finnerty, and
Reade Seligmann sued the City of Durham and others in federal court. See Evans v. City of
Durham, No. 1:07-cv-00739-JAB-WWD (M.D.N.C. Apr. 2, 2008). Other Duke lacrosse
players have also sued the City of Durham, Duke University, its hospital system, and
selected employees of both in separate federal litigation. See Carrington v. Duke
University, No. 1:08-cv-119 (M.D.N.C., Feb. 21, 2008).
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"rush to judgment"3 1 scenarios may find helpful. Were the accused
Duke lacrosse players (and other defamed lacrosse players) private
persons or involuntary public figures under the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence? 32 Were Nifong's and others' munificently quoted
statements entitled to either fair report 33 or neutral reportage3 4
protection? Did the Times engage in reportage outside the panopoly of
First Amendment protection, knowing or reckless disregard of falsity,
i.e. "calculated falsehood," 35 particularly as to its much ridiculed "body
of evidence" article published on August 25, 2006? Each of these
issues will be discussed in detail hereinafter.

I. ISSUES OF STATUS: NEW YORK TIMES CO. OR GERTZ?
Famously, the Supreme Court superimposed a threshold
requirement of constitutional malice on public official libel plaintiffs in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan36 and later extended the same
extremely demanding standard to public figures 37 and candidates for
public office. 3 8 A plurality then applied this same criterion to all
matters of public or general interest in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., 39 with the net result being that almost all litigants, whatever
their status, were subjected to this extraordinary deviation from
reputation-protective common-law standards. Following changes on
the bench, 40 the Court revisited this subject matter in its counterrevolutionary decision, 41 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,42 in which the

31.
32.
33.
34.

TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1,
See infra text accompanying notes
See infra text accompanying notes
See infra text accompanying notes

at 10, 404.
36-140.
141-326.
327-362.

35.
See infra text accompanying notes 55, 193, 198-200, 239, 242, 248, 249, 255,321,
325-326, 328, 331, 358-362, 386-395, 401-409, 525-534, 537-39.
36.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
37.

See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Associated Press v.

Walker, 389 U.S. 28 (1967); Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); see also infra
text accompanying notes 46-55.
38.
See, e.g., Monitor-Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971); Ocala Star-Banner
Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971).
39.
401 U.S. 29 (1971); see also infra text accompanying notes 55, 81-82, 88, 92,
104-105, 198, 351.
40.
David A. Elder, Defamation, Public Officialdom, and the Rosenblatt v. Baer
Criteria-A Proposal For Revivification: Two Decades After New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 33 BUFF. L. REV. 579, 580 (1984) (noting "the pro-reputation orientation and
realignment" on the Supreme Court in the decade starting with Gertz).
41.
Id.
42.
418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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Court authorized private persons to collect actual 43 (but not presumed
45
or punitive 44) damages under a negligence standard.
The Gertz opinion sketched out broad rules for general
application in distinguishing public figures from private persons based
on two considerations: a primary "compelling," "normative"
assumption-of-risk policy, 46 and a subsidiary access to the media/selfhelp policy. 47 Gertz then identified three possible types of public
figures (only the first two of which it specifically discussed in the case
before it or thereafter): all purpose or general public figures, 48 vortex
or limited public figures, 49 and hypothetical involuntary public
figures. 50 The latter, according to the Court, would be "exceedingly

43.
Id. at 349-50.
44.
Id.
45.
Id. at 347-48 (concluding that such was "a more equitable boundary" between
reputation and free-expression values in private-person cases). For further discussion of
the Gertz negligence standard, see infra note 122. Although Gertz involved both a media
defendant and a matter of public concern, it was not explicitly so limited. The Court later
resolved this in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759-60
(1985) (rejecting the New York Times Co. standard as to presumed and punitive damages
in purely private cases) As to the broader impact of Dun & Bradstreet, see ELDER,
DEFAMATION, supra note 3, §6:11.
46.
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. Accordingly, private persons have "a more compelling
call" for a remedy than public persons because they are "more vulnerable" and "more
deserving" of a libel recovery. Id at 344.
47.
Id. at 344 n.9 (noting the major limitations of this criterion and stating that
defamation law is "rooted in our experience that the truth rarely catches up with a lie.").
However, self-help's inadequacies did not render them "irrelevant" to the Court's analysis.
Id.
48.
Id. at 345; id. at 351 ("[A]n individual may achieve such pervasive fame or
notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts."). The Court
imposed a heavy burden on asserting defendants, declining to 'lightly assume" such status
and requiring "clearevidence of general fame or notoriety in the community, and pervasive
involvement in the affairs of society." Id. at 352 (emphasis added).
49.
Id. at 345 ("More commonly, . . . public figures have thrust themselves to the
forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues
involved."); see also id. at 351. This vortex/limited-public-figure question is the "more
meaningful context." Id. at 352.
50.
Id. at 345 ("Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become a public
figure through no purposeful action of his own .... ") (dictum). Later, in discussing vortex
public figuredom, the Court said "[m]ore commonly, an individual voluntarily injects
himself, or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public
figure for a limited range of issues." Id. at 351 (emphasis added). These are the only
references to involuntary public figure status in the Court's entire jurisprudence. Cf. infra
text accompanying notes 52-55 (highlighting the Supreme Court's other analyses of vortex
or limited-purpose public figuredom where this "no purposeful action"/"drawn into"
language was clearly and unequivocally ignored). For a more extended criticism, see
ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 3, §5:8, 5-65-74 (listing and strongly criticizing a number
of cases appearing to adopt the involuntary public figure concept).
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rare."51 The Court proceeded to very narrowly construe public
figuredom in Gertz and two other pivotal cases involving a range of
participants in legal proceedings: (1) a prominent civil rights attorney
engaged in representational activities 52 in a case guaranteed to
precipitate widespread media publicity, 53 (2) a divorce litigant with a
household marital name involved in a "cause c~l~bre" divorce
compelled to seek redress in state court who held several press
conferences, 54 and (3) a criminal contemnor who chose not to initially
respond to a subpoena wholly aware that his decision might receive
55
extensive publicity.
51.
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. Some have suggested that this is not a separate
subdivision, but merely a way of becoming a vortex-limited or all-purpose or general public

figure. See, e.g., Dameron v. Washington Magazine, Inc., 779 F.2d 736, 741-42 (D.C. Cir.
1985); Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1084 (3d Cir. 1985);
see also infra text accompanying notes 66-74.
52.
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352 (concluding that the plaintiff, although well known in
legal circles, had only a "minimal role" during the coroner's inquiry into the death of his
clients' son, did not participate in the criminal prosecution of the police officer, never
discoursed on the civil litigation or criminal prosecution with the media, and was not
quoted in such capacity). Gertz's involvement was strictly limited to client representation.
Consequently, he did not "thrust himself into the vortex of this public issue, nor did he
engage the public's attention in an attempt to influence its outcome." Id. (emphasis added).
The Court also cryptically rejected the suggestion he was a public official as an officer of
the court because such a recognition would "distort the plain meaning" of this concept
"beyond all recognition." Id. at 351.
53.
Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979) (interpreting
Gertz as rejecting public figuredom despite Gertz's voluntary affiliation with a case "certain
to receive extensive media exposure") (emphasis added).
54.
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453-55 (1976) (citing only two public
figure standards--"all purpose" and "vortex"-and concluding that plaintiff met neither).
She had not "assume[d] any role of especial prominence in the affairs of society" (with the
exception, arguably, of Palm Beach) and had not "thrust herself to the forefront of any
particular public controversy in order to influence the resolution" of any issue. Id. at 453.
As to the "cause c6l~bre" contention, acceptance of such would "reinstate" Rosenbloom by
equating "public controversy" under the Gertz test by defining it to include "all
controversies of interest to the public." Id. at 454. Marital controversies involving the ultrarich did not meet the Gertz standard despite the interest therein by some element of the
public. See id. Nor was such a matter of free choice in light of the state's monopoly over
dissolution. See id. In such situations "[r]esort to the judicial process . . .is no more
voluntary in a realistic sense than that of the defendant called upon to defend his interests
in court."' Id. (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1971)). The press
conferences respondent held to try to "satisfy inquiring reporters" did not translate into
public figuredom. Id. at 455 n.3. Such actions "should have had no effect" upon the
underlying legal dispute and the Court declined to think "any such purpose was intended."
Id. In addition, there was no suggestion respondent "sought to use" the conferences "as a
vehicle . . .to thrust herself to the forefront of some unrelated controversy in order to
influence its resolution." Id. (emphasis added).
55.
See Wolston, 443 U.S. at 167 (finding plaintiffs health-based refusal to appear,
"knowing that his action might be attended by publicity," was not conclusive). The Court
cryptically rejected a per se rule of public figure status as to all who engaged in criminality,
id. at 168-69, and rejected in some detail the lower court's conclusion that via his refusal,
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Against this backdrop, how should the three Duke accused be
evaluated, 56 given the extensive and ultimately successful efforts of
the accuseds' lawyers 57 to counter Nifong's extraordinary barrage of
highly prejudicial, inculpatory, and defamatory statements, 58 and the
limited contacts the accused had with the media? 59 Are the accused
quintessential examples of the hypothetical "exceedingly rare"
involuntary public figure? Or do they fall into the category, under
New York Times Co., of those "dragged unwillingly" 60 into the public

plaintiff "stepped center front into the spotlight" on Soviet espionage, id. at 165-68 (quoting
Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 578 F.2d 427, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1978)). The Court noted that

Wolston had never discussed his situation with the media and emphasized that attraction
of media attention did not "automatically transform[]" a private person into a public
person, because such a transformation would resurrect the Rosenbloom approach that was
doubly rejected in Gertz and Firestone. Wolston, 443 U.S. at 167-68. In powerful language,
the Court thundered: "A libel defendant must show more than mere newsworthiness to
justify application of the demanding burden of New York Times." Id. at 167-68 (citing
Firestone, 424 U.S. at 454) (emphasis added). Justice Rehnquist repulsed any suggestion
that the plaintiff "engaged the attention of the public in an attempt to influence the
resolution of the issues" therein. Wolston, 443 U.S. at 168. Nor was Wolston's failure to
respond "calculated to draw attention" to him in order to "invite public comment or
influence the public with respect to any issue." Id. at 168. "He did not in any way seek to
arouse public sentiment in his favor and against the [government's] investigation." Id.
(emphasis added). Accordingly, this was not a scenario where a contemnor "invite[d]" a
contempt citation to use such "as a fulcrum to create public discussion" about investigative
or prosecutorial methods or conduct. Id. Significantly and quite tellingly, Justice Rehnquist
also noted as a factual matter that petitioner had, like Gertz, see supra note 52, never
discussed the court proceeding with the media and "limited his involvement to that
necessary to defend himself' from the criminal contempt charge, Wolston, 443 U.S. at 167
(emphasis added). Justices Blackmun and Marshall correctly construed the Court's
exceptionally narrow construction of vortex/limited-purpose public-figure status as strictly
limited to scenarios where plaintiff "literally or figuratively 'mounts a rostrum' to advocate
a particular view." Id. at 169-70 (Blackmun & Marshall, JJ., concurring in the result).
56.
Or, more broadly, how should the members of the Duke lacrosse team be
characterized in terms of status?
57.
TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 98 (noting that a press conference by
Joseph B. Cheshire, counsel for David Evans, was a "highly unusual tactic" but "the only
way to beat Nifong's savage attacks in the media"); see also infra text accompanying notes
138, 488.
58.
See infra text accompanying notes 180, 214-217.
59.
TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 93 (noting that David Evans, one of the
co-captains, helped draft a statement of the lacrosse team's innocence that was released by
Duke); id. at 225-26 (detailing the May 15, 2006, public press statement by David Evans
following his indictment that proclaimed his innocence, and noting that Evans's speech
"marked a turning point in public perceptions" of the matter); id. at 182, 224 (citing the
interview of the three accused by Ed Bradley on 60 Minutes on Oct. 15, 2006); id. at 352-53
(citing the press conference on April 11, 2007, by the declared-innocent accused, where all
three spoke, following Attorney General Roy A. Cooper's press conference); id. at 355
(noting the comments of Finnerty and Evans in the third 60 Minutes program on the Duke
lacrosse case on April 15, 2007).
60.
Wolston, 443 U.S. at 166.
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area by media publicity and who should not be viewed as "open
season"6 1 targets with little hope of redress?
As I have indicated elsewhere, 62 a plethora of precedent has
followed GertzlFirestoneWolston63 and showed that mere involvement
in litigation-in whatever capacity and however great the ensuing
publicity 64-does not automatically grant public-figure status. In the
65
face of such clear precedent, however, a dubious minority line of
cases seems to affirm or contemplate the viability of an involuntary
public figure status. In the leading case, Dameron v. Washington
Magazine, Inc.,6 6 the District of Columbia Circuit adopted this curious
brooding albatross in cases involving a plaintiff involuntarily
subjected to media limelight as long as the plaintiff has a "central,
albeit involuntary, role" in the controversy. 67 In Dameron, the
plaintiff-air traffic controller was defamed in one of a series of brief,
interfaced stories (the Mount Weather crash) contained in the
eleventh page of a lengthy magazine article on air safety emanating
from a highly publicized Washington, D.C. air disaster. 68 Although
not identified in the interface-a factor the court itself viewed as
important but paradoxical 69-the plaintiff had previously testified at
length at a National Transportation Safety Board hearing, with the
61.
Id. at 169.
62.
See ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 3, §5:16, 5-108-111; see, e.g., Miller v. KSL,
Inc., 626 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah 1981) (noting that through an accusation of criminality,
plaintiff was "plucked by the defendant from the anonymity of private life and thrust
against his will into the limelight").
63.
See ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 3, §5:16. A fourth Court decision,
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979), did not involve a libel plaintiff involved in a
legal proceeding. However, the Court's construction of public figuredom was equally
restrained. The plaintiff was a research scientist whose federal-government grants had
resulted in bestowal by defendant-Senator of his "Golden Fleece" award. Id. at 114. The
Court rejected vortex public-figure status even though he had received some access to the
media as a result of the award. Id. at 134-36. This did not demonstrate he was a public
figure "prior to the controversy" precipitated by the award. Id. at 134-35. His writings
became controversial only as a result of the award. Id. The Court strongly rejected any
such media bootstrapping: "[c]learly, those charged with defamation cannot, by their own
conduct, create their own defense by making the claimant a public figure." Id. at 135
(emphasis added). Lastly, his press access was purely responsive to the defendantgenerated controversy, and he did not have that "regular and continuing access" that is an
attribute of public figuredom. Id. at 136.
64.
See Pendleton v. City of Haverhill, 156 F.3d 57, 68 (1st Cir. 1998) (concluding
that it is "apodictic that an individual's involvement in a criminal proceeding-even one
that attracts substantial notoriety-is not enough, in itself, to ingeminate public figure
status"); ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 3, §5:15, 5-107-111.
65.
ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 3, §5:8, 5-71-74.
66.
779 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
67.
Id. at 741 (emphasis added).
68.
Id. at 737-38.
69.
Id. at 742.
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net result being that he and his role in the Mount Weather crash had
70
received extensive preexistent publicity.
The Dameron court held that while a plaintiffs self-propulsion
into a controversy was the "primary and most frequent route"71 to
vortex/limited-purpose public-figure status, it was not the exclusive
course. 72 It cryptically distinguished Justice Rehnquist's powerful
majority opinion in Firestone as involving a "voyeuristic interest"
wholly different from an interest in air-traffic safety 73 and
differentiated Justice Rehnquist's equally potent Wolston majority
opinion on the ground that the claimant therein was not defamed as to
the specific controversy to which he was central-his refusal to
provide subpoenaed grand jury testimony-but as to a separate, "at
most tangential role" in the governmental investigations of Soviet
74
espionage in general.
Dameron's cryptic Firestone/Wolston discussions were shallow
and unpersuasive, as was its ultimate conclusion that such a broad
involuntary-public-figure category is defensible. It is clear from a
reading of Firestone that a litigant's involuntariness was a co-equally
important focus. 75 And it is extremely doubtful that the Court's result
would have been any different had the husband-counterclaimant
sought exclusive custody and alleged that the wife-claimant had
abused their child-an undoubted matter of public interest. 76 As few
publicized matters would fall within the "voyeuristic interest"
category, a huge and reputation-devouring maw of an exception would
be superimposed on the Court's jurisprudence under such an
approach-including all criminal charges and accusations since they
have been invariably deemed per se matters of public concern. 77 This
would, of course, boldly, baldly, and incongruously fly in the face of
Firestone and Wolston.

70.
Id. Plaintiffs concession as to his continuing recognizability may relegate
Dameron to marginal value as precedent. See ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 3, §5:8, 569, n.33.
71.
Dameron, 779 F.2d at 741.
72.
Id. at 740-43.
73.
Id. at 742.
74.
Id. at 742-43.
75.
See supra text accompanying note 54.
76.
See infra text accompanying notes 116-135.
77.
See ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 3, §6:11, 6-73-74, n.33; infra text
accompanying note 84. The same broad treatment applies to true matter under the common
law/First Amendment legitimate-public-interest privilege in public disclosure of private
facts cases. See DAVID A. ELDER, PRIVACY TORTS §3:17 (West Group 2002 & Supp. 2008)
[hereinafter ELDER, PRIVACY].
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In addition, Dameron's central-versus-tangential dichotomy is
easily met and more facilely manipulated, depending on how the court
chooses to characterize the controversy. The Dameron court itself
reflected some ambiguity on this issue. 78 Another court could just as
easily have focused on the Mount Weather crash as merely tangential
to the particular controversy relating to air safety concerns emanating
from the Washington, D.C. crash. Under this characterization, the
Mount Weather crash would be merely illustrative, a minor or
tangential part, of a broader concern about air controller
responsibility-just as Wolston involved a specific but limited
79
exemplar of the broader concern about Soviet espionage in general.
In Wells v. Liddy,8 0 the Fourth Circuit, whose precedent would
be applicable in any Duke lacrosse North Carolina-based federal
litigation, savaged Dameron as creating a class of public figures
"equivalent to" and "indistinguishable" from that in Rosenbloom. 8 1
Rejecting Dameron's c'est la vie/public figuredom by a "sheer bad
luck"f'centrality" approach, 82 the Wells court attempted-not very
successfully-to provide more specific guidelines for involuntary
public figuredom.
Noting the concept's sparse underpinnings in
83
Gertz (but attempting to apply its two rationales), the court required
defendants to prove the plaintiffs "central[-]figure" status in a broadly
defined "significant public controversy"8 4 and that the defamatory
78.
Dameron, 779 F.2d at 741 (referencing "the question of controller responsibility
for air safety in general and the Mount Weather crash in particular"in discussing the
germaneness issue) (emphasis added); id. at 740 (noting, in its discussion of fair report,
that the defamatory passage was "part of a very brief factual piece about safety at National
Airport, which in turn is part of a larger inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the
crash of Flight 90," which was the later Washington crash that precipitated the article)
(emphasis added).
79.
Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979) (noting Wolston
played only a "minor role" in any public controversy that existed regarding Soviet
espionage).
80.
186 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999).
81.
Id. at 538-39.
82.
Id. at 539 ("[Unfortunately, bad luck is relatively common" and Dameron
"created a class ... equivalent to the class in Rosenbloom."); see also Flowers v. Carville,
310 F.3d 1118, 1129 n.7 (9th Cir. 2002) (characterizing Dameron as "stating that people
can become public figures through sheer bad luck"). Having sold her story to a tabloid, the
plaintiffs decision to respond to the candidate's public denial by holding a press conference
and playing secretly taped conversations did not make her an "involuntary" public figureshe "voluntarily injected herself into the fray, or at least threw kerosene on the flames once
the conflagration was under way." Flowers, 310 F.3d at 1129 n.7.
83.
Wells, 186 F.3d at 539.
84.
Id. at 539-40; see also id. at 540 ("A significant public controversy is one that
touches upon serious issues relating to, for example, community values, historical events,
governmental or political activity, arts, education, or public safety."). The controversy must
have pre-existed the defamatory statements' publication. Id. at 540.
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matter arose "in the course of discourse" thereon, making the plaintiff
85
the media's "regular focus."
Defendants must also show that a plaintiff acted or failed to act
under "circumstances in which a reasonable person would understand
that publicity would likely inhere"8 6-a "course of conduct" with the
The court took
plaintiff as a foreseeable "central figure."8 7
considerable pains to emphasize that a bootstrapped public interest
could not function as a "surrogate" for a plaintiffs voluntary
participation,88 and that courts must reject the powerful inducement
to transfer those hauled into important and notorious controversies
(such as Watergate) into public figure status.8 9 Ultimately, the court
did not have to delve into its exceedingly amorphous criteria in detail
or demonstrate how they were consistent with the Supreme Court's
that the threshold "central
as it found
jurisprudence,9 0
figure"/"principal" requirement had not been met-the plaintiff was a
"minor figure"/"footnote" in the Watergate burglary. 91
The Wells decision is only marginally superior to Dameron and
continues to foster a revivified Rosenbloom of major proportions in any
setting where a defendant can demonstrate that the plaintiff engaged
in some undefined "course of conduct" (or oxymoronic non-conduct!)
that precipitated the plaintiff into centrality in a "significant public

85.
Id. at 539-40 ("[A]n involuntary public figure need not have sought to publicize
...). However, the amount of media coverage
her views on the relevant controversy.
sufficient to make plaintiff central to the controversy would "vary greatly" with the breadth
of the controversy. Id. at 540 n.26. As to a community-limited controversy, a defendant may
focus on local print and electronic outlets. Id. Where a defendant tries to demonstrate
centrality on a broader basis, be it international or nationwide, media treatment thereof
must be shown to be "significantly broader." Id.
Id. at 540.
86.
Id. ("[A]n involuntary public figure has pursued a course of conduct from which
87.
it was reasonably foreseeable, at the time of the conduct, that public interest would arise.")
(emphasis added). Unlike a vortex/limited-purpose public figure, no showing is required
that the plaintiff had "specifically taken action through which he has voluntarily sought a
primary role in the controversy to influence the outcome of debate on the matter." Id.
Id. at 541. The court was confident this would not be equivalent to a
88.
resuscitated Rosenbloom, entrapping anyone "linked in the media to a matter of public
concern." Id. at 540.
Id. at 541.
89.
90.
See Wells, 186 F.3d. at 541-42 n.28; see also ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 3,
§5:12, 5-90 (strongly criticizing the "broad swathe" of the "course of conduct"/"centrality"
decisions, and concluding that it would be the "relatively rare" plaintiff who could meet
private plaintiff status where the individual's "views, actions, or activities were sufficiently
newsworthy to have generated prior publicity (avoiding, thereby the bootstrapping
problem.").
Wells, 186 F.3d at 541. Thus, the court did not have to delve into the issue of
91.
whether the plaintiff had engaged in "any action from which public interest was a
reasonably foreseeable result." Id. at 541-42, n.28.
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controversy." 9 2 Of course, this approach ignores the fundamental
thrust of Gertz and its progeny-that a generalized assumption of risk
based on a "course of conduct" did not and does not suffice for
93
It
vortex/limited-public-figure status of the voluntary variety.
strains credulity to conclude that the Court contemplated the perverse
result that such rejected generalized assumption of risk would be
94
backdoored into involuntary public figuredom!
The other decision cited by Wells, Khawar v. Globe Intern.,
95
Inc., is no more defensible. In Khawar, the California Supreme
Court opined that, if available at all, 96 involuntary public figure status
would be limited to those who have "acquired such public prominence"
regarding the controversy into which they are dragged as to provide
"media access sufficient to effectively counter" media-disseminated
defamation. 9 7 The court noted in this respect that no one had
interviewed the plaintiff, a Pakistani journalist at the Ambassador
Hotel at the time of Robert F. Kennedy's assassination, prior to the
book's publication, and that only a single local television station
interviewed him afterwards. This was deemed insufficient to qualify
him for involuntary public figure status. 98
Consider the proffered perversion of Gertz inherent in
Khawar's position-the primary "normative" and "compelling"
assumption-of-risk justification 99 is totally ignored, and Gertz's policy
92.

Id. at 539.

93.
See supra text accompanying notes 52-55; see also ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra
note 3, §5:8, §5:12.
94.
See Wells, 186 F.3d at 541. But see id. at 540 (broadly constructing the criteria's
effect-it "captures that 'exceedingly rare' individual who, although remaining mute during
public discussion of the results of her action nevertheless has become a principal in an
important public matter"-but excluding those "mentioned peripherally" or "merely
named" in a media account) (emphasis added).
95.
965 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1998).
96.
Id. at 702.
97.
Id.
98.
Id. The single interview in response to the book evidenced "some access" by
Khawar but was no more than any private person would have in the face of "sensational
and defamatory accusations" in a key media entity with significant national distribution.
Id. at 702-03. The Supreme Court had "consistently declined" to permit this circumstance
as the basis for public-figure status. Id. at 703. The California Supreme Court also rejected
vortex/limited-purpose public-figure status. Id. at 702. Although Khawar had been filmed
near RFK's podium just before the assassination, this fact arose pre-assassination twenty
years before the book implicating him in the assassination and was irrelevant to the libel
litigation. Id. at 703-04. Moreover, even as to RFK's candidacy, plaintiffs voluntariness in
standing near RFK played at most a "trivial" role therein. Id. at 703. Lastly, Khawar's
proximity to RFK was for souvenir purposes and he had no intention of bringing attention
to himself or influencing public perception regarding any controversy or issue. Id. at 70304.
99.
See supra text accompanying notes 46, 52-55.
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hierarchy is inverted, making its minor, subsidiary rationale alone
sufficient for involuntary public figure status. 100 The ability of the
media to bootstrap themselves within the New York Times Co.
panoply of protection is given a huge, self-interested, illimitable
inducement, particularly in cases like the Duke lacrosse scenario,
where modern media's twin combustibles of political correctness 0 1
and voracious sensationalism 10 2 combine to pour fuel on a story of
10 3
minor, inherent newsworthiness.
In sum, neither Dameron, Wells, nor Khawar are consistent
with Gertz and its progeny, but rather involve a concept that can only
be described as a constitutional non1 0 4 sequitur-a calculated,
"essentially standardless and open-ended"
circumvention device10 5
at odds with a plethora of contradictory precedent 10 6 and the Court's
aforementioned elemental philosophy.10 7 One court made this point
clear by rejecting public-person status based on a single interview
after the defendant's conviction was reversed. Imposition of publicfigure status in such cases would allow for the unilateral bestowal of
public figure status via "excessive coverage of a private person."10 8 In
100.
Id.; see also ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 3, 5-78-79 (noting that most
opinions appropriately consider the access/absence-thereof factor as "an underlying
subsidiary rationale" but not an element of public-figure status).
See supra text accompanying notes 2, 6-13, 22-27, 30; infra text accompanying
101.
notes 363-544.
See supra text accompanying notes 9-10, 21-27, 30, 31, 35; infra text
102.
accompanying notes 363-544.
103.
See infra text accompanying note 383.
104.
ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 3, §5:8, 5-74. This is aptly and amply
evidenced by the prototypical exemplar referenced in some quarters, i.e., the private
individual snared in a police raid. Id.; see, e.g., Wiegel v. Capital Times Co., 426 N.W.2d 43,
49 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (quoting LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 880
(1988)). Of course, this is exactly the factual setting in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S.
29 (1971). See supra text accompanying notes 55, 81-82, 88, 92; infra text accompanying
notes 105, 198, 351.
See ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 3, 5-73-74 ("[I]t is difficult not to conclude
105.
that this minority view... constitutes an attempt by courts and commentators ...

though

formalistically and technically adhering to Gertz, to substantially reintroduce and
rejuvenate the repudiated Rosenbloom-general public interest doctrine under an only
slightly less open-ended and amorphous involuntary public figure classification .... "). Of
course, the media is quite creative and exceptionally aggressive in conjuring up ways to
circumvent even the extraordinarily generous protections accorded under the New York
Times Co. standard. See David A. Elder, Truth, Accuracy and Neutral Reportage:
Beheading the Media Jabberwock's Attempt to Circumvent New York Times v. Sullivan, 9
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 551, 551-830 (2007) [hereinafter Elder, Media Jabberwock].
106.
See ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 3, §5:8, 5-71-74.
See supra text accompanying notes 40-55, 60-61; Elder, Media Jabberwock,
107.
supra note 105, at 550-627.
108.
Jacobson v. Rochester Commc'ns Corp., Inc., 410 N.W.2d. 830, 835-36 (Minn.
1987).
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other words, a compelling case can be made that involuntary public
figuredom is not merely extraordinarily rare but is (or should be)
extinct10 9 in light of the Court's jurisprudence.
But what of the Duke accuseds' counsels' ultimately eminently
successful strategy-via counsel interviews, press conferences, legal
motions, and very limited personal contact of the accused with the
media-to counter and respond to Nifong's highly inflammatory public
condemnations?
Did these collective activities make the Dukelacrosse accused public figures? Significant precedent 1 0 has adopted
the view that "purely defensive, truthful statements"1 1' 1 in response to
press inquiries made by those involuntarily thrust into the public
limelight-as litigants or otherwise-do not suffice. The case law has
correctly interpreted Court precedent as rejecting the between-a-rockand-a-hard-place, plaintiff-as-accused dilemma, i.e., loss of private
status by defending oneself or permitting the public to believe in the
charges' substantial truth through non-denial. 112 This rule applies at

109.
See Jones v. Palmer Commc'ns, Inc., 440 N.W.2d 884, 895 n.1 (Iowa 1989);
ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 3, §5:8, 574. Other decisions also question or reject the
concept's continuing validity in light of later Court precedent. See Barry v. Time, Inc., 584
F. Supp. 1110, 1115 n.6 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Franklin v. Benevolent & Protective Order of
Elks, 159 Cal. Rptr. 131, 139-41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); Schultz v. Reader's Digest Ass'n., 468
F. Supp. 551, 559 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (noting that Firestone "forecloses the possibility" of
involuntary public figuredom); Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 538 (4th Cir. 1999)
(suggesting that "[s]o rarely have courts determined that an individual was an involuntary
public figure that commentators have questioned the continuing existence of that
category"); see also RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION 2:33-35 (2008) (concluding

that the post-Gertz triumvirate of Firestone!Wolston/Hutchinson "appears to take virtually
all of the oxygen out of the one-sentence musing in Gertz hypothesizing the possibility of
involuntary public figures"); Dale K. Nichols, Comment, 14 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 71, 80,
83-84 (1980) (finding a strong argument that this trio "may have abolished the involuntary
public-figure class sub silentio"). For other parallel citations, see Joseph H. King, Jr., Deus
ex Machina and the Unfulfilled Promise of New York Times v. Sullivan: Applying the
Times for All Seasons, 95 KY. L.J. 649, 673, nn. 125-26 (2006-07). Even a distinguished
author sympathetic to a broadened swath of New York Times Co. has suggested in his
extensive analysis of involuntary and other public figure case precedent that the
"boundaries and outlines" of public figuredom have been "formless and ill-defined" with the
"hirsute contours ...
especially vague for the involuntary public figure subcategories." King,
at 712-13 (suggesting a total constitutionalization of all defamation law under the knowing
or reckless disregard standard regardless of status or the subject matter content of the
defendant's statement).
110.

ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 3, §5:15, 5-110-111.

111.
Clyburn v. News World Commc'ns, Inc., 903 F.2d 29, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
112.
Waicker v. Scranton Times Ltd. P'ship, 688 A.2d. 535, 541 n.4 (Md. 1997); see
also Clyburn, 903 F.2d at 32 (noting that there is little justice in concluding that an
individual "dragged into a controversy should be able to speak publicly only at the expense
of foregoing" private-person-status protection); Foretich v. Capital Cities ABC, Inc., 37 F.3d
1541, 1564 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting the same proposition at Clyburn). Indeed, a failure to
respond may be an "adoptive admission" under state evidence law. Gallagher v. Connell, 20
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least where the plaintiff is not attempting to "gain public attention in
an attempt to influence the outcome" 11 3 of the proceeding.
But is the defensive-responsive versus "attempt to influence
the outcome" dichotomy practical, feasible, or fair to the accused-later
libel plaintiff, particularly in the context here, where a "rogue
prosecutor" manipulated and inflamed the local populace and local
and national media by filing serious felony charges based on no
substantial evidence? 11 4 Under such unconscionable circumstances,
can the law conscionably relegate a criminal defendant to the status of
"quietly seeking to exert his legal rights"?11 5 In these cases, the best
defense may be a calculatedly aggressive offense. Depriving the
wrongfully charged of his or her private-person status because of an
attempt to mitigate the damage, even the playing field, or precipitate
reconsideration by a wrong-headed, stubborn, or unethical prosecutor
(or a Nifong-like multiple-defect equivalent) functionally allied with a
politically biased and complicit media engaged in a collective "feeding
frenzy" would pervert and subvert logic, fundamental fairness, and
common sense.
Fortunately for the Duke-lacrosse plaintiffs and those similarly
situated, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed an earlier precedent with
many parallels, Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 116 as a "selfdefense"/non-vortex public-figure rule' 17 with equal validity in
involuntary public-figure cases. 1 8 In Foretich, the media extensively
publicized a former daughter-in-law's charges that the plaintiffgrandparents had physically and sexually abused their grandchild,
were complicit in the father's abuse, and had threatened to kill their
grandchild if she informed anyone.11 9 In a groundbreaking and
Cal. Rptr. 3d 673, 683-84 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a single statement by a priest

after defendant's accusation did not make him an "involuntary" public figure).
113.
Steere v. Cupp, 602 P.2d 1267, 1274 (Kan. 1979); see ELDER, DEFAMATION,
supra note 3, 5-113-20 (analyzing the "participation plus" rule in cases involving legal
proceedings).
114.
See supra text accompanying notes 11-14; infra text accompanying notes 363544.
115.
Diversified Mgmt., Inc. v. Denver Post, Inc., 653 P.2d 1103, 1108 (Colo. 1982)
(quoting DiLeo v. Koltnow, 613 P.2d 318, 322 (Colo. 1980).
116.
37 F.3d 1541 (4th Cir. 1994).
117.
Id. at 1543, 1546-64.
118.
See Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 540 (4th Cir. 1999).
119.
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc, 37 F.3d at 1543 (describing the controversy in which
plaintiffs became embroiled as "one of the most notorious child-custody battles in American
history"); id. at 1548 (quoting the transcript of The Phil Donohue Show). As a result of the
mother's obstreperous behavior in frustrating the father's visitation rights, she was held in
civil contempt, became a cause c6l~bre in feminist circles, and precipitated a debate and an
act of Congress restricting contempt in District of Columbia child custody cases. Id. at
1544, 1555, 1561.
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scholarly opinion by Judge Murnaghan, the court indicated that it was
"extremely reluctant" to impute public figuredom based on an
accused's reasonable public responses 120 in an attempt to vindicate his
or her reputation. The court relied on the wisdom of the common-law
publisher's privileged right of reply 2 1 as justifying an "uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open"1 22 public retort to such devastating public
accusations. The court applied broad standards of proportionality and
concluded that responses to such reputation-savaging attacks 23 would
have to be "truly outrageous" before it would view them as "altogether
The court analogized the
disproportionate to the occasion."1 24
grandparents' highly visible responses to "the use of fists in response
125
to firearms."

120.
Id. at 1558-64. The court followed its presumption that the plaintiff was a
private individual, and that the defendant carried the burden of proving that rule of New
York Times Co. applied. Id. at 1550. The court also noted that the Fourth Circuit's test was
"relatively stringent" compared to the District of Columbia Circuit's "sufficiently central
role" test. Id. at 1554 n.11. The Fourth Circuit didn't follow a federal opinion from the
District of Columbia Circuit, see id. at 1555, 1556 n.13 (citing and discussing Foretich v.
Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1099, 1108 (D.D.C. 1991)), that held that
a plaintiff was a public figure because her press responses went beyond "flat denials" and
constituted a "course of conduct . . . likely to attract substantial attention." Advance
Magazine Publishers, Inc, 765 F. Supp. at 1108 (D.D.C. 1991)); see also supra text
accompanying notes 55, 87, 90 (discussing the "course of conduct" test).
121.
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc, 37 F.3d at 1559-64.
122.
Id. at 1560 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
123.
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc, 37 F.3d at 1558-60, 1562-64, 1558 n.15 (finding public
accusations of child sexual abuse defamatory per se); see also id. at 1562 (denominating the
charges "as destructive to reputation as virtually any charge imaginable"). The addition of
an "s" to an actress-accuser's docudrama statement was apparently inadvertent. Id. at
1550. Accordingly, had the plaintiffs been held to be public figures, that conclusion would
have been result-determinative under the negligence-is-never-enough corollary of
constitutional malice. See infra text accompanying notes 401-409. As private figures,
Virginia law, like that of most jurisdictions, see ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 3, §6:2,
would subject the plaintiffs to a negligence standard. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc, 37 F.3d at
1552. They would also have the burden of proving falsity, or more specifically, that they
had not abused their grandchild. Id. at 1560 n.20.
124.
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc, 37 F.3d at 1562 (quoting Montgomery Ward & Co. v.
Watson, 55 F.2d 184, 188 (4th Cir. 1932)); see also Capital Cities/ABC, Inc, 37 F.3d at 1559
n.19 (citing W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 115, at 825 (5th ed. 1984) ("[A defendant] may publish,
in an appropriate manner, anything which reasonably appearsto be necessary to defend his
own reputation against the defamation of another ....")(emphasis added) [hereinafter
KEETON ET AL.]). The court broadly defined this right of response, i.e., that it must "clearly
relate to its supposed objective-blunting the initial attack and restoring one's good name."
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc, 37 F.3d at 1560.
125.
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc, 37 F.3d at 1562. The court noted that plaintiffs never
"actively sought" press interviews but had acquiesced in several interviews with
newspapers, attended a minimum of three press conferences or rallies for their son, and
appeared on at least two television programs. Id. at 1545-50 (analyzing this topic in detail).
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The Foretich court conceded that plaintiffs' public responses
were likely "intended (at least in part) to influence the outcome of the
custody dispute" and congressional debate on the mother's civil
contempt citation, 126 but concluded that the circumstances therein
made it "almost impossible" to disentangle self-defensive statements
from those calculated to influence the resolution of the
controversies.' 27 Applying a "primary"' 28 or "predominant"'' 29 motive
test, the court viewed the totality of the record as evincing "measured
defensive replies."' 30 The court concluded that a desirable resolution
of the custody/visitation issue would have a greater vindicatory effect
than any mere reply.131
Finally, the court reformulated the self-censorship-of-the-press
argument and redirected it against the media, concluding that
imposing public-figure status would have "unsettling breadth"'132 and
provide an "open season"' 33 to defame the plaintiffs and others
similarly situated-the wrongfully accused from the Duke lacrosse
team-by "muzzl[ing]"1 34 the falsely accused. By contrast, protecting
the plaintiffs' responses without forfeiting private-person status would
encourage First Amendment interests in individual self-expression
and the societal interest in the dissemination and discussion of
35
truth.'
126.

Id. at 1563.

127.
128.

Id.
Id.

129.
Id. at 1543, 1559.
130.
Id. at 1563; see Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 536-37 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding
that a letter to the editor in response to a book review in which the plaintiff was identified

was covered by her right of self-help/reasonable response). As a corollary, the plaintiffs had
not "voluntarily assumed a role of special prominence" in the inter-parental contretemps
"inorder to influence its outcome .. " Capital Cities/ABC, Inc, 37 F.3d. at 1556 (emphasis
added); see also id. at 1560, 1563. The court rejected the suggestion that the plaintiffs'
press contacts and interviews were "aimed at swaying public opinion" and that they were
used as "props" by their son. Id. at 1558-59. Defendants paid "inadequate attention to the
context" of their public statements and "undervalue[d]" their personal interests in
defending themselves against the "extraordinary attacks launched" by their former
daughter-in-law. Id. at 1557-58.
131.
Capital Cities/ABC,Inc, 37 F.3d at 1563.
132.
Id. In order to collect damages public figuredom would require plaintiffs to
comply with the New York Times Co. criterion in litigation against defendant and any and
all potential media and non-media defendants that repeated the abuse accusations. Id.
133.
Id. at 1563-64 (quoting Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 169
(1979)) ("We see no reason to expose the [plaintiffs], or other similarly situatedpersons, to
such a potential barrage.")(emphasis added).
134.
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc, 37 F.3d at 1564.
135.
Id. ("By freely permitting the Foretiches to respond to Dr. Morgan's charges
against them--charges that have never been proved in any court of law-we foster both the
individual interest in self-expression and the social interest in the discovery and
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Viewed against the backdrop of the Court's jurisprudence and
the close parallels with the Foretich opinion, the Duke lacrosse
accused could make persuasive arguments that they and their
lawyers' forceful but measured responses to Nifong and an equally
136
complicit press were reasonable, proportionate replies not exceeding
that necessary to vindicate the accuseds' reputations. Any other
result would not "hold[] the balance true."'3 7 Indeed, any other result
would devastate personal reputations and reward a "rogue prosecutor"
and a largely run-amuck media for a politically correct, complicit
In this case, the savagery was ultimately
public lynching. 138
ameliorated only by accuseds' counsels' very effective use of freedoms
of expression that precipitated wide-ranging criticism of both
prosecutorial and media ethics, 139 and provided a much deserved
"checking function"'140 on the misfeasance and malfeasance of both.
II. ACCURACY, FAIR REPORT AND NEUTRAL REPORTAGE
The New York Times and other media republished defamatory
statements of third parties in a variety of contexts: police investigation
file matter, numerous public statements by prosecutor Nifong both in
the campaign and non-campaign contexts, including press conferences,
and statements by private parties, including but not limited to, Duke
faculty and students. Traditional black letter law holds a republisher
liable to the same extent as the originator of the defamation.' 4 ' Any
libel defendant in the Duke lacrosse or parallel scenario would likely
attempt to defend, at least in part, by using one or both of the major
proffered exceptions to republisher liability - fair report and neutral

dissemination of truth-the very goals that animate our First Amendment jurisprudence.")
(emphasis added).
136.
See id. at 1563 ("[W]here the original attack was widespread, the response can
be widely disseminated as well .... the counterattack must be made primarily in the
forums selected by the original attacker.").
137.
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 23 (1990).
TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 123. "We knew that unless we turned this
138.
lynch mob mentality around, our clients might have to endure the worst of all fates for an
innocent person, a trial." Id. (quoting Joseph B. Cheshire, counsel for David Evans); id. at
198-99 (concluding that counsels' media tactics were necessary to "counter Nifong's
unprecedented, falsehood-filled media offensive," and were well within the rules of the
state bar's Code of Professional Conduct, which allowed such responsive comments if they
are necessary ."to protect a client from the substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent
publicity"' precipitated by others).
139.
See infra text accompanying notes 363-544.
140. See infra text accompanying note 167.
141. Elder, Media Jabberwock,supra note 105, at 723-28.
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reportage. This section will analyze these doctrines in the setting of
the New York Times coverage of the Duke lacrosse case.
A. FairReport
A very controversial area of the doctrine of fair report is aptly
and compellingly showcased by the New York Times article of August
25, 2006,142 generally viewed as "the single-most-derided substantial
144
look at the Duke case"' 43 in all the media reportage on the subject.
This article relied extensively on the newspaper's exclusive access 145 to
both typed and handwritten notes by police sergeant chief investigator
Mark D. Gottlieb, which magically corrected major defects in Nifong's
case that were highlighted by defense counsel motions. Defense
counsel for one co-defendant termed the compilation of Gottlieb's notes
46
a "make-up document."'
Should such investigative file matter be nonetheless treated as
covered by fair report and protected if fairly and accurately
synthesized?' 4 7 The black letter rule in Section 611 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts appends a major qualification to protected coverage
of the fact-of-arrest/charge-of-crime 148 scenario: "[S]tatements made by
the police or by the complainant or other witnesses or by the
prosecuting attorney as to the facts of the case or the evidence
expected to be given are not yet part of the judicial proceeding or of
*"149
These unofficial
the arrest itself and are not privileged ....
as
not entitled to
statements or file matter are fortunately treated
fair-report status by the majority of federal circuits and the
"overwhelming majority" of state and federal decisions.1 50
In a
leading, authoritative opinion, Bufalino v. Associated Press,15 ' the
Second Circuit succinctly reflected this view: "Only reports of official
statements or records made or released by a public agency are

142.
See infra the text accompanying notes 363-458.
143.
Rachel Smolkin, Justice Delayed, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Aug.-Sept. 2007,
http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp?id=4379 (hereinafter, Smolkin).
144.
See id. (providing a balanced overall critique of the media with respect to the
Duke lacross case).
Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 448-458.
145.
See infra text accompanying note 452.
146.
147.

See DAVID A. ELDER, THE FAIR REPORT PRIVILEGE §2:00-:08 (1988) (reviewing

fair report standards of fairness and accuracy) [hereinafter ELDER, FAIR REPORT]; ELDER,
DEFAMATION, supra note 3, §§3:18-26.
148.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 cmt. h (1977).
149.
Id.
150.
Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 105, at 786-87.
151.
692 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1982).
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protected by . . . [Section] 611 ....
Statements made by lower-level
employees that do not reflect official agency action cannot support the
152
privilege."
Another leading decision, Wynn v. Smith, 153 delved further into
both the potential for abuse of and raison d'6tre for fair report. In
Wynn, the Nevada Supreme Court rejected a confidential Scotland
Yard report portraying plaintiff-Wynn (a high profile business
executive in the Las Vegas casino gambling industry) as "a front man
for the Genovese family." 154 An amicus curiae Chicken Little brief was

152.
Id. at 272 (emphasis added); see also Phillips v. Evening Star Newspaper Co.,
424 A.2d 78, 88-89 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting that a "police log" accessible to the media did
not involve information of sufficient "dignity and authoritative weight" to be "official," and
did not involve "official agency action" since the log was "little more than an informal
arrangement between the police and the media, a joint venture, which consist[ed] of
nothing more sanctified than unofficial statements of police regarding a crime"); see
generally Doe v. Doe, 941 F.2d 280, 288 n.9 (5th Cir. 1991) ("[Dlata proffered by police
officers in connection with an arrest are likely not [privileged]

....

[T]he data .

.

. were

provided to the media in guises almost assuredly unofficial and undeserving of public
record status") (dictum); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 680 F.2d 527, 537 n.14 (7th Cir. 1982)
("A secret police file hardly qualifies as a report on a public proceeding. Nor does the
repetition of this information by a public official, a police officer, make this a report of a
public proceeding."); Stone v. Banner Publ'g. Co., 677 F. Supp. 242, 246 (D. Vt. 1988)
(holding that statements attributed to a police inspector and his investigative report did
not justify fair report-such reports sans judicial action do not have "the same quality of
fairness or truthfulness as statements of fact resulting from a judicial investigation");
Kelley v. Hearst Corp., 157 N.Y.S.2d 498, 501-02 (N.Y. App. Div. 1956) (stating that what
"police said" privately to the media about "acts of other persons" did not constitute a "public
and official proceeding" under the New York statute, as the term "proceeding" could not be
easily found to encompass "merely informal statements or assertions by public officers
concerning their investigations"); Lancour v. Herald & Globe Ass'n, 17 A.2d 253, 256-59
(Vt. 1941) (describing the court's rationale in refusing fair report to information resulting
from an interrogation of plaintiffs co-defendant). "No doubt it is desirable that the public
may know that the police and other officials charged with the duty of detection and arrest.
. . are acting upon reasonable grounds ....

But, weighing the social values involved, it

seems better to confide in the diligence and discretion of such officials, rather than that any
person should be subjected to unmerited obloquy through the publication of false
accusations made to them in the course of their investigations, the tendency of which is ...
'to prejudice those whom the law still presumes to be innocent and to poison the sources of
justice."' Id. at 259 (quoting Rex v. Fisher, 2 Camp. 563, 571); Norfolk Post Corp.. v.
Wright, 125 S.E. 656, 657 (Va. 1924) (holding that the information provided the media by
detectives was not entitled to fair report); see also generally Elder, Media Jabberwock,
supra note 105, at 786-88; ELDER, FAIR REPORT, supra note 147, § 1:10.
153.
Wynn v. Smith, 16 P.3d 424 (Nev. 2001).
154.
Id. at 431. Defendant-book publisher's catalogue ad was published despite
voluminous data tendered by the author of the proposed book persuasively evidencing the
falsity of the imputation and indicating that the report was created by hostile and biased
persons. Respondent/Cross-Appellant's Answering Brief at 3-10, Wynn v. Smith, 16 P.3d
424 (Nev. 1999) (No. 31063). At trial, the defendant conceded the absence of any factual
basis for the charge. Id. at 6-7. Had Scotland Yard been asked, the commander would have
informed the defendant the defamatory statements were "unattributed, unsubstantiated,
prepared to serve a political purpose, and rejected as substandard" by Scotland Yard. Id. at
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filed-stating that denial of fair report "could fundamentally affect
what amici and every other news organization report, as a matter of
routine, every day of the week."1 55 However, the Wynn court viewed
this republished matter as little more than the "spread[ing] of common
innuendo."'156 The court emphasized that the purpose of fair report is
to "obviate any chilling effect on the reporting of statements already
accessible to the public"157 and that extension of protected status to
such "substandard and unsubstantiated" matter would "directly
conflict" with the protections of defamation law and "undermine the
basis"'' 58 for the fair-report privilege.
As I have suggested elsewhere, this accessible-to-the-public
criterion is a pivotal and necessary justification 159 for fair report. The
minority view mainly relies on a dubious line of California decisions
that accorded exceptionally questionable interpretation to the
California fair-report statute 16 0 and the Third Circuit decision in
Medico v. Time, Inc.,161 which involved "tentative and preliminary
conclusions." 162 These cases take a much broader and essentially openended, standardless view that would treat almost all government file
matter 163 as fair-report-protected. Conceding that the "agency"-public
8. The commander rejected the argument this was Scotland Yard's "official position." Id. at
15-16.
155.
The amici self-portrayed themselves as national and local newspapers, wire
services, magazines, book publishers and the leading associations representing them. Brief
for the New York Times Co. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 1-2, Wynn, 16
P.3d 424 (Nev. 2001) (No. 31221).
156.
Wynn, 16 P.3d at 430.
157.
Id. at 429-30 (emphasis added) (citing the media's agency function because the
citizenry is "unable to monitor all official acts in person"); see infra text supported by notes
164, 177-79, 202-203, 266, 295-96, 217 (discussing the "agency" rationale).
158.
Wynn, 16 P.3d at 430.
159.
Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 105, at 756-802.
160.
Id. at 780-87 (concluding that the courts' commingling of the judicial
proceedings' privilege and fair report is indefensible and contrary to not only strong public
policy but also case law suggestions in the California Supreme Court's own jurisprudence).
161.
643 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1981).
162.
Medico, 643 F.2d at 139-40.
163.
Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 105, at 761-69, 794-802. Compare U.S.
Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Committee For Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1980),
where the United States Supreme Court rejected FOIA access to "rap sheet" information in
another case involving a member of the Medico family, and implicitly repudiated the
rationale adopted in Medico. There, the Court sharply rejected the argument that identities
of individuals with "rap sheets" were information relevant to the FBI's performance of its
law enforcement functions. Id. at 773. Promotion of openness about government is "not
fostered by disclosure of information about private citizens that is accumulated in various
governmental files but that reveals little or nothing about an agency's own conduct." Id. at
773. Even as to alleged corrupt contacts with a congressman, a prior criminal history would
disclose nothing about the congressman's contacts. Id. at 774. Although the "rap sheet"
information might provide newsworthy story details, that is not FOIA's "public interest"
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access rationale was unavailable,16 4 the Medico court nonetheless
extended the doctrine based on a "public supervision"1 6 5 rationale.
This approach "seems perverse." 166
Moreover, Medico's overall
analysis 167 provided "no serious consideration to balancing the

focus: "although there is undoubtedly some public interest in anyone's criminal history,
especially if the history is in some way related to the subject's dealing with a public official
or agency, the FOIA's central purpose is to ensure that the government's activities be
opened to the sharp eye of public scrutiny, not that information about private citizens that

happens to be in the warehouse of government be so disclosed." Id. (emphasis in original).
164.
Medico, 643 F.2d at 140-41; id. at 141 n.23 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 611 cmt. d (1977) ("It is not clear whether the privilege extends to a report of an
official proceeding that is not public or available to the public under the law.")). The latter
was "a gratuitous, arbitrary addition" by the rapporteurbased on a single question, was not
found in the earlier Restatement of Torts, and flew in the face of the "nearly unanimous
view" of common law precedent. ELDER, FAIR REPORT, supra note 147, §1:15, at 139; Elder,
Media Jabberwock,supra note 105, at 763-64.
165.
Medico, 643 F.2d at 141-42. The court, unfortunately not being tongue in-cheek,
concluded that such "public scrutiny" of law enforcement files and investigations may
"often have the equally salutory effect of fostering among those who enforce the laws 'the
sense of public responsibility,"' helping thereby to "ensure impartial enforcement of the
law." Id. at 141. Perhaps concerned by the "public supervision" rationale's ambiguity, the
court attached a caveat as to republication of every FBI file. Id. The court narrowed its
focus to the "heightened" concern in evaluating the conduct of a former Congressman. Id.
Compare infra note 283. As I have suggested elsewhere, this does not constitute much of a
limitation, given the broad swathe of public official status. See Elder, Media Jabberwock,
supra note 105, at 766-67; id. at 767 nn. 1408-09.
166.
ELDER, FAIR REPORT, supranote 147, § 1:10, at 90-91:
How is public responsibility of public agents in performance of their public
functions fostered by court sanctioning of unauthorized governmental leaks
resulting in public vilification of presumably innocent individuals? Law
enforcement personnel generally (including prosecutors and local and national
police investigative agencies) have a duty to protect the citizenry from unfounded
or scurrilous charges not warranting formal prosecution or other public official
action-by filtering out bona fide from frivolous or speculative allegations of
criminality. Is such a professional sense of public responsibility not inherently
undermined by the lesson emanating from the [Medico] court's conclusion - that
investigative officers may publicly convict in the public mind any individual
linked to any investigation into allegations of corruption of a public official
regardless of whether said information is sufficient for or could or will be used in
a public forum with a direct or indirect right of replication by the victim of the
vilification? Such an impetus to unprofessional disclosure of non-public
information regardless of the factual truth or reliability of the information
contained therein is an unfortunate but clear lesson emanating from [Medico's]
fair report conclusion and seems to run afoul of fundamental values-that is, the
presumption of innocence and the quasi-constitutional interest in reputationand run counter to cherished democratic ideals. (citations omitted).
167.
Medico, 643 F.2d at 142 (citing the "informational" rationale and the necessity
of relying preeminently on governmental acquisitions due to the huge difficulties of
corroboration of information about organized crime, and noting that such information was
of "legitimate public interest" even without public official involvement). Of course, carving
out a special needs "organized crime" exception gives rise to a "cozy, incestuous
relationship" between official sources and the media that eviscerates the media's
"checking" functionl"public supervisory" rationale and makes the media "easily
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important countervailing factors that veritably jump off the pages"'168
and the compelling justifications underlying comment (h). 169
Luckily for plaintiffs, Medico has a sparse following, 170 likely
did not reflect the Pennsylvania law 171 that it purported to apply, and
was later disavowed by a Third Circuit opinion, Schiavone
Construction v. Time, Inc., 72 involving reportage of statements
purportedly coming from an internal FBI memorandum that
implicated plaintiffs in Teamsters president Jimmy Hoffa's
disappearance.' 73 The court delved into whether fair report applied at
all 174 and then delineated at length its "serious doubts"1 75 as to fair
report's application to the case. The Medico court had exclusively
manipulable tools-conduits for whatever shaded or distorted view of the facts government
wishes to issue." Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 105, at 766 n.1408.
168.
See ELDER, FAIR REPORT, supra note 147, § 1:10, at 91. This would include the
following:
[T]he incalculable harm to reputation . . . from implication in organized crime,
the veil of authenticity and credibility that attends disclosure of a government
'source' . . . (particularly where such [source] is shorn of its prefatory
legend
indicating the tentative nature of [its] conclusions therein), the questionable
reliability of information that the . . . FBI . . . presumably [found] insufficiently
persuasive to justify public disclosure or other official action, the unauthorized
nature of the disclosure and the public interest in discouraging (or at least not
encouraging) such lawless disclosures, the extremely limited interest of the
public in inculpatory, defamatory matter disseminated outside of normal judicial,
legislative, and executive channels, and the absence of an identifiable
authoritative decisionmaker taking legal and/or political responsibility for his or
her 'official action.'
Id. (citations omitted).
169.
See id. at 88. I have suggested the following, among others:
[E]x parte communications not 'buttressed by judicial action' constitute a 'grave
hindrance to the administration of justice' by undermining the presumption of
innocence and encouraging improper or unethical action by law enforcement
personnel . . . [T]hese reports, which have the clearly tendency and likely effect of
'looking toward [the suspect's] guilt,' 'maximize the potential harm' to the
suspect's reputational interest without measurably advancing or enhancing the
public's interest in detection or reduction in crime.
Id. (citations omitted). As the author has repeated more recently, Medico's anti-democratic
values should be carefully assessed:
In light of 'our increasingly bureaucratized, technocratic society with its pushbutton retrieval ability to recall information from innumerable governmental
files' and the broad definition of 'public official,' Medico should provide
'considerable food for thought' to civil liberties aficionados cherishing
'fundamental values' other than freedom of expression.
Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 105, at 769 (synthesizing ELDER, FAIR REPORT, supra
note 147, at 92).
170.
Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 105, at 780-87.
171.
Id. at 758-73.
172.
847 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1988).
173.
Id. at 1072.
174.
Id. at 1086.
175.
Id. at 1086 n.26.

VANDERBILTJ. OFENT.AND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 11:1:99

focused on "broad policies" promoting "report[age] on public affairs
and . . . promot[ing] an informed public" 176 while ignoring state-law
emphasis on the "importance of open proceedings."' 1 77 The Schiavone
court adopted a scathing critique of Medico offered by a "leading
secondary authority" that stated that Medico was "not in harmony
with the mainstream of the common law"1 78 and emphasized that
unauthorized law enforcement leaks "could become powerful tools for
1 79
injuring citizens with impunity."
Another highly controversial and important fair-report issue
involves the wide reportage by the New York Times 80 and other media
entities of exceedingly defamatory statements made by Nifong in his
candidate-for-election capacity.' 8 ' Do media entities have fair report

176.
Id.
177.
Id. (following the common law "historical justification" that the report was
"already in the public domain").
178.
Id. (quoting F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS §5:24 n.34 (2d
ed. 1986). The authors' excoriation is worth quoting at length:
These are, in fact, precisely the circumstances in which it would ordinarily be
thought that the dissemination of falsehoods should not be privileged. There is
nothing about the fact that a wiretapped criminal has lied about an honest
person in a telephone conversation, or that a detective or congressional
investigator or similar minor functionary has erroneously (or maliciously)
defamed someone in an unpublished memorandum, that gives rise to such a
public need for the reporting of these events (with their underlying defamation
uncorrected) as to outweigh an innocent victim's interest in the protection of his
reputation. Apart from an independent public interest in the reporting of these
other events, which is non-existent, the publication of the imputation is at most
an ordinary republication of the defamation. The normal liability of republishers
. . . should not be evaded by the patently spurious pretense that what is being
reported is not the defamatory imputation itself, but instead an 'official action or
proceeding.' Neither an ordinary wiretap nor the composition of a routine
working memorandum is an event of sufficient moment to qualify as such an
'action or proceeding' for purpose of the fair report privilege.
F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 178, §5:24, at 245 n.33 (emphasis added).
179.
Schiavone Construction v. Time, Inc., 847 F.2d 1069, 1086 n.26 (3d Cir. 1988).
180.
See infra text accompanying note 181.
181.
See, e.g., Duff Wilson & Juliet Macur, Lawyers for Duke Players Say DNA
Clears Team, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2006, at 1 (quoting the News & Observer of Raleigh as
quoting Nifong at a candidate forum ("I believe a sexual assault took place"); as
paraphrasing Nifong that "most rape cases do not depend on DNA testing'; and as noting
Nifong's comment that the case was not over ("If that's what they expect, they will be sadly
disappointed.")) [hereinafter Wilson & Macur, Lawyers]; Juliet Macur & Duff Wilson, Duke
Inquiry to Continue, and So Will a Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2006, at 1-3 (citing
plaudits and Nifong 's criticisms and quoting Nifong's statements to a panel of students
and community leaders in a gym at North Carolina Central University, the historically
black university where the accuser was a student: 'My presence here means this case is not
going away.") [hereinafter Macur & Wilson, Duke Inquiry]; Calame, Covering, supra note
23, at 2 (repeating the "[m]y presence here" statement in the context of mild criticism for
failure to introduce the political-campaign/racial context of the primary earlier); Duff
Wilson & Jonathan D. Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case Give Details but No Answers,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2006, at 3-9 (citing Nifong's statement at a press conference about his
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protection for reportage of such comments? The Restatement (Second)
of Torts modified18 2 its predecessor and expanded fair report
absolutism to accounts of "any meeting, assembly or gathering . . .
open to the general public and. . . held for the purpose of discussing or
otherwise dealing with matters of public concern." 18 3 Surprisingly, the
drafters cited no precedent for this absolute protection even in the
context of "core political speech."' 1 4 Why? Because there was then
and is now no direct authority for such protection, 8 5 absent a
protective state statute. 8 6 Illustration Three to comment (i)187
synthesized and relied on pre-New York Times Co. decisions, 8 which
forfeited fair report where common-law malice 8 9 was proved.
campaign-"I have not backed down from my initial assessments"-and his statements at a
North Carolina Central University "forum" about handling rape prosecutions "the oldfashioned way") [hereinafter Wilson & Glater, Files from Duke Rape Case].

182.
ELDER, FAIR REPORT, supra note 147, § 1:11, at 111 (noting that by the time of
the issuance of the new Section 611, a "modest consensus" favoring a qualified privilege
had developed in candidate or public-official public-speech cases); see, e.g., Pulverman v.
A.S. Abell Co., 228 F.2d. 797, 802 (4th Cir. 1956) (noting a "well recognized" "right and
duty," absent which "popular government could hardly function" modernly).
183.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 cmt. i (1977). As with § 611 generally,
this subsection accords absolute protection. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §

611 (1977); see also infra text accompanying notes 309-326.
184.
ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 3, §3:11, at 3-35. The campaign cases do
support a general rule of qualified privilege. Id. at n.4; see also supra note 182. As to cases
involving public meetings/matters of public concern more broadly, see ELDER, FAIR
REPORT, supra note 147, §1:11, at 113-14; ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 3, §3:11, 3-3436.
185.
ELDER, FAIR REPORT, supra note 147, at 111; ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note
3, §3:11, 3-35-36.
186.
ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 3, § 3:11, 3-36 n.6. Compare id., with Kilgore
v. Younger, 640 P.2d 793, 796 (Cal. 1982) (involving a press conference where a state
attorney general issued an official report applying the absolutist California statute).
Kilgore is eminently distinguishable. See infra text accompanying notes 232-239.
187.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 cmt. i, illus. 3 (1977) ("During an
election campaign a political party holds a public meeting at which candidates for office
and their supporters speak. In the course of a speech A, a candidate for office, makes
defamatory statements concerning his opponent, B. C then publishes in his newspaper a
complete and accurate report of the meeting, including these statements. The report is
privileged."). Illustration Four involves a public meeting called by citizens to urge a grand
jury investigation of law enforcement. Id. at e.g. § 611 cmt. i, illus. 4. During that meeting,
a speaker defames the chief of police. Id. The media entity publishing "a complete and
accurate account" of the meeting, including the defamatory statements, is held to have an
absolute privilege. Id. (based on Borg v. Boas, 231 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1956)); see infra text
accompanying notes 288-90.
188.
E.g., Jackson v. Record Publ'g Co., 178 S.E. 833, 835-37 (S.C. 1935).
189.
Id. at 837 (finding no "express malice"); Pulvermann v. A.S. Abell Co., 228 F.2d
797, 802-03 (4th Cir. 1956) (same); Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Choisser, 312 P.2d 150,
153-55 (Ariz. 1957) (finding no "actual malice"); Abram v. Odham, 89 So. 2d 334, 335-38
(Fla. 1956) (finding no "express malice"); see also Palmer v. Seminole Producer, 9 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 2151, 2152 (Okla. Civ. App. 1983) (noting that the mixed fair-report/neutral-
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In addition, the candidate-reportage cases relied on involved
scenarios where the plaintiffs-candidates for public office, other
public figures, or public officials-would undoubtedly or likely be
deemed public persons1 90 who could be legitimately treated under
controlling Supreme Court precedent' 9 1 as having assumed the risk of
defamation 192 and who thereby must meet the threshold requirements
of the demanding New York Times Co. standard. 193 I have found no
case involving the scenario presented in the Duke lacrosse case, i.e.,
no case involving reports of a prosecutor-candidate's statements
defamatory of clearly private individuals linked to matters of public
195
concern.194 Yet Section 611 implicitly rejects any such limitation

reportage for an account of a candidate's statement is forfeited if the opponent
demonstrates "knowledge of probable falsity") (quoting Jurkowski v. Crawley, 657 P.2d 56,
60 (Okla 1981)).
Pulvermann, 228 F.2d at 800-02. The court held that one co-plaintiff, an
190.
assistant chair of the Democratic National Committee who was a "high official" in the party
and "actively engaged" in the presidential campaign of Governor Adlai Stevenson was not

defamed by an Associated Press report quoting a charge of "crookedness" by presidential
candidate Dwight Eisenhower because of plaintiffs involvement as an intermediary
between the U.S. and Portugal while functioning as a committee member. Id. at 802. The
other plaintiff in Pulvermann was a partner on the contract, which was "a matter of public
business," as it involved the purchase of tungsten, a requisite element in producing steel.
Id. The latter's independent-contractor/intermediary status in a substantial international
commercial transaction might well make him a public official under the Court's criteria.
See ELDER, FAIR REPORT, supra note 147, at 115-16 n.11; cf. Arctic Co., Ltd. v. Loudoun
Times Mirror, 624 F.2d 518, 522 (4th Cir. 1980) (identifying factors that confer "public
official" status on government contractors); see generally ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note
3, § 5:1, at 5-30 n.200 (discussing independent contractors as public officials); see also
Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 312 P.2d at 152-53 (holding that candidates on ticket for city
mayoral council were defamed in accounts of other candidate's defamatory statements
based in rumor); Abram, 89 So. 2d at 335-37 (stating that pollster-prognosticatorcommentator who "injected" himself into a gubernatorial campaign may have been
defamed by reportage of gubernatorial candidate's statements); Jackson, 178 S.E. at 834,
837 (holding that a candidate for state senate was not defamed by report of gubernatorial
candidate's statements).
See supra text accompanying notes 36-38, 46-55, 60-61.
191.
192.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (recognizing such assumption of
risk as a "compelling normative consideration" distinguishing public from private persons);
see supra text accompanying notes 46-55; see also ELDER, FAIR REPORT, supra note 147, at
115-16 n.11.
See supra text accompanying note 36.
193.
ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 3, § 3:11, 3-35 n.4 (noting that no decision has
194.
ever raised or discussed the issue of whether a non-public person defamed in a candidate's
speech would be subject to a different standard than public persons so defamed); ELDER,
FAIR REPORT, supra note 147, at 115-16 n.11; see supra text accompanying notes 187-190.
The brief opinion in Hayes v. Newspapers of New Hampshire,Inc., 685 A.2d 1237, 1238-39
(N.H. 1996), is not inconsistent with this analysis. While the case involved a private
individual, the meeting was held by the board of selectmen, a local legislative entity. See
id. at 1238. Presumably, the board exercised control over the meeting. See id. In any event,
the court's adoption of Section 611 did not involve any discussion of the absolute versus
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and would extend fair report absolutism to all plaintiffs regardless of
status. This approach seems indefensible.
The only post-1977 case discussing Section 611's absolutist
posture, WKRG-TV, Inc. v. Wiley, 196 involved republished statements
from a meeting held at a church imputing possible corruption to a
plaintiff serving as president of a county commission. 197 The court
rejected Section 611's republication absolutism based on the publicconcern/public-meeting criteria, citing the Supreme Court's repeated
repudiation of a "newsworthiness" standard 198 and the sufficient
media protection provided by the high burden 99 imposed on the
plaintiff-public official 20 0 under New York Times Co. The facts are
wonderfully illustrative of why courts should view constitutional
absolutism as exceedingly suspect in public-meeting contexts: the
source of the defamatory statement was an anonymous, self-styled
rumor that the defendant had previously investigated; this
investigation gave the defendant clear grounds for seriously 20doubting
1
falsity under the Court's constitutional malice jurisprudence.

qualified dichotomy. See generally id. On remand, the "extent to which the privilege should
apply, if at all," remained open for further analysis. Id. at 1239.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 cmt. i (1977).
195.
196.
495 So. 2d. 617 (Ala. 1986). Another case rejected in toto fair report in the
context of reportage of a campaign debate for sheriff on the ground that neither state
common law nor statutory law had adopted such a practice. See Freedom Newspapers of
Tex. v. Cantu, 126 S.W.3d 185, 193-95 (Tex. App. 2003). The New York Times Co. standard

applicable to public figures controlled. See id.
197.
WKRG-TV, Inc., 495 So. 2d at 618-19.
Id. at 619 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 337-48 (1974)
198.
(rejecting the plurality view of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971), which
implied the New York Times Co. standard applied to all plaintiffs, regardless of status, as
to all matters of general or public concern); see supra text accompanying notes 36-45.
See supra text accompanying notes 39, 193.
199.
WKRG-TV, Inc., 495 So. 2d at 619-21.
200.
The court noted that the defendant had not mentioned substantial pre201.
publication information evidencing that the statements were untrue. Id. at 621. The
original source was an anonymous rumor sheet that another reporter investigated at the
time, including an interview with the company with which plaintiff had the allegedly
corrupting, part-ownership interest and the company's attorney, who offered refutatory
documentary proof. Id. In addition, the county attorney called the reporter and told her the
rumor was false, and the rumor was not referenced in the initial broadcast. Id. The
plaintiff denied ownership and called the prior investigation to the reporter's attention. Id.
The report conceded the denial of any ownership interest of the plaintiff by the corporation
president. Id.; see also ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 3, § 7:12 (discussing the issue of
contradictory evidence ignored by defendant as compelling evidence of constitutional
malice). Indeed, publication of rumor is generally viewed as alone sufficient for
demonstrating constitutional malice. Id. § 7:2, 7-45; see also St. Amant v. Thompson, 390
U.S. 727, 732 (1968) (noting that statements "based wholly on an unverified anonymous
telephone call" would not be likely to persuasively support an argument that a publication
was made in good faith).
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Clearly, two of the classic fair-report rationales are met in
20 2
public-meeting/public concern cases: "informational" and "agency."
Section 611 relies explicitly thereon in its rationale for its public
meeting extension, i.e., "to protect those who make available to the
public information concerning public events that concern or affect the
public interest and that any member of the public could have acquired
for himself by attending them." 20 3 In some of the cited supporting
authority, a very indirect type of "public supervisory" function 20 4 may
be coincidentally (but not necessarily) involved-where rumored
20 5
allegations of corruption were raised and reported, as with Wiley.
But it is doubtful that this addendum would justify fair report
absolutism.20 6 Wiley clearly rejected such an approach. The court's
determination seems undeniably correct. In assessing the depth of
constitutional protection in light of the equally strong interest in
redressing reputation in such settings, it needs to be emphasized that
these types of nongovernmental proceedings "often provide fewer and
less effective restraints on the dissemination of scurrilous charges
"207
than do 'official' proceedings . ...
In sum, it appears highly unlikely that the Supreme Court
would extend absolute protection to a fair and accurate account of
statements by a "rogue prosecutor"/public official/candidate for public

See generally ELDER, FAIR REPORT, supra note 147, § 1:00, at 3-4 (discussing
202.
the two "primary" rationales--"agency" and "supervisory"-and the "incidental," "almost
symbiotic" "informational" rationale).
203.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 cmt. i (1977).
204.
ELDER, FAIR REPORT, supra note 147, at 123 n.67.
205.
WKRG.TV, Inc., 495 So. 2d at 618-19 (noting that the statements implied abuse
of public office); see infra text accompanying note 288 (discussing Borg v. Boas, 231 F.2d
788 (9th Cir. 1956)).
206.
ELDER, FAIR REPORT, supra note 147, at 123 n.67 (suggesting such may justify
only a qualified privilege).
207.
ELDER, FAIR REPORT, supra note 147, at 6.
("[T]he discussions do not involve the 'forensic debate [or] legislative or
administrative deliberation or determination' that 'official' reports and
proceedings normally engage in; many participants therein will . . . not be
subject to the normal restraints of the political or electoral processes that apply
to official acts or proceedings; the direct or indirect opportunity for response of
defamed persons will often be less effective or meaningful; the professional
ethical restraints and sanctions that apply in many official proceedings may be
inapplicable in the nongovernmental context; the presiding authority in such a
meeting (if there is one) will normally not have the same authority to maintain
order and restrain, within reasonable parameters, the subjects under discussion;
such meetings, unlike many official reports or proceedings, do not operate under
rules of procedure or evidence and do not require that allegations be made in any
formal manner (such as under oath).") (citations and footnote textual analyses
omitted); see also id. § 1:11, at 114, 123 n.67; ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 3,
§ 3:11, 3-37, n.9.
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office acting clearly outside his official capacity. 208 Even in such areas
as elections, the Court has rejected First Amendment absolutism in
"newsworthiness" settings: 20 9 "We have not gone so far ... as to accord
the press absolute immunity in its coverage of public figures or
elections." 210 The aforementioned lack of controls and restraints
makes First Amendment absolutism particularly inappropriate. Some
form of qualified privilege is consistent with clear precedent. 211 Where
the defamed plaintiff is a public person, forfeiture by constitutional
and
would
be appropriate
malice-regarding-substratal-falsity
212
The jury remains out as to defamed
constitutionally compelled.
private individuals (such as the defamed Duke lacrosse players) and
whether a negligence-regarding-substratal-falsity standard would be
213
constitutionally permissible and appropriate.
208.
209.

See supra text accompanying notes 180-81.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (rejecting for media and other

defendants an "unconditional and indefeasible immunity" as necessitating a "total"
sacrifice of countervailing values founded in defamation law); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S.
153, 176 (1979) (concluding that absolute immunity had been "regularly found.., to be an
untenable construction of the First Amendment); see Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note
105, at 613-27.
210.
Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688 (1989). It is
worth emphasizing that one of the reportage-of-campaign cases, Phoenix Newspapers v.
Choisser, 312 P.2d 150 (Ariz. 1957), involving reports of statements of incumbentcandidates for mayor and city council, was cited twice by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.
376 U.S. 254, 280 n.20, 288 (1964) (citing the case as an example of an "oft cited . . . like
rule" supporting its constitutional malice holding). The Arizona Supreme Court has
subsequently characterized Phoenix as a "qualified" privilege case. See Green Acres Trust
v. London, 688 P.2d 617, 620 (Ariz. 1984).
211.
Pulvermann v. A.S. Abell Co., 228 F.2d 797, 802 (4th Cir. 1956) ("The right and
duty of newspapers to publish for the benefit of the public matters of this character is well
recognized; and, in the age in which we are living, popular government could hardly
function if this were not true."); Phoenix Newspapers, 312 P.2d at 154 ("There can be no
doubt that the publication in question was of public interest and it was communicated by
one whose right it was to inform the public of such matters."); see also Abram v. Odham, 89
So. 2d 334, 337 (Fla. 1956).
See supra text accompanying notes 35-38.
212.
Cf. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 115-16, 133-36 (1979) (rejecting
213.
Speech and Debate Clause absolute protection regarding defendant-U.S. Senator's accurate
republication of information first published in a speech either given by him or published in
the Congressional Record). The Court declined to apply New York Times Co. and instead
applied the Gertz negligence standard to plaintiff-private person, and in doing so rejected
newsworthiness as sufficient for public-figure status. Id.; see also supra text accompanying
notes 40-55. Although the Court did not expressly analyze the fault-regarding-underlying
fault issue, its treatment of the litigation below strongly suggested that underlying fault
would be the remand focus. See Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 105, at 627 n.539.
Interestingly, the Court in Hutchinson referred to J. Story's Commentaries on the
Constitutionas supporting the "long established" English precedent on point in denying the
right of a legislator to have absolute Speech and Debate Clause protection for
republication, but interpreted one editor's version as supporting "a qualified" privilege,
"akin to that for accurate newspaper reports of legislative proceeding." Hutchinson, 443
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Nifong's extensive contacts 214 with the media in the noncampaign context 2 15 similarly raise important issues as to whether
such contacts, and in what settings (if any), would entitle reporting
media like the New York Times to assert fair report rather than mere
non-fault-based, responsible reportage. An examination of the Times
articles shows that their authors did not always carefully delineate
the settings in which such contacts might arguably have taken placewhether by telephone or personal interviews, contacts with individual
reporters, informal interviews with multiple members of the media,
informal press conferences, or pre-announced press conferences.216
Media reportage of these largely defamatory statements 2 17 raises
U.S. at 128-29, 129 n.13 (citing J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 863, at
329 (1833)). The Hutchinson Court did not specifically reach the fair report issue. See
Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 105, at 628-29 (analyzing Hutchinson thoroughly).
214.
See infra text accompanying notes 215-217.
215.
See supra text accompanying notes 180-213 (discussing the campaign context).
216.
911 Calls Lead the Police to Duke's Lacrosse Team, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2006,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/30/sports/30timeline.html?n=Top/Ref
(referencing a television interview) (hereinafter, 911 Calls); David Barstow & Duff Wilson,
Charges of Rape Against 3 at Duke Are Dropped, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2006, at 1-5,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/23/sports/23duke.html?n=Top/Refer
(not
disclosing the interview setting) (hereinafter, Barstow & Wilson, Charges of Rape); David
Barstow & Duff Wilson, Prosecutorin Duke Case Faces Ethics Complaint, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
29, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/ 12/29/us /29nifong.html (referencing
Nifong's "long list of public comments" and stating that he "granted dozens of interviews"
in the context of ethics charges; also noting that North Carolina courts "traditionally
granted" prosecutors "broad leeway in making public comments that 'serve a legitimate law
enforcement purpose"'); Viv Bernstein & Joe Drape, Rape Allegation Against Athletes Is
Roiling Duke, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2006, at 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2006/03/29/sports/29duke.html?n=Top.Refer
(referencing
a
telephone
interview)
(hereinafter, Berstein and Drape); Rick Lyman & Joe Drape, Duke Players Practice While
Scrutiny Builds, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2006, at 2, available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2006/03/30/sports/30duke.html?n=Top.Refer
(stating that Nifong "said") (hereinafter,
Lyman & Drape); Officer Describes Woman in Duke Case as Drunk, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14,
2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com2006/04/14/sports/sportsspeciall/14duke.html
(not disclosing the statement or setting) (hereinafter, Officer); Official in Duke Players'
Case
Admits
Errors,
N.Y.
TIMES,
July
29,
2006,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/29/us/29duke.html?n=Top/Reference (referencing a pressconference statement) (hereinafter, Officer Admits Errors); Duff Wilson, Duke Rape Case
Shadows an Unusual Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2006, at 2, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2O06/11/01/us/Olduke.html?n=Top/Reference
[hereinafter Wilson,
Duke] (repeating earlier statements to a local television station); Duff Wilson & Jonathan
D. Glater, Prosecutor'sSilence on Duke Rape Case Leaves Public With Plenty of Questions,
N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2006, at 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com2006/06/12
/us/12duke.html?n=Top/Reference [hereinafter Wilson & Glater, Prosecutor's Silence]
(repeating earlier statements on national television); Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke
Rape Case, supra note 181, at 1 (repetition of statement to Fox News); Wilson & Macur,
Lawyers, supra note 181 (not disclosing the statement or setting).
217.
911 Calls, supra note 216 (quoting Nifong as stating 'I am convinced that there
was a rape"'); Bernstein & Drape, supra note 216, at 1 (quoting Nifong's criticism of the
Duke lacrosse players collectively for not speaking at the time or later coming forward by
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significant issues as to whether such statements are privileged reports
of "an official action or proceeding" 21 8 or "a meeting open to the public
that deals with a matter of public concern." 219 Alternatively, they
might be considered unprivileged accounts falling within comment
(h)'s heavily majoritarian 220 refusal to extend fair report to statements
by prosecutors and others "as to the facts of the case or the evidence
expected to be given .... ,221 As indicated above, unlike an arrest or
criminal charge, which may be reported, these additional matters are
222
not generally protected by fair report.
An examination of the cases involving statements by
governmental attorneys is quite revealing. Cases supporting the
comment (h) point of view 223 have strongly cautioned against
according uninvestigated fair-report protection to the prosecutor's
"unfounded and baseless suspicions" 224 and for the necessity of
stating, "The thing that most of us found so abhorrent, and the reason I decided to take it
over myself, was the combination gang-like rape activity accompanied by the racial slurs
and general racial hostility"); Barstow & Wilson, Charges of Rape, supra note 216, at 4-5
(quoting Nifong as having an obligation to take the case to a jury unless the accuser
doubted her identifications, stating his remorse regarding the "hooligans" statements, and
referring to the accuser as "my victim"); Wilson & Macur, Lawyers, supra note 216
(repeating Nifong's statement that he believed a sexual assault had indeed occurred);
Lyman & Drape, supra note 216, at 1-2 (quoting Nifong as having "said" investigators were
building a "solid case" which disputed and refuted the players' contention that no sexual
assault had happened, citing a nurse's corroborating evidence, and speculating that
"condoms were used"); Officer, supra note 216 (repeating Nifong's statement that he
believed a sexual assault had indeed occurred); Official Admits Error, supra note 216
(quoting Nifong as stating, "That having been said, this case remains a Durham problem,
and it demands a Durham solution"); Wilson, Duke, supra note 216, at 1 (repeating the 'no
doubt' a rape occurred" and "bunch of hooligans" comments together with a charge that
"daddies could buy them expensive lawyers" when they got into legal trouble; also
reporting that Nifong stated, "I'm not going to allow Durham's view in the minds of the
world to be a bunch of lacrosse players at Duke raping a black girl from Durham"); Wilson
& Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181, at 1 (repeating Nifong's earlier
statement that there was "no doubt in my mind that she was raped"); Wilson & Glater,
Prosecutor's Silence, supra note 216, at 1 (repeating Nifong's earlier statements ('There's
no doubt in my mind that she was raped and assaulted") and his depiction of lacrosse
players as "hooligans" engaged in an aiding/abetting/cover-up. The authors point out that
Nifong's earlier statements later "come to appear far less robust" when depicting the
accuser's charges and Nifong's refusal to meet the press after an earlier barrage of press
contacts).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 cmts. d, e, h (1977).
218.
219.
Id. § 611 cmt. i.
220.
See supra text accompanying notes 148-152.
221.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 cmt. h (1977).
222.
Id.
For more detailed analyses, see ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 3, § 3:10, §
223.
1:10; ELDER, FAIR REPORT, supra note 147; Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 105, at
756-802.
Hagener v. Pulitzer Publ'g Co., 158 S.W. 54, 59-60, (Mo. Ct. App. 1912) ("If an
224.
officer should call in a newspaper reporter and relate to him what he expected to do with
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constraining fair report within "well-defined 225 parameters to
forestall "disguised malice" or other prosecutorial misconduct or
misfeasance. 226 Thus, in a leading case, a Kansas state court rejected
fair report as to a prosecutor's volunteered private accusations
indicating an intent to prosecute.2 27 Even where official conduct was
at issue, such a pre-investigation statement did not concern a matter
for the "guidance and instruction" of the public or have "a beneficial
influence on the conduct of public affairs."228 Other illustrative cases
have denied fair-report protection to, for example, a county assistant
prosecutor's "heated colloquy" with the chief of police in court after the
state's case, 229 and a scenario where an assistant district attorney
charged the plaintiff-attorney with unprofessional conduct while court
was not in session in the presence of a court clerk, deputy sheriff,
reporter, and other bystanders. 230 Cases like these seem to have
relied at least in major part on the absence of the control or restraint
231
mechanisms applicable in judicial proceedings.
certain persons, naming them, and saying that these persons, though honest men, were

thieves and those others, though innocent women, were prostitutes, the publisher should
not be allowed the claim of privilege for so great an outrage, even though the officer may
have thought he was speaking the truth."). In this particular case, the prosecutor was
allegedly "unfriendly" to plaintiff-county sheriff and made such statements without any
investigation. Id. at 55, 59, 60, 64. No evidence had been shown and the defendant had no
basis for assuming that such had occurred. Apparently, the alleged misconduct of plaintiff
was a matter for future investigation. Id. at 65.
225.
Id. at 60.
226.
Id.
227.
Id. (noting that statements made by the prosecutor without investigation
"bearD no approach to an official act or statement the publication of which is privileged").
228.
Id. at 63-65. Rather than a matter of "great interest affecting the public," the
prosecutor's statements were the "unfriendly private opinion[s]" of the prosecutor about the
plaintiffs official conduct, which had theretofore not been before the public or of interest to
it; these statements were unlike a prosecutor's official notice to the public after a "thorough
investigation" of the matter. Id; see also Yerkie v. Post Newsweek Stations, 470 F. Supp.
91, 93-94 (D. Md. 1979) (declining to extend fair report to a prosecutor's statements to the
media). Occasional cases have extended the same rule to reports of a judge's extrajudicial
statements. See, e.g., Wood v. Constitution Publ'g Co., 194 S.E. 760, 764, 767 (Ga. Ct. App.
1937) (holding that reports made of information supplied during a reporter's "customary
call" to the office of a federal court commissioner-a judicial official-involved an act
"outside of the discharge of any official duty," and thus not covered by fair report);
Henderson v. Evansville Press, 142 N.E.2d 920, 921, 923-25 (Ind. Ct. App. 1957) (stating
that on the record it could not be determined whether a judge's charges of "shysterism"
against an attorney were made while the judge was on the bench or during the course of a
judicial proceeding; malice was also alleged).
229.
Rogers v. Courier Post Co., 66 A.2d 869, 872-74 (N.J. 1949) (noting that the
plaintiff was township treasurer and head of the local Republican Party).
230.
Viosca v. Landfried, 73 So. 698, 700 (La. 1916).
231.
Rogers, 66 A.2d at 873-74. Compare id., with supra text accompanying note 207.
The Rogers court applied the same analyses to any pending judicial proceedings. Rogers, 66
A.2d at 874. Such were not made during any prosecution and were not "official
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At the other end of the scale are cases extending fair report to
state attorneys general who issued detailed written reports at press
conferences or otherwise made authoritative pronouncements or
issued official notices as chief law enforcement officers of their
respective states. For example, fair report was extended to a governor
and attorney general's joint, thorough investigations and official
determination and announcement 232 that a racing facility was an
"open felony" and that attendees would be arrested and prosecuted. 233
Fair report also applied to an attorney general's adopted and
distributed organized crime commission official report. 234 These cases
undoubtedly involved official reports 235 in the nature of official legal
opinions 236 by a state's highest ranking law-enforcement officer 23 7 on
"matters of great public interest."238 A comparable decision extended
parallel protection to official reports and press releases of the U.S.
Department of Justice. 239 All epitomized the prototypical "filing of a
report by an officer or agency of the government" 240 based on a prior
statement[s]" either as generally viewed or under the state statute. Id. The narrow state
statute was limited to department heads and county prosecutors as to in-progress or
finished investigations. Id. The statute's purpose was the centralization of responsibility

and did not help a subordinate. Id. at 874-75. In addition, no evidence existed that showed
that the assistant prosecutor was involved in or had completed any such investigation. Id.
at 875.
232.
Hagener, 158 S.W. at 59-60, 64; Tilles v. Pulitzer Publ'g Co., 145 S.W. 1143,
1152-54 (Mo. 1912).
233.
Tilles, 145 S.W. at 1147, 1150, 1152-54 (stating that the threatened
prosecution, including use of the militia, involved the acts of important government
officers, which the public was entitled to know about-in part to avoid arrest and
prosecution); see also Hagener, 158 S.W. at 59-60, 63-64. In such cases, "the good done for
the public so far outweighs and overbalances the inconvenience suffered by individuals,
that immunity for the publisher is said to rise to the dignity of public policy." Id. at 59.
234.
Kilgore v. Younger, 640 P.2d 793, 795-97 (Cal. 1982) (citing CAL. CIV. CODE §
47(4), (5) (West 2007) as providing absolute protection for any "other public official
proceeding" and a "public meeting ... lawfully convened for a lawful purpose and open to
the public," or where the "publication of the matter complained of was for the public
benefit"). The court exclusively relied on the Subsection 5 aspect and held that, as to the
press, the 'legally convened"/"lawful purpose" criteria were met. Id. at 796. The court cited
Section 611's "parallel privilege." Id. at 795-96. All members of the court concurred in the
part of the opinion about the media privilege. Id. at , 808-09 (Bird, C.J., Tobriner, J. &
Tamura, J., concurring and dissenting in part). The court's agreement on the first aspect of
the "public meeting" criterion in Section 5 made it "unnecessary to solve the troublesome
question" as to whether the "public benefit" alternative was met. Id. at 808 n.3.
235.
Hagener, 158 S.W. at 59-60, 64-65; Tilles, 145 S.W. at 1152-54.
236.
Hagener, 158 S.W. at 59-60, 64-65; Tilles, 145 S.W. at 1152-54.
237.
Hagener, 158 S.W. at 64-65; Tilles, 145 S.W. at 1152.
238.
Hagener, 158 S.W. at 59, 64.
239.
Nanji v. Nat'l Geographic Soc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 425, 432, 433-34 (D. Md. 2005)
(noting that no constitutional malice had been alleged, but that the "modern view . ..
discards the search for malice").
240.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 cmt. d (1977).
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detailed and apparently thorough investigation. 24 1 A parallel decision
at the local level involved a prosecutor's issuance of an official public
warning to attendees at a public auction concerning the depredations
242
of a known check forger.
Even a wide-ranging media interview with a state attorney
general about a grain theft ring may be entitled to some level of fairreport 243 protection. An analysis of "open violations of [the] law" by
the state's highest ranking law official 244 based on a detailed
investigation of the facts was found privileged where no proof of
common-law malice was shown. 245 Yet, the court strongly emphasized
the media had no "free rein and immunity to print unfounded and
unwarranted scurrilous, unscrupulous and defamatory statements
about a citizen" in bad faith. 246 These concerns remain valid. Note
that the Kansas Supreme Court majority preeminently cited Coleman
v. MacLennan.247 Coleman was the minority fair-comment variant on
which the United States Supreme Court primarily relied in New York
248
Times Co. v. Sullivan.

241.

See supra text accompanying notes 232-239.
242.
Woolbright v. Sun Commc'ns, Inc. 480 S.W.2d 864, 865-68 (Mo. 1972) (stating
that the privilege was defeasible by proof of constitutional malice, but none was shown).

243.
Beyl v. Capper Publ'ns, Inc., 305 P.2d 817, 818-19, 822-23 (Kan. 1957). The case
consisted of almost all direct quotes from or a summary of information provided by the
attorney general during a newspaper interview. See id. The information was highly
inculpatory of plaintiff-public official as the "key man" and provided a detailed analysis of
the facts, theories, and evidence. See id.
244.
Id. at 819. The fact that the attorney general was the source seems to have been
particularly important in the case. See id.
245.
Id. (defining lack of good faith variously as "express malice," "actual malice,"
"actual evil mindedness," and "knowledge of ...
falsity") (emphasis added). Note the
overlap of the latter with the New York Times Co. criteria. See supra text accompanying
note 35.
246.
Beyl, 305 P.2d at 819 (emphasis added).
247.
98 P. 281 (Kan. 1908).
248.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280-82 (1964); see also supra text
accompanying note 210. A later Kansas case following Coleman and Beyl, Stice v. Beacon
Newspaper Corp., Inc., 340 P.2d 396 (Kan. 1959), involved the same "open violations of the
law" qualified-privilege/fair-comment approach. Id. at 398-401. The plaintiff was a public
official implicated as a leader in a local burglary gang. Id. Most of the sources quoted were
police officials. Id. However, the attorney general was quoted as saying that he intended to
prod the burglary probe and investigate the appropriateness of plaintiffs conduct. Id. at
398. Stice was also specifically cited as support in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 376 U.S.
254, 280 n.20 (1964). Note that Stice variously indicated that the qualified privilege was
forfeited by "actual malice," "evil-mindedness, or specific intent to injure," or absence of
"reasonable or probable grounds" for belief in truth. Stice, 340 P.2d at 400-01 (emphasis
added). Note that the latter was more protective of plaintiffs than the New York Times Co.St. Amant criteria. See supra text accompanying note 35-36; infra text accompanying notes
401-404.
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A trio of other more modern public-attorney/fair-report cases
involved more ambiguous circumstances. One decision adopting a
qualified privilege focused on quoted statements made by an assistant
attorney general on behalf of the office of the attorney general as to a
matter that it had apparently investigated and upon which the office
was willing to take a public stance. 24 9 A New York decision involved a
press conference by a borough district attorney who issued an official
press release exposing a credit card ring, adding oral amplifying and
identifying comments. 25 0 In dicta, the court denominated this as an
official proceeding under the state fair-report statute 25 1 (relying on the
perfunctory analysis in a single case) 252 but ultimately resolved the
249.
Haueter v. Cowles Publ'g Co., 811 P.2d 231, 234, 238-40 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
After finding that the entire article was true as to plaintiff-private person, a holding that
makes the rest of its analyses dicta, the court then accorded press reportage a conditional
privilege defeasible by knowing or reckless disregard of falsity, which was not proved. Id.
Compare id., with Levine v. CMP Publ'ns, 738 F.2d 660, 668-69 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding
that a press-reported statement to the effect that the state attorney general's office was
"considering further legal action" but was concerned about its jurisdiction was not accorded
fair-report status because of questions regarding accuracy and also because it was "by no
means clear" that such constituted any report of a public proceeding under the statute);
Curran v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 439 A.2d 652, 654, 659-60 (Pa. 1981) (involving a
story attributable to "federal sources" in the U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division,
which were considered reliable sources of information, disproved constitutional malice; fair
report was not discussed]); Braig v. Field Comm'ns, 456 A.2d 1366, 1368-69, 1372, 1374-77
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (applying the public-official standard to statements made about a
police misconduct case during defendant's television's program, which quoted statements
by co-defendant-assistant district attorney-head of the police misconduct unit; finding the
individual co-defendant's acts not "so closely related to his duties as Assitant District
Attorney" to provide him absolute immunity and finding an issue of constitutional malice
in the media's televised reportage of his charges against plaintiff-judge; not discussing fair
report).
250.
Sbarbati v. N.Y. Post, 10 Media L. Rep. 2190, 2191-92 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
251.
Id. at 2191.
252.
Baumann v. Newspaper Enterprises, Inc., 60 N.Y.S.2d 185, 186 (N.Y. App. Div.
1946). The court characterized an "investigation" by the district attorney as an "official
proceeding" under New York's fair-report statute without disclosing any details about how
the material was disclosed or in what setting. See id. Later, the court amplified its ruling
somewhat. Baumann v. Newspaper Enterprises, 69 N.Y.S.2d 474, 475 (N.Y. App. Div.
1947) (holding that fair report extended to "conversations" with the source, an assistant
district attorney). Baumann relied on BriarcliffLodge Hotel v. Citizen-Sentinel Publishers,
see text accompanying note 283, and Farrell v. New York Evening Post, 3 N.Y.S.2d 1018,
1021-22 (N.Y. App. Div. 1938), which involved an official press release after an official
investigation announcing terminations by the director of a large governmental
organization and that the organization would seek federal indictments for payroll padding
and "kickbacks." Id. The court defined the adjectives "public" and "official" qualifying
"proceeding" in the fair report statute very broadly. See id. at 1021. "Public" connoted
"affecting the people at large or the community .. . [as] distinguished from private or
personal." Id. "Official" meant "pertaining to an office or public trust." Id. In light of this
interpretation, the press should be "free and untrammeled" in enlightening society as to
"matters of public concern." Id. at 1022. The court noted the accentuated growth of
"bureaucratic secrecy." Id. Of course, this interpretation negated any interpretation of
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matter solely on lack of fault/reasonable reliance on a responsible
source. 253 A third decision involved reportage of amplifying comments
by a U.S. Attorney at a press conference regarding a filed
indictment. 254 However, the only issue seemed to be fairness and fault
255
as to defendant's report.
The most detailed analysis of fair report in the pressconference setting is in Wright v. Grove Sun Newspaper,Inc. 256 In this
dubious case, the county district attorney held a public press
conference in which he distributed a transcript with an attached
"public" as "publicity in open hearings." Id. at 1022. Note that the court emphasized that
the acts taken were by an official empowered to do so after full investigation and the public
had a legitimate right to know the reasons therefore. Id. A later case following Baumann
and Briarcliff Lodge involved remarks made by an assistant district attorney concerning
testimony before a grand jury. See Bridgwood v. Newspaper PM, 93 N.Y.S.2d 613 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1949). The Bridgwood court reversed a more thoughtful opinion below,
Bridgwood v. Newspaper PM, 87 N.Y.S.2d 482, 483 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949), which had refused
to accord fair-report status to "a conversation with a prosecuting attorney." Id. at 483. The
court relied on Jacobs v. Herlands, where the court provided a compelling analysis: "No
prosecuting officer or investigator is justified, in anticipation of finding evidence of
wrongdoing, in making a public statement to the press which injures the reputation of any
person. With due regard for the right of the public to be informed of the conduct of the
officials, the time for such information to be given is after evidence of wrongdoing has been
obtained. The rights of the individual, as well as the rights of the public, are to be
considered." 17 N.Y.S.2d 711, 712-13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940). Compare id., with Keogh v. New
York Herald Tribune, Inc., 274 N.Y.S.2d 302, 305-07 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966) (citing Bridgwood
positively, and noting the 1956 deletion of "public" by statute but concluding that
references to grand jury did not "purport" to either depict witness testimony or other
actions before a grand jury-"[t]hey merely tell a story").
253.
Sbarbati, 10 Media L. Rep. at 2192 (noting that New York cases have
"consistently held" such reliance defeated fault and citing Chapadeau v. Utica ObserverDispatch, 341 N.E.2d 569, 571-72 (N.Y. 1975), which adopted a "grossly irresponsible"
conduct requirement in private-personpublic-concern cases). For a discussion of the latter,
see ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 3, § 6:10; see also infra text accompanying notes 346347.
254.
Curran v. PhiladelphiaNewspapers, Inc., 439 A.2d at 660-62 (quoting dicta to
the effect that if the amplifying comments had been made, fair report would apply).
255.
Id. at 662 (finding a question of fact as to whether the reporter "consciously
ignored the probable falsity" of her interpretation of the U.S. attorney's remarks).
256.
873 P.2d 983 (Okla. 1994). Compare Mark v. Seattle Times, 635 P.2d 1081,
1089-92 (Wash. 1981), where the court did not reach the issue of whether any accurately
reported remarks of a deputy prosecutor were covered by fair report. The court stated
pointedly that its conclusions should not be interpreted as approving the prosecutor's
conduct, citing its disciplinary rules and bench-bar-press guidelines, and that it had
previously noted such actions "were open to criticism." See State v. Mark, 618 P.2d 73, 76
(Wash. 1980). Note that the court treated an affidavit of probable cause and a suspect
information form as indistinguishable from an information, as both were required in
support of the information by court rule. Id. at 1089. The sole issue of fair report related to
the prosecutor's remarks at the press conference. Note further, however, that assuming
arguendo, that the latter were privileged, the court viewed privilege as only conditional. It
left it open exactly what form of abuse was required, i.e., some form of negligence or
knowing or reckless disregard of falsity. Id. at 1091-92.
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affidavit detailing an informal private conversation between
257
undercover narcotics agents that involved a closed investigation.
The majority did not deny, 258 and at least three dissenters or partial
dissenters affirmatively concluded, 259 that the distribution of the
transcript was politically motivated, released in the context of a hotly
contested re-election campaign. 260 Emphasizing First Amendment
considerations and the public's so-called "right to be informed," 26 1 the
court applied a broad, objective 2 62 analysis focusing on whether these
acts of the district attorney were within the "penumbras of his official
duties."263 If so, they were conclusively presumed 264 "official" because
they involved the "investigative function" of his office, 265 so long as the
news conference was open to the public. 266 In essence, the court found

257.
Wright, 873 P.2d at 985.
258.
See id. at 988 n.23. The majority seems to implicitly concede this political
motivation, concluding merely that comment thereon would be inappropriate because, even
if wrongful, they were not "imputable" to the media. See id. The court relied on the denial
of inquiry into the prosecutor's subjective motivation in evaluating abuse of a qualified
executive privilege in constitutional torts cases. Id. (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 815-19 (1982)).
259.
Id. at 993 (Simms, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting that such
was the "obvious purpose" of the press conference and agreeing this was not an "official
function" of the prosecutor); id. at 993-95 (Summers, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) (joined by Lavender, V.C.J.). A fourth judge dissented without joining any opinion. Id.
at 993 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
260.
Id. at 994.
261.
Id. at 986-88 (emphasizing the media self-censorship that would result if the
media had to test the truth for falsity of records and statements that public officials made
available to the public in an effort to avoid litigation of libel suits, resulting in the choice to
"subordinateD" individual reputation to the larger societal interests protected by fair
report).
262.
Id. at 988 (analyzing only the "critical occasion") (emphasis in original).
263.
Id. at 988-89, 991.
264.
Id. at 988 (relying on historical and customary distribution of information by
prosecutors at press conferences). Interestingly, the majority emphasized the importance of
lawyers disseminating information to the public. Id. at 988 n.21 (citing 5 O.S. 1991, Ch. 1,
App. 3-A, Rule 3.6(d)). The majority did not explicitly discuss why the restrictionscontained
therein did not countervail. See id.
265.
Id. at 988. The court gave this a very broad interpretation, relying on the
absolute privilege accorded federal officials at various levels by the Supreme Court. Id. at
988 n.24 (adopting the federal rule, also known as the "outer perimeter" of duty approach)
(citing Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 572-76 (1959)). The state cases are "strongly divided
and quite inconsistent" on the absolute-versus-qualified-privilege issue as to lower ranking
state or local officials like Nifong, with the "probable numerical majority" of decisions and
the Restatement (Second) of Torts according only a qualified immunity. See ELDER,
DEFAMATION, supra note 3, at § 2:14, 2-101 to -112.
266.
Wright, 873 P.2d at 984-86. The court majority emphasized this open-to-thepublic/agency function as the "underpinning"of fair report, with the media "as a mere
substitute for the public eye and ear." Id. at 985 n.1 (emphasis in original). It also cited
broader informational functions of fair report:
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this press conference to be a hybrid "official"-report/publicmeeting/open-to-the-public/matter-of-public-concern 267 scenario and
268
accorded fair reportage thereof as an absolute defense.
A powerful partial dissent eviscerated the five-member
majority opinion, suggesting that the majority had not provided any
legal authority justifying fair-report protection for a press-conference
release of private conversations rather than official reports. 2 69 Indeed,
this case involved no charges against the plaintiff, no ongoing
investigation or prosecution, no completed prosecution, no
contemplated charges or contribution, and no contemplated
resuscitation of a past investigation.
The district attorney was
"simply trying to win" a heated election, 270 not acting under the
prosecutor's official duties or capacity. 271 This type of inculpatory

Without accurate media coverage of official public events, it is highly doubtful

that the general public would be able to make informed decisions and participate
intelligently in their governance; nor would representatives of government be
able to perform their assigned tasks effectively. It is hence against the backdrop
of public interest in information concerning public and official activities of

government that this case juxtaposes the interest of an individual in protecting
his reputation from harm.
Id. at 986 (emphasis in original) (citing Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92
(1975)). Importantly, the court did not discuss directly the public-supervisory-function
aspect of Cox Broadcasting that followed the court's statement that, "With respect to
judicial proceedings in particular, the function of the press serves to guarantee the fairness
of trials and to bring to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the administration
of justice." 420 U.S. at 492 (emphasis added).
267.
Wright, 873 P.2d. at 988-92. Compare id. with id. at 996, 999-1000 (Summers,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (joined by Lavender, V.C.J.) (disparaging the
"public meeting' aspect of Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 611 as a minority view
followed by the court majority, which left the private-person-plaintiff remediless). For other
discussions of the "public meeting" aspect, see supra text accompanying notes 181-189,194213, 219, 234, 249-255; see also infra text accompanying notes 286, 288-304.
268.
Wright, 873 P.2d at 985-86, 987, 992. The only limitation on any fair and
accurate account was the absence of republished information of "general public interest."
Id. at 989. The court did not reach the quite separate neutral-reportage privilege. Id. at 985
n.4, 986 n.7, 989-90, 990 nn.29-30 (noting that neutral reportage goes beyond fair report by
extending protection to accurate reportage of statements by private individuals). Note that
at least two partial dissenters would have rejected neutral reportage because of plaintiffs
private status, to which the privilege would not apply. Id. at 993 n.1, 1001 (Summers, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (joined by Lavender, V.C.J.). This is the
overwhelming majority view. See infra text accompanying notes 330, 342-351.
269.
Wright, 873 P.2d at 993, 996, 996 n.6 (Summers, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (joined by Lavender, V.C.J.) (noting that the private conversation dealt
with future investigative plans and was neither part of any official proceeding nor publicly
available).
270.
Id. at 993-95.
271.
Id. at 994.
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statement, defamatory of a private person, 272 was not the type of
statement the public needed to know, 273 as it lacked the "dignity and
2 75
authoritative weight" 274 of matters traditionally accorded protection.
In reaching this conclusion, the partial dissenters relied in part on
professional-conduct restrictions on prosecutors, 276 the only qualified
executive immunity provided to prosecutors in constitutional tort
cases that involve extrajudicial functions, 277 and the impetus fair
report would give to irresponsible "'political hacks"' with no ingrained
sense of social propriety or responsibility. 2 78 Another partial dissenter
emphasized the significant and unfair advantage such immune
officials would have vis-A-vis their opponents 2 79 by using a fair-reportprotected press conference to malign their opponents and garner free
publicity with absolute impunity.
The partial dissenters' criticism of the majority's use or misuse
of precedent 28 0 is well justified. Two cases relied on by the majority
272.
Id. at 989 (noting that the rule is not limited by the defamed person's
status/character); id. at 993 (Summers, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (joined by
Lavender, V.C.J.).
273.
Id. at 997-1000 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 cmt. h as
supporting the "general rule" on this issue, and concluding that such a conversation was
contained neither in a court proceeding nor a formal, official report and thus was merely
"an informal oral communication between police officers"). "[E]xtra-judicial defamation of
the citizenry by the police is not a vital process of democratic government." Id. at 997
(Summers, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (joined by Lavender, V.C.J.) (quoting
KEETON, ET. AL., supra note 124, at 206).
274.
Wright, 873 P.2d at 998-99 (quoting Phillips v. Evening Star Newspaper, 424
A.2d 78, 89 (D.C. 1980).
275.
See supra text accompanying notes 148-179, 218-231.
276.
Wright, 873 P.2d at 994 (Summers, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(joined by Lavender, V.C.J.) (emphasizing the constraints on prosecutors imposed by Rule
Section 3:6 as to certain types of "extrajudicial statements to the press," yet conceding that
some press conferences might fall within the bounds of statutorily authorized duties).
Contraid. at 988-89, 991.
277.
Id. at 995; see also Catalano v. Pechous, 387 N.E.2d 714, 722 (Ill. 1979)
(denying absolute privilege to statements by an elected city clerk to the media). Note that
the Wright majority repeatedly relied on the constitutional-tort-based qualified immunity
of prosecutors. 873 P.2d at 985 n.1; id. at 988-89, 988 n.24. Ultimately, however, it did not
address any district attorney immunity issues. Id. at 992. The district court had earlier
ordered the claim against the state dismissed because of noncompliance with the
Oklahoma Government Tort Claims Act, but this was not appealed, and the court then also
dismissed all other claims. Id. at 985-86.
278.
Id. at 998 (Summers, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (joined by
Lavender, V.C.J.) (quoting LAWRENCE ELDREGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION 504-05 (1978))
(hereinafter, ELDREDGE).
279.
Wright, 873 P.2d at 993 (Simms, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(noting that such allows the incumbent to "speak about any matter remotely connected
with his office during his campaign with immunity").
280.
See id. at 996, 996 n.6, 999-1000 (Summers, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) (joined by Lavender, V.C.J.); see also id. at 985 n.1, 989 n.25 (listing the cases relied
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involved extensively investigated official reports 28 1 issued by
governors on matters of compelling public interest 28 2 after thorough
investigation. 28 3
Another reported an undoubtedly official action
taken by a village water board in giving formal notice to a delinquent
major commercial customer. 28 4 A fourth was based on press reportage
of a legislator's proposals and "what . . . actually happened" in the
2 6
legislature. 28 5 Three others synthesized speeches by candidates.
Another applied a media-qualified privilege to defame a public-official
sheriff non-maliciously. 28 7 Lastly, the court relied on a public-meeting
scenario involving impugning a plaintiff-judge's integrity in the
context of an appeal to another judge present at the meeting to
on). The court noted that, in Buckley v. Fitzgerald, 509 U.S. 259, 277-78 (1993), the
Supreme Court accorded only qualified executive-officer immunity to post-indictment
press-conference statements despite the fact they were "integral" to a prosecutor's role and
"may serve a vital public function." Id. at 988 (quoting Buckley, 509 U.S. at 278).
281.
Brandon v. Gazette Publ'g Co., 352 S.W.2d 92, 93-95 (Ark. 1961) (stating that
reportage of press statements at a specially called press conference involving a detailed,
"thorough" investigation of nursing homes and announcing an ordered removal of welfare
patients therefrom was privileged when defendant was not alleged nor proved to have
acted "solely" for malicious reasons); Sciandra v. Lynett, 187 A.2d 586, 587-89, 592 (Pa.
1963) (according the press a privilege to fairly report a publicly released report, the
"Reuter's Report" ordered by the New York governor into the famous "Appalachin" meeting
of organized crime families that had precipitated "immediate nationwide publicity;" noting
the report involved an "extensive probe," the matter was one of "vital public importance,"
and the report was not published "solely" for malicious reasons).
282.
Brandon, 352 S.W.2d at 93-95; Sciandra, 187 A.2d at 587-89.
283.
Compare Brandon, 352 S.W.2d at 93-95, and Sciandra, 187 A.2d at 587-589,
with supra text accompanying notes 231-237.
284.
Briarcliff Lodge Hotel, Inc. v. Citizen-Sentinel Publishers, Inc., 183 N.E. 193,
196-97 (N.Y. 1932) (stating that an account of a formal termination-of-services order
directed by the village water board pursuant to an ordinance and sent by the mayor was an
"action taken by an official body given as news to the public" on a matter of unpaid
assessments, and a "matter quite vital" to the public; emphasizing the obligation of village
officials to act fairly and impartially and the press's important function therein: "The fact
that the press is ever ready to publish any irregularities or acts of favoritism has a
tendency to keep officials up to the high mark of their calling").
285.
Garby v. Bennett, 59 N.E. 1117, 1117 (N.Y. 1901). The state fair-report statute
controlling at the time included a malice-forfeiture privilege. Id. This was modified in 1930.
See Gurda v. Orange County Publ'ns Div., Inc., 439 N.Y.S.2d 417, 419 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981)
("The privilege set forth ... is absolute, irrespective of the presence or absence of malice or
bad faith, but only when the report is 'fair and true."') (quoting N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 74
(McKinney 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 436 N.E.2d 1326 (1982).
286.
Pulvermann v. A.S. Shell Co., 228 F.2d 797, 802-03 (4th Cir. 1956); Phoenix
Newspapers, Inc. v. Choisser, 312 P.2d 150, 153-55 (Ariz. 1957); Abram v. Odham, 89 So.
2d 334, 335-38 (Fla. 1956); see supra text accompanying notes 181-195.
287.
Fortney v. Stephan, 213 N.W. 172, 173-74 (Mich. 1927). The defendant, the exmayor, defamed the plaintiff, a public-official sheriff, in a newspaper owned and controlled
by the ex-mayor. Id. at 173. The privilege was qualified, not absolute, and forfeited by "bad
faith, or with actual malice, or without reasonable cause to believe them to be true." Id. at
174 (emphasis added).
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convene a grand jury. 28 8 That report involved two official actions
announced at the meeting: the district judge's refusal to convene a
grand jury and his direction to the district attorney to thoroughly
investigate the facts so that he might reconsider his decision if the
facts so warranted. 28 9 Equally importantly, the case involved only a
qualified privilege. The court found no evidence of common law malice
290
forfeiting the press's privilege.
In light of the above, which of Nifong's numerous press
contacts 29 1 are entitled to fair report, if any? Telephone or personal
interviews with individual media reporters seem to only qualify for
responsible-reliance protection under the First Amendment or more
protective state law standards 292 and seem indistinguishable from the
comment (h) scenarios discussed in this Article 293 and elsewhere. 294
Even the Wright majority would apparently not have accorded such
fair-report protection. 295 It repeatedly emphasized the foundational
media as a "mere substitute for the public eye and ear"296 function of
fair report. This openness to the public does act as a set of modest
partial constraints by allowing those present, both media and nonmedia, to pose questions, compare written releases with spontaneous
comments, suggest alternative hypotheses or conclusions, and assess
motivation-in other words, it permits members of the media to act as
trained professionals in evaluating the content, bases for, and biases
underlying the prosecutor's comments. Of course, the officeholder
may decline to entertain questions. This would itself reflect on the
authoritativeness, dignity, and officialness of the press conference,
and whether it should be accorded fair-report protection.
288.

Borg v. Boas, 231 F.2d 788, 792-95 (9th Cir. 1956). The meeting was called to

look into an incident involving an alleged battery at a private club. Id. at 789. The primary
speaker and the source of the defamatory charges was a naval officer who was trying to
protect the interests of his student, the alleged victim. Id. This source acted with an
"honest purpose" but apparently much that was said-any and everyone had an
opportunity to speak-was rumor. Id. at 792-94. The court analogized the meeting to a
New England town meeting and the press's performance of its "most valuable function" in
"reporting proceedings ... relat[ing] to the administration of law," deeming such reportage
"vital" in a representative democracy, because "[o]therwise, there is no guard against
maladministration." Id. at 794.
289.
Id. at 794.
290.
Id. at 792, 795.
291.
See supra text accompanying notes 214-222.
292.
See supra text accompanying notes 40-45, 123, 253; infra text accompanying
notes 346, 347.
293.
See supra text accompanying notes 148-179, 220-222.
294.
See supra text accompanying note 223.
295.
Wright v. Grove Sun Newspaper Co., Inc., 873 P.2d 983, 985 n.1, 986-90, 992
(Okla. 1994).
296.
Id. at 985 n.1.
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Wright did what other courts have not, and broadly treated
politically motivated unofficial disclosures as "official" and entitled to
fair report -without even blinking the proverbial eye. In other words,
the majority adopted a version of an old adage-if it walks like a duck
and quacks like a duck, it must be a duck even if it is obviously and
eminently a ravenous fox in thinly veiled duck plumage ready to shred
throat. This partisanship was not, the court opined, "imputable" 297 to
the media. But was the media immune from being required not to
ignore what was apparently perfectly obvious to all-that the county
district attorney therein (like Nifong) was in the midst of a heated
election campaign? This was clear to the media in the Wright case, as
the court seemed to acknowledge. 29 It was likewise clear to the local
and national media in the Duke lacrosse case (although largely
ignored or grossly understated by the latter).299
In such
circumstances, can the media not legitimately be required to forego
ostrich-head-in-the- sand know-nothingness and intelligently assess
whether a public press conference is an "official" act or proceeding
rather than a political act indistinguishable from a campaign event?
The integrity of the law and the media demand an affirmative
response.
As the partial dissenters indicated in Wright,30 0 professional
limitations on inflammatory prosecutorial public statements are
hugely important to the right of fair trial, respect for the law and the
criminal justice system, and the rights of the individual, whether or
not formally accused. And in light of the prodigious volume of
national publicity given to the Duke lacrosse case and Nifong's
prosecutorial misconduct, accepted restrictions on inflammatory
public statements by prosecutors and parallel affirmative duties of
fairness imposed on them-always a matter of public record for the
responsible professional reporter-are now and should remain a
prominent fixed star in a reporter's field of vision, both as a matter of
journalistic ethics and legal liability. The North Carolina Attorney
General called Nifong a "rogue prosecutor" 30 1 while some have
suggested his acts were aberrational. 30 2 Others have suggested his

297.
Id. at 988, 988 n.23; see also id. at 985.
298.
See supra text accompanying notes 257-260.
299.
See infra text accompanying notes 379-385, 438, 469-471.
300.
See supra text accompanying notes 269-274.
301.
TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 351-52 (press conference on Apr. 11,
2007).
302.
Adam Liptak, The Nation; ProsecutorBecomes Prosecuted, N.Y. TIMES, June 24,
2007, at 1 (quoting the vice-president of the National District Attorney's Association as
saying that such misconduct was "rarer than human rabies") [hereinafter Liptak].
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varied forms of misconduct are not uncommon, 30 3 but are rarely
disciplined. 30 4 Only time will tell whether this disciplinary desert
changes.
In any event, the media has been put on notice: prosecutors do
act unseemly, unprofessionally, and even corruptly. In the future,
when a prosecutor attempts to convict or pillory either an accused or a
political opponent through public statements or press conferences,
journalistic "red flags" should arise instantly. These "red flags" should
create unquestionably important concerns about falsity and fault in
assessing responsible reliance thereon. Equally and equitably, they
should make the media exceedingly wary of being willingly complicit
in facilitating the destruction of lives and reputations. The media
does, after all, bear the burden of demonstrating that fair report is
applicable. 30 5 One of the few bright sides of the "Nifonging" of the
Duke lacrosse players' reputations is that future courts will likely very
closely scrutinize press-conference statements in assessing the
justifiability of according them fair-report protection.
If, as suggested above, unofficial public statements and
prosecutors' press conferences, whether involving a Nifong or a
scenario similar to Wright, should not be entitled to fair report, what
is the default scenario? Obviously, at minimum the appropriate First
Amendment fault-regarding-substratal-falsity rule based on a
plaintiffs status as a public 30 6 or private plaintiff applies 30 7 unless
state law accords the plaintiff more extensive protection. 30 Assuming,
arguendo, that a court decides that some level of fair report should
apply, what are the options? Discarding the quasi-absolute "made[original
of
the
approach
]solely[-] for"-malicious-purposes
Restatement,30 9 Section 611 of its 1977 successor accords all matters
303.

Id. at 1-2.

304.
Id. at 1 (citing sources as saying discipline of prosecutors was "light or
nonexistent" and explaining that the Nifong disbarment was a case of him getting "a taste

of something like his own medicine, a trial in the court of public opinion").
305. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 613(2) (1977) ("In an action for defamation
the defendant has the burden of proving, when the issue is properly raised, the presence of
the circumstances necessary for the existence of a privilege to publish the defamatory
communication.") (emphasis added); id. at cmts. h, i; ELDER, FAIR REPORT, supra note 147,
at 345-50.
306.
See supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
307.
See supra text accompanying notes 40-45.
See supra text accompanying note 253; infra text accompanying notes 345-346.
308.
309. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 611 (1938). As the author has opined elsewhere, this
limitation would give all defendants a "quasi-absolute privilege" in most fair report cases.
ELDER, FAIR REPORT, supra note 147, at 306 n.37. Other well-known commentators have
reached a parallel conclusion. See ELDREDGE, supra note 278, at 421 ("As a practical
matter, this gave the news media a complete immunity . .. because a newspaper, for
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covered by fair report an absolute privilege. 310 In other words, a
media defendant can ignore known substratal falsity as long as the
matter is fairly and accurately reported. 311 Absent any statute,3 1 2
almost no case law supported this position at the time of its
adoption. 313 The Supreme Court's limited references on point have

example, would always have one purpose, informing the public."); KEETON ET. AL., supra
note 124, § 115, at 838 (noting, "as a practical matter," the "made solely for" criterion gave
defendants a privilege to report accurately despite absence of belief in truth); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS app. § 611, 134 (1981) (concluding that there appears to
be no decisions defeating fair report under "the purpose to harm" limitation).
310.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 cmt. a (1977) ("[T]he privilege exists
even though the publisher himself does not believe the defamatory words he reports to be
true and even when he knows them to be false.") (emphases added). Fair report applies to "a
report of an official action or proceeding or of a public meeting that deals with a matter of
public concern, even though the report contains what he knows to be a false and defamatory
statement." Id. at cmt. b (emphasis added). Constitutional fault based on status then
becomes important only in cases of substantial inaccuracy or unfairness. See id. cmts. b, f.
311.
Id; see supra text accompanying notes 182-189.
312.
See ELDER; FAIR REPORT, supra note 147, at 283 (listing available statutes, and
concluding that the "well-settled view" of the common law fair report was defeated by
"malice").
313.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS app. § 611, 134-35 (1981) (citing three
Supreme Court opinions as supporting an absolute privilege of fair report: Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971); and Greenbelt
Coop. Publ'g Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970)). As the ALI drafters note, Pape and
Firestone dealt with the appropriate fault standard in abuse-of-fair-report cases-negligent
misinterpretation for private persons (Firestone)and knowing or reckless misinterpretation
for public persons (Pape). Id. at app. § 611, 134-35. Actually, the narrow holding of Pape
was based on an absence of any material inaccuracy in light of the extraordinary ambiguity
in the report the defendant attempted to synthesize. See Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra
note 105, at 570, 570 n.143. The third case, Greenbelt Cooperative, was incorrectly
interpreted by the drafters of the Restatement as indicating "a constitutional privilege to
report an accurate report of an official governmental proceeding." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS app. § 611, 134. No reasonable construction of the Court's opinion supports such
an analysis, despite dicta to the effect that public meetings are of "particular First
Amendment concern." Greenbelt, 398 U.S. at 11; see also Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra
note 105, at 564-65. The drafters also referenced as secondary authority Cox Broadcasting
Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), and Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc., 556 F.2d
113 (2d Cir. 1977). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS app. § 611, 134-35. Of course, Cox
Broadcasting involved reportage of true, not false, matter. See infra text accompanying
note 316. Edwards involved a quite different concept-neutral reportage-which did not
involve official public proceedings or reports, but instead involved acts by private
individuals or public officials in an unofficial capacity. See supra text accompanying note
268 and see infra text accompanying 335. The only other case cited by the ALI drafters was
Mathis v. PhiladelphiaNewspapers, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 406 (E.D. Pa. 1978), which adopted
the recently approved new RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611, app. § 611 at 134-35.
Interestingly, the court cited approvingly the then Pennsylvania law on point, which made
fair report defeasible under the "solely for the purpose"-of-malice test articulated in the
original Restatement. Mathis, 455 F. Supp at 17. However, the plaintiff had not provided a
"shred of evidence" to support forfeiture on this ground. Id.
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been extremely ambiguous. 314 One case in particular, Time, Inc. v.
Firestone,315 provides terse dictum interpreting Cox Broadcasting,Co.
v. Cohn,316 which involved substantially true matter, that seems to
protect "[t]he public interest in accurate reports of judicial proceedings
"317

While there are arguably compelling arguments for absolutism
in accurately reporting judicial, legislative, and some other official
proceedings, 318 it is not ineluctably clear that the Court (or courts
generally) would or should adopt Section 611's knee-jerk absolutism in
the "public meeting"/"open to the public"/"public concern" setting or in
the case of press conferences of the unofficial-statements variety
involved in Wright and abused by Nifong. Both involve scenarios open
to enormous abuse where traditional controls and restraints may not
function effectively or are largely absent. 319
The common law
assiduously made such accounts defeasible by some version of
common-law malice. 320 The Supreme Court appeared to sanction this
qualified-privilege approach in its cited authority in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan.321 Moreover, the Court may have somewhat modified
its strong defense of trial reportage in its analysis in Time, Inc. v.

314.
ELDER, FAIR REPORT, supra note 147, at 297 (noting that the Court's
jurisprudence on fair report's constitutional status is "decidedly ambiguous, somewhat

confusing, and somewhat confused"); see also Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 38
(1971) (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.) (citing the Restatement of Torts "made-solely-for"
"conditional" privilege for fair report); Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 152, n.18
(1967) (plurality opinion of Harlan, J.) (referring in dictum to fair report as "absolute");
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 65 n.1 (1964) (footnoting without discussing a state
fair-report statute applicable in criminal defamation defeasible by "actual malice" of the
common law variety). This was without any suggestion by Justice Brennan, the Court's
most consistent media-protector, that such a limitation "posed any constitutional
difficulties." See ELDER, FAIR REPORT, supra note 147, at 297.
315.
424 U.S. 448, 457 (1976) (applying the First Amendment minimal-fault
negligence standard to the defendant's inaccurate interpretation of plaintiffs divorce as
granted on dual grounds of adultery and extreme cruelty); see supra text accompanying
note 54; infra text accompanying note 322.
316.
420 U.S. 469, 471-75, 489-97 (1975) (according substratally true matter of open
public record absolutely protected status in suits based on privacy torts of public disclosure
and intrusion upon seclusion); see also Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 105, at 576-82,
603-13 (discussing Cox and its substratal truth focus); ELDER, PRIVACY, supra note 77, chs.
2, 3 (discussing privacy torts).
317.
Firestone, 424 U.S. at 457 (emphasis added); see also Wolston v. Reader's Digest
Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 169 (1979).
318.
See ELDER, FAIR REPORT,

supra note 147, §§ 1:00, 3:01-:02;
DEFAMATION, supra note 3, §§ 3:1-:17.
319.
See supra text accompanying notes 214-308.
320.
See supra text accompanying notes 184-189.
321.
See supra text accompanying notes 187-189, 210, 243-248.

ELDER,
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Firestone.322 It also later compellingly distinguished reportage of
judicial proceedings from the more limited public interest in knowing
what police release to the public in cases of true matter in officialincident reports. 323
This analogy suggests exceptional caution
regarding the level of fair report protection given to publicly released
false matter in unofficial remarks by a prosecutor and to all matters of
public concern at a public meeting.
Taking into account the extraordinary uniformity of the Court's
staunch rejection of First Amendment absolutism, it is quite probable
that the Court will eventually narrowly limit Section 611's knee-jerk
grandiosity or reject it entirely in favor of a constitutional-maliceregarding-substratal-falsity forfeiture standard3 24 in the scenarios
discussed above-and perhaps beyond. The Court would likely find no
First Amendment justification in deceiving the public 325 by accurately
reporting "calculated falsehood,"326 even if found within the four

322.

Firestone, 424 U.S. at 475 ("The details of many, if not most, courtroom battles

would add almost nothing toward advancing the uninhibited debate on public issues
thought to provide principal support for the decision in New York Times.") (emphasis

added). The Court's analysis was in the context of the media's unsuccessful attempt to
carve out a New York Times Co.-level fault standard for all inaccuratereportage of judicial
proceedings regardless of plaintiff status. Id. at 455, 457. As the author has indicated
elsewhere, fair report, with its fairness-accuracy and "public supervisory" functions, is a
"quite different and distinguishable" scenario. Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 105, at
581 n.225.
323.
Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 105, at 827-28, 828 n.1723; Florida Star v.
B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532 (1989) (rejecting Cox Broadcasting as controlling precedent;
suggesting that the latter involved "courthouse records ... open to public inspection"; and
emphasizing "the important role the press plays in subjecting trials to public scrutiny and
thereby helping guaranteeing their fairness"). The Court also acknowledged the diminished
privacy interest in matter already in the public record and the self-censorship potential
resulting from making such "generally available" but then punishing disseminators for
their offensiveness. Id. at 531 n.7. In the case before it, no such "public scrutiny" was
"directly compromised" because the information emanated from a police report "prepared
and disseminated" at a time when "not only had no adversarial criminal proceedings
begun, but no suspect had been identified." Id. at 352.
324.
Supra note 35.
325.
See Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 105, at 618-20 (citing the Court's
"compelling and eloquent defense of a state's authority to sanction ...pollution of public
discourse") (citations omitted); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 776-77, 777
n.6 (1984) (citing the state criminal-defamation statute as illustrative of the state's
legitimate interest in "safeguarding its populace from falsehood"); Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) (rejecting protection for "the lie, knowingly and deliberately
published about a public official" as "at once at odds with the premises of democratic
government and with the orderly manner in which economic, social, or political change is to
be effected," and noting both historically and modernly that some are "unscrupulous
enough and skillful enough to use the deliberate or reckless falsehood as an effective
political tool to unseat the public servant or even topple an administration").
326.
Garrison, 379 U.S. at 75 (using "calculated falsehood" as an abbreviation for
knowing and reckless falsehoods).
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corners of partisan, unofficial prosecutorial statements at a press
conference or during a public campaign appearance.
B. Neutral Reportage
Related to but separate from the issue of bestowal of fair report
is the highly controversial doctrine of neutral reportage, a doctrine
fabricated from whole cloth 32 7 by Judge Irving Kaufman in Edwards v.
National Audubon Society.328 Misusing and abusing precedent, the
Second Circuit came to the extraordinary conclusion that media
defendants could accurately report statements from "responsible,
prominent" 32 9 sources, at least about public persons, 330 with
impunity, 33 1 i.e., despite knowing that the statements are "calculated
falsehoods," 33 2 or, more colloquially, a pack of lies. This distinctly
minority variant 333 provides absolutist protection from traditional
republisher liability3 34 under circumstances involving private,
unofficial sources that would not otherwise be even arguably covered
335
by fair report.
An analysis of the New York Times articles on the Duke
lacrosse case evidences that the newspaper regularly relied on and
accurately quoted statements and sources 33 6 of dubious objectivity
327.
Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 105, at 640-55 (analyzing, in depth,
neutral reportage and Edwards v. NationalAudubon Society, 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1977)).
556 F.2d 113. In light of the court's absence-of-constitutional-malice, alternative
328.
finding, the neutral-reportage aspect has been regularly cited as dicta. See Elder, Media
Jabberwock, supra note 105, at 641-42, 642 n.654.
329.
Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120.
330.
Id; see infra text accompanying notes 342-351.
331.
Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120. The media defendant was not required to "take up
cudgels against dubious charges" and was not required to censor such "newsworthy
statements merely because it had serious doubts regarding their truth." Id. (emphasis
added). The Court referenced neutral reportage in only one case-Harte-Hanks
Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton-andin doing so noted that the district court had
found the source not "responsible, prominent," and stated that the petitioner had not
pursued the issue before the Court. 491 U.S. 657, 660-61, 660 n.1 (1989). Note that neutral
reportage clearly and explicitly circumvents the constitutional malice limitation.
332.
See supra text accompanying notes 35, 325-26.
333.
See Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 105, at 627-723.
334.
Id. at 723-28.
335.
Norton v. Glenn, 860 A.2d 48, 52-53, 53 n.6 (Pa. 2004) (noting that neutral
reportage is an "animal distinct" from fair report and arises, as in the case before it, from
the media's perceived right to publish accurate accounts of "statements ... not made in the
course of official proceedings"); see also supra note 267.
336.
See Karen W. Arenson, Duke Grappling With Impact of Scandal on Its
Reputation, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2006, at 2, available at http://www.nytimes.com2006/04/07
/education/07duke.html? (quoting Tallman Trask, III, the overseer of athletics at Duke, as
aware of the lacrosse players' fifteen violations over three years and concluding that "[ilt
is
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and/or knowledge of the facts. Should such accurate depictions be
given neutral-reportage protection? Take, for example, the Times
quotation of then-Duke Professor Houston A. Baker, Jr., a strident
multiculturalist/agent provocateur, who lambasted the entire Duke
lacrosse team, accusing Duke athletics, like many universities' sports
programs (and specifically University of Colorado football), of the
"blind-eyeing of male athletes, veritably given license to rape, maraud,
337
deploy hate speech and feel proud of themselves in the bargain."
Should the Times be accorded absolute protection for accurately
republishing such defamatory drivel? Of course, courts generally-

a stretch to get from their previous boorish behavior to gang rape") (hereinafter, Arenson);
Nicholas D. Kristof, Jocks and Prejudice, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2006, available at
http://www.dukenews.duke.edulmmedia/pdf/kristof611.pdf (noting the Houston Baker
comment in the context of racial stereotyping) (hereinafter, Kristof); Rick Lyman, New
Strain on Duke's Ties With Durham, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2006, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/31/us/31durham.html?_r=l (indicating that people were
scrutinizing Duke's response by quoting a student who asked, "Is this going to be a team of
rich white men who get away with assaulting a black woman?"); Lyman & Drape, supra
note 216, at 1 (quoting campus marchers as saying, "Out of the dark and into the street, we
won't be raped, we won't be beat"); Juliet Macur, Duke Players' Accuser Finds Ways to
Avoid News Media, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006
(quoting the student-government president
/04/03/sports/othersports/031acrosse.htm
saying, "We want to let her know that, no matter her occupation, she shouldn't have been
victimized"); Juliet Macur, Three Miles and a World Away, A Vigil for the Accuser, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 4, 2006, available at http://nytimes.com/2006/04/04/sports/othersports
/04duke.html?n (quoting a student who grabbed the mike during hip-hop at a student
election rally and stated, "A student here has been raped, don't you know that ....Wake
up. We need to support her"); Juliet Macur, With City on Edge, Duke Students Retreat, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 2, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.comI2006/04/02/sports/02duke.html?
(quoting a woman who lived near the accuser as stating, "If she was a white woman raped
by black students, the whites would be in an uproar and things would be more out of
hand," and claiming that the players were "treated like high class" and "being protected
because they have money"); Duff Wilson, Ethics Hearing for Duke Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES,
June 13,
2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/13/us/13duke.html?
(paraphrasing a Durham black activist ejected from the courtroom during a lunch break
during the proceedings,as saying to one of the mothers of an accused, "[P]eople still thought
her son did something wrong and should have stood trial").
Arenson, supra note 336; see also David Brooks, Virtues and Victims, N.Y.
337.
2006, available at http://select.nytimes.com/2006/04/09/opinion
TIMES, Apr. 9,
/09brooks.html?. Later, after the charges were dropped and North Carolina Attorney
General Roy A. Cooper termed the accused "innocent" and Nifong a "rogue prosecutor," the
mother of one of the lacrosse team players asked Baker by e-mail to reconsider his
defamatory statements. Peter Applebome, After Duke Prosecution Began to Collapse,
at
15,
2007,
available
TIMES,
Apr.
Continued,
N.Y.
Demonizing
http://select.nytimes.com/2007/04/15/nyregion/15towns.html?n (detailing the exchange).
Incredibly, Baker responded 'LIES!,"' called her a "provocateur... trying to get credit for a
scummy bunch of white males!," further characterized them as "farm animals," and nastily
stated that, "[Q]uite sadly, [she was the] mother of a farm animal." Id.; see supra text
accompanying notes 11-14.
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despite some recent aggressive media efforts to the contrary 33 8-do not
accord such accurate accounts a truth defense or bar plaintiffs from
challenging the statement's underlying falsity. 339 This reflects the
Court's own unequivocal view on the issue in Masson v. New Yorker
Magazine.340
Should the courts nonetheless bypass established
Supreme Court jurisprudence on status-based fault regarding
underlying falsity 341 by according neutral reportage protection?
The issue is not merely an academic exercise. Take the
situation of a New York-domiciled Duke lacrosse player who
legitimately believes that he was defamed by such a statement. 342
Should suit be allowed? New York's state and federal courts have
taken dramatically different positions on the issue.
New York
completely rejects neutral reportage under these circumstances,
apparently in regard to public and private persons alike. 343 The
Second Circuit, author of Edwards, has, on the other hand, reaffirmed
neutral reportage. 344 The court's decisions are unclear as to its
extension to private persons. 345 Nonetheless, the Second Circuit has
taken the bizarre position that New York's more-protective-than-theFirst Amendment stance in cases of matters involving a private

338.
See Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 105, at 728-55. Under this view,
which is not limited to the media, accurate reportage becomes truly Orwellian truth. See id.
at 732-40. As noted elsewhere, "[t]his accuracy-pseudo-truth is a stunning concept ... not
justified by 'common sense, the common law, the needs of the media, or the First
Amendment."' Id. at 729-30; see also ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 3, §2:4, 2-24 to -25.
339. See Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 105, at 728-55.
340. 501 U.S. 496, 514-17, 521-25 (1991) (adopting the historical understanding of
truth and holding that any deviation therefrom would be an "unnecessary departure from
First Amendment principles of general applicability," "essential principles" of the common
law since the late sixteenth century, and a "radical change" from the Court's
jurisprudence).
341.
See supra text accompanying notes 36-55, 248, 321, 324, 340; infra text
accompanying notes 386-388, 402-404, 525-534, 537; see also Elder, Media Jabberwock,
supra note 105, at 555-627.
342.
One of the Duke lacrosse accused, Collin Finnerty, is a native New Yorker.
Wilson & Glater, Prosecutor's Silence, supra note 216. The other two, David Evans and
Reade Seligman, are from Maryland and New Jersey, respectively. See id.
343.
See Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 105, at 696-98, 822-26 (interpreting
Hogan v. Herald Company, 444 N.E.2d 1002 (N.Y. 1982), which adopted the opinion of
Simons, J., in Hogan v. Herald Co., 446 N.Y.S.2d 836 (App.Div. 1982), viewing plaintiffs
private-person status as "unquestionably irrelevant" to the Hogan analysis).
344. Law Firm of Daniel P. Foster, P.C. v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 844 F.2d 955,
961 n.12 (2d Cir. 1988) (noting that New York decisions would not be binding as a matter
of federal constitutional law).
345. Id. at 961; see aslo Konikoff v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 234 F.3d 92, 105 n.11
(2d Cir. 2000) (noting that the circuit had adopted neutral reportage as to public figures);
Levin v. McPhee, 917 F. Supp. 230, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (not resolving the issue and
rejecting neutral reportage for other reasons).
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person and public concern 346 may anesthetize the media from suits by
private persons because the media could be found not to have acted
347
grossly irresponsibly in neutrally reporting known or suspected lies.
Aside from New York federal courts and a small minority of
other jurisdictions, 348 neutral reportage should not be a problem if, the
Duke lacrosse players generally, and the three accused specifically,
are viewed as private rather than public persons. 349
The
overwhelming view 350 of the decisions rejects neutral reportage in the
private-person setting-and appropriately so. 351 Additionally, it is not
altogether clear that a rabble-rousing provocateur such as Professor
Baker would be viewed as a "prominent, responsible source" under
this exceedingly nebulous criterion. 352 Only a small and highly
controversial minority view has focused on "prominence,"' 35 3 even in
346.

See supra text accompanying note 253.
347.
Konikoff, 234 F.3d, at 104-05 (noting that it would "ordinarily," but "not
necessarily," be "grossly irresponsible" to publish a knowingly or recklessly false statement,

and that New York might well decide to adopt such a stance to "harmonize" "an anomaly"
that seems to be "more apparent than real"). As the author has said elsewhere, such a New
York development seems "extraordinarily, even laughably, unlikely." Elder, Media
Jabberwock, supra note 105, at 822. It was conceded that such an interpretation infused a
version of "neutral reportage protection" into New York law. Konikoff, 234 F.3d at 104 n.11.
Of course, this approach also circumvents neutral reportage's general limitation, where
adopted at all, to public persons. See supra text accompanying notes 268, 330; infra text
accompanying notes 342-351.
348.
Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 105, at 657-64.
349.
See supra text accompanying notes 132-140.
350.
Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 105, at 657-60 (noting that under the
"overwhelming consensus" view, neutral reportage does not extend to private persons,
despite a "small but dubious and unpersuasive minority view" to the contrary).
351.
Id. at 659-60 ("The cases reflect an almost visceral antipathy to the illogical
suggestion that the Supreme Court, having withdrawn from Rosenbloom's adoption of
Sullivan to Gertz's minimal fault standard, would precipitously and magically reverse itself
and revitalize Rosenbloom's qualified First Amendment privilege into newsworthiness
absolutism. This would require a constitutional quantum leap. Even the media, with
massive resources at its command, has no success in making this position palatable to the
courts.").
352.
See Elder, Media Jabberwock,supra note 105, at 664-72.
353.
Id. at 666-69
("The rationale for this minority view is syllogistic. Source reliability is
irrelevant to the purposes fulfilled by neutral reportage-the public interest in
all disclosures about public controversies. By definition, then, a 'responsible'
source/trustworthiness requisite is likewise deemed irrelevant. In other words,
the neutral reportage purpose is to shed light on the parties to the controversy,
with the citizenry left to judge the merits of their competing positions. The net
effect is unconscionable; it provides absolute protection to dissemination of
charges by such an exemplar of trustworthiness as a convicted felon who has
flunked a lie detector test ....

If adopted, the 'prominent' source/public person

gets an opportunity via the republisher's immunity from liability to gain
widespread exposure for a calculated falsehood. The public person plaintiff takes
a knock-out blow below the belt and is left remediless against the media
republisher, all in the interest of letting the public be the 'ultimate arbiter' of the
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public-person plaintiff cases, as being alone sufficient for neutral
reportage protection.
As I have suggested in detail elsewhere, in the now-leading
case of Norton v. Glenn,3 5 4 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court gave a
withering, unanswerable critique 355 to neutral reportage, refusing to
accord a media defendant neutral-reportage protection where a codefendant borough council member made charges of homosexual
misconduct against the public official plaintiffs (the mayor and
borough council president) outside the council's chambers following a
council meeting. 35 6 The reporter was on notice that there were
substantial reasons to seriously doubt the source's credibility 35 7 but
nonetheless proceeded to accurately publish his statements.
A
unanimous court rejected any "blanket immunity" 35 based on the
purported "special role"359 of the media, emphasizing that this
"sweeping privilege" 360 would eviscerate much of state defamation law.
It emphasized that the constitutional-malice standard, repeatedly
reaffirmed by the Court, 36 1 would not be "jettison[ed]" by it to "so
sharply tilt the balance" 36 2 against reputation.

competing positions. As a distinguished jurist said in another context, '[a]n

instinctively felt sense of injustice cries out against such a sharp bargain."').
354.
860 A.2d 48 (Pa. 2004).
355.
For an extended discussion, see Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 105, at
627-40.
356.
Id. at 49-50.
357.
Brief in Opposition to Certiorari at 4-5, Tory Publ'g Co. v. Norton, 544 U.S. 956
(2005) (No. 04-979), 2005 WL 438008 (including groundless parallel charges of
homosexuality directed at the reporter); Brief of Appellee Wolf at 5-6, Norton v. Glenn, 860
A.2d 48 (Pa. 2004) (Nos. 18, 19 MAP 2003) (same); Brief of Appellee Norton at 5, 7-8,
Norton, 860 A.2d 48 (Nos. 18, 19 MAP 2003) (same; indicating "substantial doubts"
regarding the source's charges; and detailing evidence, areas of investigation, and sources
of information evidencing the source's suspect credibility and information).
358.
Norton, 860 A.2d at 56-57.
359.
Id. at 56.
360.
Id.
361.
Id. at 55-57; see supra text accompanying notes 36-55, 73-76, 99-100, 190-193,
198-200, 324-326; infra text accompanying notes 401-405, 525-534, 537.
362.
Norton, 860 A.2d at 57. The court found no greater protection under the
Pennsylvania Constitution. Id. at 57-58.
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III. THE NEW YORK TIMES COVERAGE-THE AUGUST 25TH, 2006 "BODY
OF EVIDENCE" ARTICLE AS "CALCULATED FALSEHOOD"

In assessing Taylor and Johnson's highly critical analysis of
the New York Times, 36 3 I took a tripartite approach and examined the
newspaper's own web-available standards, critically scrutinized the
articles chronologically and as a collective, and perused selective
reviews of the book and the Duke lacrosse scenario generally. A
perusal of the Times own published standards was quite revealing and
provided insight into why the paper's coverage was so shockingly
unprofessional and universally deplored. 364 The manual is filled with

For examples see supra text accompanying notes 25; infra text accompanying
363.
notes 365, 373, 383, 385, 397, 399, 413, 417-418, 421, 428-429, 438, 440, 449, 452, 454, 459,
462, 473, 477-478, 481-482, 484, 487-488, 493, 500-501, 504, 508-509, 520, 523-524.
364.
See Kristof, supra note 336 (imploring the media, and at least in part the
Times, to engage in "some deep reflection" and to "look beyond race and focus relentlessly
on facts"); Clarence Page, What the Duke Lacrosse Case has Taught Us, JEWISH WORLD
REV., Sept. 10, 2007 (giving the Times "a well-deserved skewering"); Andrea Peyser, Duke
Case: Will The Times Apologize?, N.Y. POST, Apr. 12, 2007, available at
http://www.nypost.com/seven/O4122007/postopinion/opedcolumnists/duke-casewill the-ti
Thomas Sowell, Duking It Out:
mes-apologize__opedcolumnists-andrea-peyser.htm;
available at
19,
2007,
June
ONLINE,
Unfinished Business, NAT'L REVIEW
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=ZWFkNzAyZDEwOTJjNjJhNDMOMzQ4MWJjZDYzN
TRlMGQ= (listing the Times as among those that "disgraced themselves in hyping a lynchmob atmosphere" when the case first became public; noting that it was not a "naive
ingenue," and citing its support for Al Sharpton's "fraudulent accusations" in the Tawana
Brawley matter, with its parallel "politically correct" stature of a black accuser and white
accused) [hereinafter Sowell, Duking]; Thomas Sowell, New York Times Buried the Duke
Story: The Press is Biased in Reporting University Scandals, CHARLESTOWN DAILY MAIL,
Oct. 3, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 1950 1144 (noting that Duke President Brodhead's
apology was truncated and placed next to the obituaries on page twenty-eight of the Times)
[hereinafter Sowell, New York Times Buried]; Abigail Thernstrom, The Massacre of
Innocence, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2007, available at http://www.opinionjournal.com
/la?id=110010564 (criticizing the paper's "particularly egregious" coverage and noting that
such Nifong "allies-unlike the district attorney himself-paid no price for their shocking
indifference to the truth"); William L. Anderson, Duke, the New York Times, and the
27,
2007,
Apr.
LEwROCKWELL.COM,
Culture,
Political
American
("[T]he New York Times-with
http://www.lewrockwell.com/anderson/anderson183.html
the possible exception of the Durham Herald-Sun-had the worst coverage of the case of
any journalistic outlet in the country.") [hereinafter Anderson, American PoliticalCulture].
The Times, "at least as far as the Duke coverage is concerned, has starred in its role as the
Newspaper of Walter Duranty, whose prize-winning coverage and positive spin of Stalinist
collectivism in the Ukraine during the early 1930s-where '[h]istorians note that about
seven million people were starved to death,'-did not bar the Times from continuing to
hang his photo in the office lobby. Id. The Duke coverage is "a reminder that the Times is
all-too-happy to glorify an out-and-out liar as long as his political ideology is in the 'right
place."' Id.; Stuart Taylor, Jr., Hey Wait A Minute: Witness for the Prosecution?, SLATE,
Aug. 29, 2006, http://slate.com/toolbar.aspx?action=print&id=2148546 ("The Times still
seems bent on advancing its race-sex-class ideological agenda, even at the cost of ruining
the lives of three young men who it has reason to know are very probably innocent . ..
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lofty, haughty, self-congratulatory statements about the duty of
"strict" neutrality/impartiality, 365 the essentiality of "professional
detachment, free of any whiff of bias,"366 the necessity of "step[ping]
back and tak[ing] a hard look at whether [they] have drifted too close
to sources,"367 the absolute obligation to provide "complete,
unvarnished truth as best as [they] can learn it,"368 and a corollary,
righteous non-toleration of any "betray[al] [of their] fundamental pact"
with readership by publishing any knowingly or recklessly false
information. 369 In sum, the standards espouse a commitment to "the
370
highest standards of journalistic ethics."
Unfortunately, it is hard to conclude that these standards had
much, if any, impact on the paper's Duke lacrosse coverage. Take, for
example, its "whiff of bias" self-plaudit. Although the public editor
disclaimed "ideological bias" and found gaps attributable to
"journalistic lapses," 371 his assessment is largely at odds with the
record. Starting early in its coverage of the case, its reporters made
mean-spirited, highly inculpatory quantum leaps in logic based on
almost no evidence other than speculation, stating that the "code of
silence ... threatens to belie [the Duke lacrosse team members'] social
when many other true believers . . . have at last seen through the prosecution's fog of lies
and distortions.") [hereinafter Taylor, Witness for the Prosecution?].
365.
N.Y. TIMES, ETHICAL JOURNALISM: A HANDBOOK OF VALUES AND PRACTICES
FOR THE NEWS AND EDITORIAL DEPARTMENTS
1, 6, 9, 33-49, 61-62, 65 (2004), available
at http://www.nytco.com/pdVNYTEthical-Journalism-0904.pdf [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
Taylor and Johnson savage the Times on the neutrality issue, demonstrating how the early
balanced coverage by Joe Drape, giving equal treatment to information provided by defense
lawyers, resulted in the disappearance of his byline. TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at
120. Quoting Drape's statement that he was "having problems with the editors," the
authors cited sources, including one defense lawyer who had provided extensive evidence of
innocence to Drape and talked with him about why an expos6 of the hoax would not be
forthcoming, and concluded that the prevailing word was that "the editors wanted a more
pro-prosecution line. They also wanted to stress the race-sex-class angle without dwelling
on evidence of innocence. They got what they wanted from Drape's replacement, Duff
Wilson, whose reporting would become a journalistic laughingstock by summer ... " Id.
366.
HANDBOOK, supra note 365, 23.
367.
Id.
368.
Id. at 15.
369.
Id.
18.
370.
Id.
4.
371.
Byron Calame, Revisiting The Times's Coverage of the Duke Rape Case, N.Y.
TIMES,
Apr.
22,
2007,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/O4/22/opinion
/22pubed.html [hereinafter Calame, Revisiting]. Almost no one bought this argument,
however, viewing it as a whitewash. See, e.g., Anderson, American Political Culture, supra
note 364 ("Who does Calame think he's fooling? ... Calame, in short, appears unable or
unwilling to consider how the Times' failure in the lacrosse case-and having the thesis of
a paper's major article publicly dismissed as untrue surely constitutes a failure-was
attributable to reporters and editors allowing their worldviews to distort the facts.")
(quoting blogger K.C. Johnson).
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standing as human beings," 372 analogizing them to "the bold new
wardrobe of drug dealers and gang members engaged in an anti-snitch
campaign. . . ." Under such circumstances, the stigma of "traitor" was
"more powerful than the instinct to do what's right."373 Citing
illustrative examples, the author concluded: "Whatever the root, there
is a common thread: a desire for teammates to exploit the vulnerable
'' 74
without heeding a conscience.
372.
TIMES,

Selena Roberts, When Peer Pressure, Not a Conscience, Is Your Guide, N.Y.
Mar.

31,

2006,

available

at

http://select.nytimes.com/2006/03/31/sports

/31roberts.html (alteration in original); see also Harvey Araton, Do Duke Women Have
Nothing to Say?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2006, available at http://select.nytimes.com
/2006/04/02/sports/sportsspeciall/O2araton.html (analogizing the "made mute" players on
the women's basketball team to "the lacrosse players in the Blue Devils' wall of silence,
which serves only to insulate athletes and convince the reprobates among them that they
can get away with whatever") [hereinafter Roberts, Peer Pressure]; Harvey Araton, At
Duke, Coach K Avoids a Trap, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2006, available at
http://select.nytimes.coml2006/06/02/sports/02araton.htm (responding to his critics who
questioned his women's lacrosse innocence-solidarity stance, where he called "for letting
the system work" "without the accused being martyred, considering the long history in this
country of black women being abused by white men of means"-without realizing, or
acknowledging, of course, the inconsistency of this plea with his own stance as well as that
of the paper). Interestingly, Byron Calame, the paper's public editor, found "ample reason"
for Roberts's "code of silence" charge because players had "volunteered little eyewitness
information." Calame, Covering, supra note 23. It does not seem to have dawned on either
Roberts or Calame that no such evidence was provided because there was none. Blogger
and professor William L. Anderson cites the Roberts/Araton missives as illustrative of "the
real attitude of the Times" toward the Duke lacrosse matter, i.e., that the columnists from
the beginning "treated the Duke Lacrosse players as the second coming of the Klu Klux
Klan." Anderson, American Political Culture, supra note 364. In an exchange of e-mails
between Araton and himself, Anderson addressed the armbands-with-"innocent"-statedthereon controversy and suggested that "these women were close friends of the accused,
and they knew that the facts were not adding up, and that there was no rape, kidnapping,
or sexual assault." Id. However, "Araton never wrote back and.. .ignored [Anderson's]
subsequent emails." Id. (alteration in original). Anderson chastised Roberts and Araton,
among others, for failing to "do even basic research before publishing stories [claiming that]
they take the other approach that they are above having to do research like other people
who may have to get their hands a bit grubby before firing away in print." Id. (alteration in
original). He claimed that "[t]he tip-off... is that they rarely return e-mails to anyone who
criticizes them, and their 'we are untouchable' attitudes define their work." Id.
373.
See Roberts, Peer Pressure,supra note 372. In this same article, Roberts made a
highly misleading statement: "According to reported court documents, she was raped,
robbed, strangled, and was the victim of a hate crime." Id. (emphasis added). As the book's
authors suggest, "[t]he message is clear: lynch the privileged white boys [and] due process
be damned." TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 121 (alteration in original). This
overstated interpretation was criticized mildly by Byron Calame as a "nit I would pick,"
although "technically correct," since it suggested that "the case was farther down the road
than it was." Calame, Covering, supra note 23. Actually, this is more than a "nit," as it
strongly suggests that the documents demonstrated that the charges were both true and
proved. This is an error of significance that no experienced reporter should make.
374.
Roberts, Peer Pressure, supra note 372. When the dismissal of all charges was
rumored to be imminent, Selena Roberts continued her rants about "the irrefutable culture
of misogyny, racial animus and athletic entitlement that went unrestrained that night"
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What gave rise to such stereotyped preconceptions presuming
guilt? The Times (and other media following and emulating 375 its
unprofessionalism) seized upon a story line "precisely tuned to the
outrage frequency of the modern metropolitan bien pensant
journalist," 376 and "carr[ied] the standard of modern leftist political
culture," 377 thereby defaulting on its "gold standard" 378 reputation as
the national exemplar of journalistic integrity. Like Nifong, the Times
379
absorbed and exemplified "all the clues about the sanctified status"
of rape charges and accusations of racism and let these "weapons of
unequalled power," 3 0 fueled by a "ratings-driven rush to judgment, 38 1
override the essential question of why a prosecutor continued to
pursue rape charges "when DNA evidence of . . . guilt did not
materialize." 38 2 In addition, the Times let irrelevant diversions about
player immaturity, boorish behavior, and the dark humor e-mail of a
and tried to divorce the "crime" from the "culture." Selena Roberts, Closing a Case Will Not
Mean Closure at Duke, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2007, available at http://select.nytimes.com
/2007/03/25/sports/othersports/25roberts.html [hereinafter Roberts, Closing a Case]. She
ended her diatribe with the following attempt to resuscitate a repudiated thesis: "A
dismissal doesn't mean forget everything. Amnesia would be a poor defense to the next act
of athletic privilege." Id. One objective critic correctly described this missive as
"mystifying." See Smolkin, supra note 143, at 10; see also Clay Waters, Selena Roberts
Slurs Innocent Duke Lacrosse Players, Again, Apr. 11, 2007, http://www.timeswatch.org
/articles/2007/20070326114135.aspx ("When it comes to slurring innocent Duke lacrosse
players, sports columnist Selena Roberts is apparently angling to become the Amanda
Marcotte of the New York Times.").
375.
See supra text accompanying note 10.
376.
Kurt Andersen, Rape, Justice, and the 'Times,' Oct. 9, 2006, NEW YORK
MAGAZINE, available at http://nymag.com/news/imperialcity/22337 (quoting an unnamed
"senior Times alumnus") [hereinafter Andersen, Rape, Justice,and the 'Times'].
377.
Anderson, American Political Culture, supra note 364 ("[N]owhere did that
become more apparent than in its coverage of the infamous Duke lacrosse Non-Rape, NonKidnapping, and Non-Sexual Assault Case . .. [where the Times] managed to become the
'gold standard' for biased and inaccurate coverage.") (alteration in original).
378.
Id. (noting that it was once "the 'Newspaper of Record' and the place where all
good reporters wanted to spend their careers").
379.
Dorothy Rabinowitz, The Michael Nifong Scandal: The Duke Rape Hoax is
Redolent of Past Decades' Phony Child-Abuse Cases, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2007, available
at
http://www.opinionjournal.com/forms/printThis.html?id=1 10009507
(hereinafter,
Rabinowitz).
380.
Id.
381.
Jefferson Flanders, Journalists and the Duke Lacrosse Case, Apr. 16, 2007,
http://www.bloggernews.net/16065 (hereinafter, Flanders).
382.
Id.; see also Andersen, Rape, Justice, and the 'Times', supra note 376 (noting
that modern DNA tests are viewed as the "silver bullet that exonerates the unjustly
prosecuted"); Taylor, Witness for the Prosecution?, supra note 364 (noting the "sly
formulation" by the authors-whether there is a "body of evidence" to avoid the case being
bounced before trial--"while glossing over the more important question as to whether any
reasonable prosecutor could believe the three defendants to be guilty and force them
through the risk, expense, and trauma of a trial").
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player 83 somehow act as surrogates for real, admissible evidence of
guilt.
Meanwhile, the Times also ignored and/or chronically
downplayed the patently political and race-demagogic machinations of
Nifong. 384 As critics have asked, would the Times have "disgustingly
advanced the hoax" well after other media had distanced themselves if
the case had involved a comparable race-demagogue district attorney
in a racially divided district with an alleged white victim-accuser with
a criminal past and extensive psychological difficulties, along with a
nearly pristine alibi for one of the accused, if the alleged perpetrators
85
were African-Americans?
Of course, such strongly evidenced and unseemly Times
387
motivations do not suffice for, 386 but are supportive evidence of,
constitutional malice under Supreme Court precedent, as are
deviations from accepted journalistic standards, 38 8 including those of
the Times.3 89
Evidence of common law malice and breach of
journalistic standards helps explain why the defendants decided to
3 90
"disregard the most rudimentary precautions before publishing,"
and suggests a mindset "highly susceptible to the entertainment of

383.

See Flanders, supra note 381. One player with a sick sense of humor emailed

teammates after the lacrosse party that he planned to have some strippers over and kill
and skin them. Teammates recognized the "pale imitation" to the book and movie,
American Psycho, "a point the media entirely ignored." TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1,
at 138-39. Except for the e-mail, the negative press portrayal of the Duke lacrosse team
was excoriated by a committee led by Duke law professor James Coleman, which looked
into the misogynistic/racist stereotypes bantered about in the press and gave the team an
overall positive assessment. While the group had issues with alcohol, such was
indistinguishable from Duke students as a whole. Of course, this stereotype negation got
little press attention-it was "the proverbial tree falling in the forest with nobody around
to hear it." TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 209, 211.
384.
Cf.
William
L.
Anderson,
Desperate Times,
Aug.
26,
2006,
http://www.lewrockwell.com/anderson/andersonl38.html [hereinafter Anderson, Desperate
Times] (referring to Nifong's case as "bogus").
385.
Andersen, American Political Culture, supra note 364 (quoting the criticism of
blogger K.C. Johnson); Peyser, supra note 364 (noting that "[w]orst of all, this story so
neatly fit the radical agenda of our 'newspaper of record"'); see also TAYLOR & JOHNSON,
supra note 1, at 126-27 (citing examples where minorities were the alleged perpetrators
and where the media refrained from creating "a metanarrative styling the accused as
personifying broader social ills involving sex, class, or interracial rape" as in the Duke
case).
386.
See Harte-Hanks Commc'n, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 667-68 (1989);
ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 3, §7:3, 7-69.
387.
See Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 667-68; ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 3, §7:3,
7-69-7-70.
388.
See Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 667-68; ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 3, §7:2,
7-22.
389.
See supra text accompanying notes 364-370.
390.
Fopay v. Noveroske, 334 N.E.2d 79, 91 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
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serious doubts concerning probable falsity." 39 1 Additionally, such
evidence indicates why a publisher is "not in the least concerned ...
with the true facts," 392 shows "an atmosphere infected with a
disposition to ignore [calculated] falsehood[] ,'393 "provide[s] a motive
for defaming someone or explain[s] apparently illogical leaps to
unsupported conclusions,"' 394 and demonstrates that the defendant has
adopted and would implement a preconceived order of battle
"regardless of how the evidence developed and regardless of whether
395
or not [a source]'s story was credible upon ultimate reflection."
The aforesaid motivational influences help explain why the
Times, after acknowledging and detailing the major difficulties with
Nifong's case in both editorial columns 396 and a June 12, 2006, Duff
Wilson and Jonathan D. Glater article on the "growing perception of a
case in trouble"-including detailed analyses of information included
397
in the defense's motion throwing "the woman's claims into doubt" 39 8
decided to resurrect and resuscitate Nifong's fatally flawed case.
The Wilson and Glater 5600-word first page investigative piece on
August 25, 2006, became a laughing stock3 99 within hours, pilloried by
391.
Ct. 1978).

Cochran v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 372 N.E.2d. 1211, 1221 (Ind.App.

392.
Arber v. Stahlen, 170 N.W.2d. 45, 48 (Mich. 1969).
393.
Miller v. Argus Publ'g Co., 490 P.2d 101, 111 (Wash. 1971), overruled on other
grounds by Taskett v. KING Broad. Co., 546 P.2d 81 (Wash. 1976) (alteration in original).
394.
Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538, 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
395.
Harte-Hanks Commc'n, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 684 (1989)
(alteration in original).
See David Brooks, The Duke Witch Hunt, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2006, available
396.
at http://select.nytimes.com/2006/05/28/opinion/28brooks.html [hereinafter Brooks, Witch
Hunt]; Kristof, supra note 336.
397.
Wilson & Glater, Prosecutor'sSilence, supra note 216. Unlike the front-page
story on August 25, this story was "buried" on page thirteen. TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra
note 1, at 239. The authors largely used the same information later cited in the August 25
article. See infra text accompanying notes 409-523. However, the overall tone of the earlier
article was much more skeptical about the prosecutor's case and the accuser's claims.
398.
See Anderson, Desperate Times, supra note 384 ("With Michael Nifong's bogus
case . . .going further into the toilet, the New York Times steps in to try to rescue its
'prosecutor as hero."').
399.
See e.g., TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 269, 271 (noting that a mere
three hours after publication, "blogs deftly tore the piece to shreds, exposing the reporters'
factual errors, their omission of critical evidence, and their overall pro-Nifong bias" and
quoting MSNBC general manager Dan Abrams as characterizing the article as a
"shameful" "editorial on the front page of what is supposed to be the news division of the
newspaper"); Anderson, American Political Culture, supra note 364 (referring to the article
as an "infamous ...piece that treated an obviously false report as an Oracle of the Gods
from Mount Olympus"); Anderson, Desperate Times, supra note 384 ("The first thing to
remember is that the Times is desperate for this story to be 'true,' and if the facts don't
warrant its truth, the Times will use other methods ... [because] one can bet that the
editors do not want to be burned again [as they had with the Tawana Brawley story], and
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one well-respected critic as the "worst single piece of journalism" 40 0 he
had ever seen in a newspaper. But the Times published it. Why? And
was it published with constitutional malice or "calculated falsehood,"
i.e., knowing or reckless disregard of falsity by clear and convincing
40 1
evidence?
The Supreme Court famously provided detailed guidance as to
40 2
constitutional malice in the leading case of St. Amant v. Thompson,
where the Court indicated that the constitutional-malice standard will
be met when a defamatory statement is "fabricated by the defendant"
(or "the product of his imagination"), is based exclusively on an
"unverified anonymous telephone call," or is "so inherently improbable
40 3
that only a reckless man" would publish the defamatory matter.
Lastly, and most importantly, the recklessness subpart is met where
the publishing defendant has "obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of
'40 4
the informant or the accuracy of his reports.
Does the August 25 story qualify for liability under St. Amant,
or was its publication mere negligence under the "negligence-is-neverenough barrier" to liability in public-person cases? 40 5 As I tell
students and the occasional client with whom I consult, the first and
often most important source of evidence for proof of constitutional
malice is what the defendant knew at the time of publication that
As courts have
contradicted its published conclusions. 40 6
acknowledged, a defendant "cannot feign ignorance or profess good
faith when there are clear indications present which bring into

what better way to keep things going than to tell readers that Gottlieb's story is the gospel
truth?") (alteration in original); Flanders, supra note 381 (quoting journalists who were
"highly critical" of the story); Peyser, supra note 364 ("In a case of 'all the lies fit to print,'
the paper on Aug[ust] 25 affected an air of Timesian authority in a damning article, spoonfed by DA Nifong. It tried to put to rest some of the alarming inconsistencies in the
accuser's story about the night she was 'attacked."') (alteration in original); Rabinowitz,
supra note 379 ("[A] close study of [the article]'s wondrous logic ... should provide rich
material for students of the press for years to come") (alteration in original); Taylor,
Witness for the Prosecution?,supra note 364 (noting that the article's "flaws are so glaring
that it was shredded by bloggers within hours after it hit my doorstep"); see also TAYLOR &
JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 260-71, for a detailed critique.
400.
Anderson, American Political Culture, supra note 364 (quoting Stuart Taylor);
see also Smolkin, supra note 143 (noting that the Wilson and Glater article "emerged as the
single-most-derided substantial look at the Duke case").
401.
For discussions of constitutional malice, see supra text accompanying notes 386395; infra text accompanying notes 401-409, 429, 525-534, 537.
402.
390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968).
403.
See id.
Id. (emphasis added).
404.
See ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 3, §7:2, 7-8-7-32 (including a detailed
405.
analysis of cases); Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 105, at 615-16.
406.
See ELDER, DEFAMATION supra note 3, §7:12.
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question the truth or falsity of defamatory statements." 40 7 Refusing to
credit contradictory evidence might indicate that a defendant, "having
taken a position[,] . . .was unwilling to retreat ... despite evidence to
the contrary and continued to pursue [the defendant's] preconceived
plan to discredit [the plaintiff]."408 Such "hard evidence" is "not simply
a failure to investigate, but a failure to consider contradictory
evidence already in [its] possession. 4 °9
Of what evidence were Wilson and Glater aware prior to the
August 25 article? The four corners of the story fleshed out in
considerable detail demonstrate the authors' diagnosed "big
weaknesses" 410 or "major problems" 41 1 with Nifong's case, including
the huge problems with the accuser's varying accounts and
credibility. 41 2 Evidentiary inconsistencies included: (1) variances as to
how many perpetrators there were, 413 who did what, 41 4 and in what
407.
Hunt v. Liberty Lobby, 720 F.2d 631, 644 (11th Cir. 1983) (quoting Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 680 F.2d 527, 538 (7th Cir. 1982)).
408.
McHale v. Lake Charles Am. Press, 390 So. 2d 556, 563 (La. Ct. App. 1980).
409.
Robertson v. McCloskey, 666 F. Supp. 241, 250 (D.D.C. 1987) (alteration in
original).
410.
Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181.
411.
Id.
412.
One of the most damning was the accuser's statement that she was dancing
with three dancers, not one other dancer. See id. Moreover, she gave them specific names:
one name, "Nikki," was a professional monniker for her co-dancer, and the other two
mentioned were "Angel" and "Tammy." Id. True to form, the authors suggest that the
accuser may have had a "misunderstanding" of their roles. Id. It turns out, and the authors
state, that "Tammy" was the dispatcher and "Angel" was the name of the escort service. Id.
This is a mind-boggling "misunderstanding" which alone should have suggested to
responsible reporters that the accuser was not credible. See id.
413.
See id. The authors gave an interesting spin to this: "But the files show that
aside from two brief early conversations with the police, she gave largely consistent
accounts of being raped by three men in a bathroom." Id. Later in the article, the authors
tried to minimize the accuser's inconsistencies, citing the prosecutor's file for the following:
"[E]xcept in some initial contacts with the police, she gave a consistent account during that
night and since then of how many men had raped her." Id. (emphasis added). The authors
tried to undermine "early reports" relied on by the defense as apparently based on further
"misunderstandings." See id. The "version [of the alleged rape] in which she claimed to
have been raped by 20 men and changed her story 'several times"' was based on a written
report from a Duke University police officer, Christopher H. Day, after he overheard
Sergeant John C. Shelton's phone conversation. Id. (alteration in original). The authors
noted that Officer Day had not spoken with either the accuser or Sergeant Shelton, yet
they nonetheless added their own observation, the basis for which was not disclosed: "The
report of 20 men may have been a reference to an estimate of the number of men at the
party." Id. The authors did concede that a reference to five rapists, documented by a
woman police officer, Gwendolyn Sutton, who spoke with the accuser at the hospital, "has
not been explained." See id. But cf. TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 265 (viewing the
"largely consistent accounts" conclusion as the "most ludicrous" of Sergeant Mark D.
Gottlieb's lies in light of a "mass of contradictions" in the accuser's multiple accounts);
Taylor, Witness for the Prosecution?, supra note 364 (noting that after recanting, the
accuser "offered a succession of wildly inconsistent stories," and that while the accuser had
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order;4 15 (2) whether a rape occurred at all; 4 16 (3) the sudden transfer

to Duke Hospital from another facility when the alleged victim was
facing an overnight detention and alleged rape; 417 (4) the fact that
Duke medical records did not provide documentary evidence that a
rape had occurred; 4 18 (5) whether the accuser suffered other physical
injuries and the extent thereof;4 19 (6) variances in the descriptions of
her three attackers; 420 (7) absence of DNA evidence directly connecting
the accused to the accuser 421 or third-party corroboration that a rape
told the sexual-assault nurse a version implicating the second dancer in helping a lacrosse
player drag her into the house and stealing her money, three weeks later the accuser
settled on a three-player rape in which the players forcibly separated the two dancers
"while [holding] onto each other") (alteration in original).
414.
See Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181 (noting that
the victim had given two different names for the man who allegedly orally raped her).
415.
See id.
416.
See id. (providing that the accuser had made statements to Durham Police
Sergeant John C. Shelton-who had earlier reported her to be drunk-to the effect that she
was "groped, not raped," which resulted in a call to his watch commander that she was
withdrawing the rape charges; that Shelton thereafter heard her repeat her rape charges
to her doctor; and that after confronting her,"[s]he told [him that] she did not want to talk
to [him] anymore and then started crying and saying something about them dragging her
into a bathroom") (quoting Sergeant John C. Shelton) (alteration in original).
417.
See id. Sergeant Shelton directed the accused to be taken to an overnight
mental-health and substance-abuse center. Id. The authors then quoted a police officer as
saying that the victim answered affirmatively when asked if something had happened to
her and if she had been raped. Id. The story noted that she was then taken to Duke
University Medical Center. Id. The authors did not discuss, as others have in some detail,
that the accuser only made the rape charges when faced with an overnight stay. Id. Indeed,
even one of the paper's leading liberal op-ed columnists had drawn this conclusion. See
Kristof, supra note 336; see also TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 31.
418.
See Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181 (stating that
the medical report "did not say much [other than that there was] some swelling [but] no
visible bruises") (alteration in original); cf. Taylor, Witness for the Prosecution?,supra note
364 (noting that this was a "crippling weakness" in Nifong's rape case); see also TAYLOR &
JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 31-35, for a detailed analysis.
See Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181. The authors
419.
conceded that the accuser's "other injury" accounts "changed over time," and cited both a
denial by the accuser quoted in a physician's notes from the initial emergency room
examination and another doctor/sexual assault expert's conclusion of a normal exam that
turned up only three minor scratches on knee and ankle. Id. The authors then refer to the
nurse's recollection that later that night the woman claimed of "being held by both legs and
pinched, pushed and kicked," and her claims made at a University of North Carolina
hospital the following day of being "knocked to the floor multiple times and [that she] had
hit her head on the sink" during a sexual assault with claimed complaints related thereto.
Id.
See infra text supported by notes 499-513.
420.
Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181. When the DNA
421.
test results were released by Nifong, the authors found people to contradict defense claims
that the tests absolved the lacrosse team members. See id. ("Outside experts say it is
possible for a rapist to leave no DNA evidence."). One unnamed expert was Peter J.
Neufeld of the Innocence Project, which had used DNA to absolve almost two hundred
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had occurred; 422 (8) the "crock" statement made by the other dancer 423
(who later abruptly modified her stance when Nifong magnanimously
dropped her bail on an unrelated probation violation);424 and (9) the
accuser's "troubled personal history," 425 including a diagnosis for
depression and bipolar disorder, 426 unquestioned drunkenness and/or
substance abuse shortly after the alleged attack, 427 and a parallel
charge of gang rape by three attackers a decade earlier. 428 Wilson and
wrongfully convicted individuals. See TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 164. In an

earlier article. Neufeld was quoted as citing multiple thousands of rape convictions without
DNA. Wilson & Macur, Lawyers, supra note 181. The use of Neufeld's quote (implicitly
incorporated in the August 25 "[o]utside experts" reference) strongly suggested skepticism
about defense lawyers' DNA claims. See Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case,
supra note 181. Neufeld later explained that this resulted from Wilson disclosing no
specifics about the Duke lacrosse case. See TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 164.

See Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181.
422.
See id. (noting the other dancer's "contradictory accounts," including her "crock"
423.
statement and her claim that she had been with the accuser-victim the entire time at the
party except for five minutes).
424.
See id. (noting the revised version of the other dancer's story, as told to
National Public Radio, in which she explained that a rape "could have happened," but that
she had neither heard nor seen it, and referencing defense lawyers' claim that this change
in her story was "to suit an opportunity," i.e., Nifong's personal reduction of her probation
violation bond payment).
Id. (stating that this history was "sure to be an issue at trial").
425.
426.
See id. (citing medical records contained in police files).
See id. The authors paraphrase the second dancer as saying that "[slhe did not
427.
know what to do with her acquaintance, who was incoherent and, she believed, drunk or
high." Id. She went to a twenty-four-hour grocery store near campus, where the security
guard called Durham police. Id. A patrol sergeant, John C. Shelton, told a dispatcher she
was "just passed-out-drunk." Id. Since she would not either stand or communicate, he
ordered two other officers to take her to an overnight substance-abuse/mental-health
facility. Id. Later, the authors note "one of the more puzzling aspects of the case": her
intoxication. Id. The article cited both her denial to University of North Carolina doctors of
pain while in the Duke emergency room because she was "drunk and did not feel pain," and
her "slightly differing accounts" of how much alcohol she had consumed that evening. Id.
The authors then provide two wholly speculative explanations provided by police for why
the alcohol consumed did not explain why she "seemed so profoundly intoxicated" after her
dance partner said she arrived 'clearly sober"' but was 'talking crazy' and 'basically out of
it"' within an hour: either a date-rape drug or rape trauma. See id. But see Taylor, Witness
for the Prosecution?, supra note 364 (stating that he had had recently received an e-mail
from a defense lawyer explaining that they had received notice of a toxicology report the
prior week that tested negative for such a drug, and posing the question: "Another
deception?"). The accused also had a criminal public record of alcohol abuse-driving while
impaired-that the authors did not discuss. See infra note 429.
See Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181 (citing the
428.
initial disclosure in Essence magazine); see also id. (stating the accuser's explanation to
investigators that she had decided to drop the charge because of difficulties in proving it
and because the men in question were already in prison for other offenses). In their earlier,
more skeptical story, Wilson and Glater had noted that neither the accuser nor police
"followed up on th[e] report [of the previous rape]." Wilson & Glater, Prosecutor'sSilence,
supra note 216. This conclusion was open to the inference that police may have thought it
meritless or that the four-year delay reflected negatively upon the credibility of the accuser
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Glater also ignored but were obviously aware of the accuser's criminal
429
history.
or the verity of her accusations. In the later story, the authors felt compelled to "throw
some light" on this matter, as defense lawyers were publicly using this to attack the
accuser's credibility. Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181. The
later article did disclose that the charges were filed four years late and that the alleged
rape occurred when she was fourteen, "a runaway and helping [the alleged rapists] sell
drugs." Id. The explanation given to Durham police and reported by the authors was that a
friend "encouraged her to report her secret so she could hold the men accountable and move
on with her life." Id. The police in question said to the authors they had "no further record
of the case." Id. The authors' light-shedding attempt to partially rehabilitate or explain the
hugely damning and credibility-devastating prior report did little to assist her-or them.
The authors also made no reference to another statement-which was disclosed on May 1,
2006, by MSNBC's Dan Abrams-that she made a statement under oath that indicated
that her then-husband had taken her into local woods and "threatened to kill her." TAYLOR
& JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 196 (noting that the accuser "had not pursued that case,
either").
429.
See TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 19-20, 166-67. This criminal history
was not specifically mentioned but was known to the authors, as the lack of disclosure
thereof had been specifically criticized by Byron Calame in his April 23, 2006, evaluation of
the coverage of the Duke case. Calame, Covering, supra note 23. He made an "interesting"
comparison to a lengthy story about unrelated charges against one of the accused, and
rejected the editors' non-germaneness reasoning as to the Duke lacrosse accuser. Id. He
thought readers "deserve to know about her record," and noted that the News & Observer
had done an article thereon. Id. Interestingly, however, no reference to such public criminal
record appears in the August 25 story. See Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case,
supra note 181. However, the accuser's "criminal record" was specifically mentioned
without further detail by influential Times op-ed columnist Nicholas D. Kristof. See Kristof,
supra note 336. So, undoubtedly, both Wilson and Glater as well as the Times editors knew
about it and did not disclose it despite the considerable bearing such might have on the
accuser's credibility. As noted above, a local paper doing a detailed, and generally highly
professional, coverage had disclosed the unnamed accuser's criminal record in an April 7,
2006, article. See Samiha Khanna, Manager: Scanty Info Delayed Search, NEWS &
OBSERVER, Apr. 7, 2006, available at http://www.newsobserver.com/news/crimesafety
/dukelacrosse/story/426021.html. The issue arose in the context of the city manager's
discussion with city council concerning whether the accuser's "criminal record affected
police action." Id. The article went on to explain that:
The woman has convictions on a record from a single 2002 incident involving
drunken driving, a stolen car and an attempt to flee from police. Under a deal
with prosecutors, the woman pleaded guilty to four misdemeanors: larceny,
speeding to elude arrest, assault on a government official and driving while
impaired, according to court records. She was required to serve three consecutive
weekends in jail and was placed on two years' probation, which she served
without incident.
Id. Note that extensive case law suggests that a source's criminal record is hugely
significant as to whether St. Amant's "serious doubts"-regarding-veracity/credibility
standard is met. See ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 3, §7:2, 7-36-7-42. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly cited a source's criminal history as extremely important.
See, e.g., St. Amant v. Thompson 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968) ("[R]ecklessness may be found
where there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of
his reports."); Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 157 (1967) (noting that the accuser
had a history of bad check charges); see also Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v.
Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 692-93 (1989) (noting that Butts involved use of an "unreliable
informant"). Interestingly, the authors did note the second dancer's criminal history and

2008]

MEDIA ABUSES

Wilson and Glater also cited other major obstacles and
concerns with Nifong's case: (1) the "clear[] setback [and] turning
point"430 in public perception emanating from the negative findings in
the initial DNA tests regarding the Duke lacrosse players
collectively; 431 (2) Nifong's unexplained retrenchment from his prior
DNA positions 432 to one where he tried to do blunderbuss damage
434
control reaching for straws 433 (the accuser's no-condoms-were-used
admission was not controlling; she'd given different accounts of
436
ejaculations within her;435 she might not have noticed the condoms;
the rape exam may have not discovered some of the semen); 437 (3)
extensive criticism of Nifong's unprofessionalism, 438 including his
that she was then "wanted by the police for violating probation in a 2001 embezzlement
case." Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181. Of course, this had to
be disclosed because it was linked to why she later modified her comment that the
accuser's charges were a "crock." See supra text accompanying notes 423-424.
430.
Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181.
431.
See id.
432.
See id. The authors, however, do not expressly state this.
433.
See infra text accompanying notes 434-437.
434.
See Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181 (explaining
that she "initially told" doctors and nurses that no condoms were used, and admitting that
this suggested that there "would be a lot of DNA evidence to test").
435.
See Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181 (noting that
she told the hospital sexual assault nurse "she didn't know," but later told Officer Himan
"she thought" one had ejaculated in her). It is not entirely clear whether the latter is
attributed to Nifong or added by the authors, but it is probably the latter.
436.
See Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181.
437.
See id.
438.
See id. ("Increasingly, Mr. Nifong has become the focus of attacks on the case.").
Indeed, as early as April 12, [2006], Duff Wilson co-authored another article in which a
criminal law professor at the University of North Carolina, Arnold Loewy, who viewed
Nifong's public statements as highly unusual, was quoted as saying: "[Nifong] seems to
want to proceed as far as he can whether the evidence is there or not." Macur & Wilson,
Duke Inquiry, supranote 181. Later, Taylor and Johnson characterized Nifong's conduct as
"the most flagrant serial smearing of innocent suspects ever to unfold in a national
spotlight." TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 87; see also id. at 100 (concluding that it is
"hard to imagine a more egregious succession of violations" of the prohibition on a
prosecutor's prejudicial public remarks); id. at 105 ("[The Duke rape case is] widely seen as
the worst case of prosecutorial misconduct ever to unfold in plain view."); id. at 321 (citing
the "common knowledge" that such prejudicial statements are prohibited and that their
"egregious nature" was apparent-or should have been-from the beginning to all,
including the media that "gave Nifong a free ride for so long"); cf. Wilson & Glater, Files
From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181 (citing defense lawyers' accusations that Nifong
provided several dozen "inflammatory interviews"). Indeed, Nifong's misconduct was not
limited to the three falsely accused; rather, he and a complicit media falsely portrayed the
entire lacrosse team as being either directly involved in the rape as principals, or indirectly
involved as aiders and abetters by encouraging or condoning it. See TAYLOR & JOHNSON,
supra note 1, at 85, 97-98, 190 ("The whole team had been smeared from coast to coast as a
bunch of thugs who stood by and watched while a defenseless woman was being raped by
their friends.").
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inflammatory public statements and defective line-up; 439 (4) Nifong's
blank and inexplicable refusal to receive evidence from defense
440
lawyers seeking to proffer information that undermined his case,
including information as to one accused whom the authors conceded
had an apparently "powerful alibi";44 1 and (5) the highly suspect lineup that violated "generally accepted guidelines" for legally admissible
442
line-up-based identifications.
In light of the above-with most of these same major
difficulties conceded, albeit in lesser detail in Wilson and Glater's
earlier June 12 article 443-what new information, and from what
444
source(s), justified the authors' conclusion that "a body of evidence"

439.
See infra text accompanying notes 499-513.
440.
See Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181 (commenting
on the questions raised by Nifong's refusal to receive evidence from defense counsel: "In the
courthouse and around town, even people who know Mr. Nifong well and respect him are
wondering: what does he have?"); see also id. (noting that the defense lawyers' repeated
attempts to meet with Nifong were rejected, and discussing the one meeting where Nifong
finally met with three defense lawyers but abruptly terminated it when they attempted to
introduce the issue of exculpatory evidence). Nifong's actions were widely viewed by
defense lawyers as extraordinary. See e.g., TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 99, 161
(listing reasons, and characterizing Nifong as engaged in "willful blindness").
441.
Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181 ("[A] cell phone
log and other records [showed] that [Seligmann, one of the accused,] left the party early.");
see also id. (discussing, in extended detail, the evidence that counsel for Seligmann would
have shown to Nifong, had he permitted it, including "cellphone records, an A.T.M. record,
a time-coded dormitory entry card and a taxi driver's account"-but drawing no conclusion
therefrom, other than a comment that Nifong had "never explained" such refusals). Note
that Duff Wilson had penned a detailed story earlier about this information, which was
accompanied by two time-stamped photos of the dancers both inside and outside. Duff
Wilson, Duke Player has Proof of Innocence, Lawyer Says, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2006,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/20O6/04/20/sports/sportsspeciall/20duke.html.
This
time frame provided a backdrop for the compelling alibi information. See id. One wellknown law professor and commentator viewed the evidence as a "conclusive 'digital alibi[n,"'
and noted that "[i]n this case, the technologies of the surveillance state served the cause of
liberty." Jeffrey Rosen, Review: Until Proven Innocent, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 14, 2007,
available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/09/14/arts/idbriefs15A.php.
442.
Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181 (noting that
defense lawyers were challenging such, and contending that "all evidence that followed
from the identifications should be thrown out") (emphasis added). A columnist later
concluded that Nifong's actions as to the line-up were "so completely different from
standard procedure that it was virtually an invitation for a judge to throw out any
identification . . . and without the identification, there was no case. This was not about
winning a case. It was about winning an election." Sowell, Duking, supra note 364, at 1.
For a more detailed analysis of the authors' treatment of this line-up travesty, see infra
text accompanying notes 499-513.
443.
Wilson & Glater, Prosecutor'sSilence, supra note 216.
444.
Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181 (citing the entire
1,850 pages of evidence as "yield[ing] a more ambiguous picture"). This article constituted
an endorsement of Nifong's actions by "the nation's most influential newspaper." TAYLOR &
JOHSON, supra note 1, at 268.
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"stronger than that highlighted" 44 5 by defense lawyers "help[ed to]
answer some important questions" 446 about the case and "add[ed] rich
detail to the narrative of what happened that night"?44 7 In sum, what
justified 449
Nifong in going to trial?448 What is their new evidence? The
"crucial" after-the-fact, thirty-three page-recollection memo, as well
as the three pages of handwritten notes by Sergeant Mark D.
Gottlieb, 450 almost perfectly managed to massage the glaring gaps 451
in Nifong's case-a document disparaged publicly by one accused's
lawyer as a "make-up document" "transparently written to try to make
up for holes in the prosecution's case" and "smack[ing] of almost
desperation". 452 Did Wilson and Glater have "obvious reason to doubt"
the veracity of the source (Gottlieb) and his "magical mystery tour"
account?
445.
Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181.
446.
Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181.
447.
Id. One should take notice of the authors' subtle yet inculpatory use of "what
happened" that night. See id. (emphasis added).
448.
See id. In their more skeptical June 12 article, Wilson and Glater had quoted
Kim Forde-Mazrui, a law professor from the University of Virginia, as saying that a case
like Nifong had would be "very difficult to win" and would "turn so much on credibility."
Wilson & Glater, Prosecutor'sSilence, supra note 216.
449.
Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181. But see TAYLOR &
JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 263 ("A good reporter reading the ... memo would have smelled
a rat, or a bunch of rats .

.

. but .

.

. Wilson .

.

. and Glater found Gottlieb's memo so

credible-or perhaps so convenient-that they used it as the spine of the long-awaited
Times reassessment."). While noting some of the contradictions with "other, harder
evidence, the Times proceeded as though the possibility that Gottlieb was lying had not
crossed its collective mind." Id.
450.
See Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181.
451.
See id. (conceding that Gottlieb's notes were "drawing intense scrutiny" from
defense counsel because they "appear[ed] to strengthen" Nifong's case, and had not been
disclosed to the defense until after they "had made much of the gaps in the earlier
evidence").
452.
Id. (quoting comments of Joseph B. Cheshire, counsel for one of the defendants,
and citing Gottlieb's admission to defense counsel that he had taken almost no notes but
had instead relied on his memory and the notes of other police officers); see Taylor, Witness
for the Prosecution?, supra note 364 ("With comical credulity, [the Wilson and Glater
article] features as its centerpiece a leaked, transparently contrived ... memo that seeks to
paper over some of the most obvious holes in the prosecution's evidence ... concocted from
memory, nearly four months after the underlying witness interviews ..
"); see also id.
(noting that "Gottlieb's memo is contradicted on critical points by the contemporaneous
notes of other police officers, as well as by hospital records" and that the Times' article
"blandly mentions these contradictions while avoiding the obvious inference that the
Gottlieb memo is thus unworthy of belief') (emphasis added). Of course, this supposed
reliance is suspect, or at least should have been viewed as such, since his later recollections
were not always consistent with other officers' contemporary notes. There were at least
eleven contradictions of contemporaneous notes by fellow officers and examining medical
personnel at the Duke hospital. "In each and every case, Gottlieb's version ... was more
favorable to the prosecution." TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 260-261; see infra text
accompanying note 520.
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Consider what Wilson and Glater were given as an exclusive
a constructed gap-filler based on memory deviating quite
extraordinarily from accepted police practice, 454 and garnered from a
police source that the authors conceded was under internal
investigation for an unrelated reason 455 and who came up with a "deus
ex machina" 456 attempt to resuscitate Nifong's case-a case on the
verge of collapsing 457 like a house of warped cards. Even Bill Keller,
executive editor of the Times, conceded that "serious questions" 458
about the information's reliability existed at the time of publication
but that this was "actual new information" about the strength of
Nifong's case, which its reporters had gotten through supposedly
diligent efforts. 459 The Times seems to be resurrecting one of its (and
the rest of the media's) favorite (but defective and largely
unsuccessful) circumvention devices around New York Times Co.-St.
460
Amant: collectively, the so called "accurate" reportage of news.
As I have demonstrated in detail elsewhere, accurate reportage
(though I am not conceding this issue) of newsworthy matter does not
provide the media, including its ranking exemplar, absolute
protection. 46 1 And the intellectually shabby and deceitful August 25
article by Wilson and Glater demonstrates why in an almost
look: 453

453.
See Calame, Revisiting, supra note 371 ("The key document [in the Wilson and
Glater article]exclusive to the Times - was the thirty-three-page typed 'case notes'
report of Sgt. Mark D. Gottlieb, a Durham police investigator.") (emphasis added); Wilson
& Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181 ("Crucial to that portrait of the case
are Sergeant Gottlieb's thirty-three pages of typed notes and three pages of handwritten
notes, which have not previously been revealed.") (emphasis added).
454.
See TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 260-61 (referring to Gottlieb's actions
as a "shocking departure from standard police practice"); Taylor, Witness for the
Prosecution?,supra note 364 (calling Gottlieb's failure to take contemporaneous notes an
"inexplicable and indefensible police practice").
455.
See Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181 (disclosing the
details of this investigation in a parenthetical paragraph deep in the article).
456.
Andersen, Rape, Justice, and the 'Times,' supra note 376.
457.
See id. (referring to the Wilson and Glater article as "The Considered,
Authoritative, Long-Awaited New York Times Assessment of the Duke Case," which was
intended to demonstrate that "[Nifong's case was not] a witch hunt, Nifong[ was] not so
bad, the[ defendants were not] the Scottsboro Boys, the accuser may well have been raped,
the[] Duke boys might have done it, [and] the case deserve[d] to go to trial").
458.
Calame, Revisiting, supra note 371. Calame viewed the August 25 article as
significantly less skeptical" about Nifong's case than the June 12 article; the summary
paragraph as an "overstated summary [that] was a major flaw in the article;" and the
authors as "not sufficiently skeptical in relying so heavily on the Gottlieb notes." Id.
459.
Id. As Taylor and Johnson concluded, this was an article three times the length
of any prior publication on the case, and "came close to admitting that the Times valued its
little scoop more than truthfulness or fairness." TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 268.
460.
See generally Elder, Media Jabberwock,supra note 105, at 551-830.
461.
See generally id.
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laughingly compelling fashion. Despite what one critic has correctly
termed its "meretricious appearance of balance," 4 62 the authors very
early on in the article showed their (and the paper's) true
allegiance. 46 3 They repeated Nifong's widely criticized, public, proaccuser statements 464 and his statements about lacrosse-player non466
cooperation 46 5 (and paid obeisance to the race/sex/privilege angle )
despite the fact that almost all other media had dismissed the noncooperation ploy as inaccurate. 467 Most importantly, Wilson and
Glater tried deceitfully to diminish the credibility of Nifong's criticswhat one critic calls "single dismissive boilerplate" 46 8-by relegating
them to a suspect class-of-three category: "defense lawyers, Duke
alumni, and obsessive bloggers. 469 Of course, the authors did not
462.
Taylor, Witness for the Prosecution?, supra note 364; see also TAYLOR &
JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 264 (noting that the article "presented a superficially neutral
tone").

463. See infra text accompanying notes 464-471.
464. See e.g., Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181 (quoting
Nifong as saying that there was "no doubt in [his] mind that she was raped"); id. (citing
Nifong's earlier admission of error in making press statements and that he had not gotten
DNA matches but nonetheless quoting him as saying that he had "not backed down from
[his] initial assessments").
465. See, e.g., id. (noting that Nifong "had been beseeching Duke lacrosse players to
break their 'stonewall of silence' about what had happened"). Later, the authors noted what
everyone then knew (but without conceding any inconsistency): that one accused and two
other team captains sharing the house where the alleged rape took place "cooperated fully"
(according to police reports); said that no rape or sex had occurred; talked at length without
lawyers; gave DNA samples; and offered to take polygraphs, which police declined because
of the DNA testing that "would solve the case." Id.
466. See, e.g., id. ("[The Duke rape case is] yet another painful chapter in the tangled
American opera of race, sex and privilege."); id. ("What is more, regardless of one's opinion
about the prosecution, to read the files, with their graphically twined accusations of sexual
violence and racial taunts, is to understand better why this case has radiated so powerfully
from the edgily cohabited Southern world of Duke and Durham.") (emphasis added); see
also Taylor, Witness for the Prosecution?, supra note 364 ("[Unwarranted reliance on
Gottlieb's dubious memo] fits the Times' long-standing treatment of the case as a fable of
evil, rich white men running amok and abusing poor black women.").
467. A leading blogger and critic criticized the Wilson and Glater article for
"wast[ing] no time [in] rehashing the old lie that the Duke lacrosse players were refusing to
cooperate with the police." Anderson, Desperate Times, supra note 384 (alteration in
original).
468. Andersen, Rape, Justice, and the 'Times,' supra note 376.
469.
Id.; see Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181 ("Defense
lawyers, amplified by Duke alumni and a group of bloggers who have closely followed the
case, have portrayed it as a national scandal-that there is only the flimsiest physical
evidence of rape, that the accused is an unstable fabricator, and that Mr. Nifong, in the
middle of a tight primary campaign, was summoning racial ghosts for political gain. By
disclosing pieces of evidence favorable to the defendants, the defense has created an image
of a case heading for the rocks."). Note the very limited reference to Nifong's politically
partisan motivation and the attempted diminishing thereof. See Wilson & Glater, Files
From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181. But cf. Wilson & Glater, Prosecutor'sSilence, supra
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acknowledge that Times editorial and other writers,4 70 as well as most
national and local journalists, 4 71 had joined these suspect three in
viewing Nifong and his police investigative network with justifiably
strong skepticism.
Wilson and Glater's attempt to resuscitate Nifong's case
focused especially on two arenas: the dearth of corroborating medical
evidence and the highly suspect identification process. Beginning
with the medical evidence, the article dramatically downplayed the
hospital forms 472 that failed to provide corroborating evidence of

note 216 ("People in Durham are asking what Mr. Nifong is up to[ and] whether his
prosecution was influenced by politics[ as ]he was in the midst of a campaign when the case
...); id. ("[Some of Nifong's critics have] accused him of 'zeal to make national
began.
headlines and win a hotly contested primary."').
See Andersen, Rape, Justice, and the 'Times,' supra note 376 (noting that David
470.
Brooks and Nicholas Kristof of the Times had also criticized the prosecution); see also Peter
Applebome, As Accusation at Duke Festers, Disbelief Gnaws at Suspect's Supporters, N.Y.
TIMES, July 16, 2006, available at http://select.nytimes.com/20O6/O7/16/nyregion
/16towns.html (citing character testimonials for one accused and some of the details
warranting skepticism for the suggestion this might have "become a cautionary tale of a
rush to judgment before facts were known, of a toxic brew of politics and race in the middle
of [Nifong's campaign]"); Brooks, Witch Hunt, supra note 396 (rejecting any explanation for
the "sweeping sociological theories ... tossed about with such wild abandon a few weeks
ago," and noting the "devastating" essays by Stuart Taylor, "one of the most admired legal
journalists in the country," in which, based on the lack of DNA evidence, the "seemingly
exculpatory" evidence, and the prosecutor's "weak case," Taylor "estimate[d] that there is
an 85 percent chance the players are innocent"); Kristof, supra note 336 (citing Stuart
Taylor's critique, and listing numerous factors why Taylor was "more than 90 percent
confident" of the accused's innocence: the time-stamped photos, including one after the
alleged attack showing the accuser "looking relaxed, with her clothes in good order"; the
"pretty good alibi" based on one accused's cell phone records of seven phone calls, including
one to a taxi driver who picked him up; the absence of any DNA evidence; the fact that the
accuser was herself a "bundle of complexities," including a criminal record and prior gangrape charges; the issuance of rape charges when the accuser was about to be detained in a
mental health center; her later shifts in position on the rape charges; the other dancer's
"crock" statement; and the argument that Nifong was possibly the "real culprit" based on
his unprofessional actions violating state bar prohibitions and the strong political
"campaign tool" context thereof).
See Andersen, Rape, Justice, and the 'Times,'supranote 376; see also Anderson,
471.
American Political Culture, supra note 364 ("Where others saw a case falling apart, the
Times saw 'a body of evidence to support [Nifong's] decision to take the matter to a jury."');
Peyser, supra note 364 (noting that the Times continued with its '"oax... long after other
media outlets had backed off'); Taylor, Witness for the Prosecution?, supra note 364
("Imagine you are the world's most powerful newspaper and you have invested your
credibility in yet another storyline that is falling apart, crumbling as inexorably as Jayson
Blair's fabrications and the flawed reporting on Saddam Hussein's supposed WMD. What
[do you] do [about a claim shown by mounting evidence to be almost certainly fraudulent]?.
. .[Y]ou tone down your rhetoric while doing your utmost to prop up a case that's almost
wholly driven by prosecutorial and police misconduct.").
See supra text accompanying notes 413-422; infra text accompanying notes 473472.
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rape. 473 These forms had been analyzed in detail in affidavits filed by
defense lawyers who claimed that a judge had been calculatedly
misled by Nifong and police in issuing earlier search warrants. 474 The
article downplayed this evidence while waxing eloquent about the
nurse's subsequent, non-medical record and "much stronger"475
statements that Gottlieb remembered in quite specific and technical
detail 476 despite having taken no notes. The authors further cited the
miracle memo as a source for the alleged victim's "extreme pain" and
bruises that Gottlieb had seen during an interview with the accuser a
couple of days later, while acknowledging that the bruises were not
477
mentioned in an accompanying officer's contemporary notes.

The authors also took great pains to ignore or discount any
alternative hypothesis for the evidence of swelling thought to be
consistent with rape. 478 Specifically, Wilson and Glater noted the
473.
See supra text accompanying note 418. Ultimately, the special prosecutors
appointed by the attorney general to review the files found no medical evidence to support
the accuser's charges. See TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 350.
474.
See Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, sup a note 181 (synthesizing
medical records attached under seal to a motion filed by two defense lawyers for
Seligmann, which suggested that there was little or no objective evidence by doctors or
nurses to substantiate that a rape occurred).
475.
Id. (quoting from Gottlieb's notes about the nurse's statements a week later
regarding the accuser's out-of-presence-of-police-officers comments-specifically, that
during the six to seven hours that they were together, the accuser had never modified her
statement after the nurse had calmed her down). Of course, the fact that none of this was
corroborated by the Duke University Medical Center medical records seemed not to phase
the authors. See supra text supporting note 418; see also Taylor, Witness for the
Prosecution?, supra note 364 (noting that the article "glosses over the contradiction"
between the nurse's own statements and her written report).
476.
See Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181 (quoting
Gottlieb's notes as saying that "the victim had edema and tenderness to palpitation both
anally and especially vaginally" and that it was "[very] painful . . . [for her] to have the
speculum inserted vaginally"; further quoting Gottlieb's notes of a later conversation with
the nurse to the effect that the "blunt force trauma" was "consistent" with the sexual
assault alleged by the accuser).
477.
Id. (stating that Gottlieb's memo said that during an interview with the
accuser, a female officer "took photographs and confirmed that '[the accuser] had the onset
of new bruises present,"' but also noting that "[t]he female officer's report [did] not mention
bruises"). This discrepancy was quite important, but its importance was largely ignored,
which is a pattern typical of the authors' treatment. See TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1,
at 262, 265-66 ("Despite Mangum's sometimes story of being hit in the face, strangled, and
having her head smashed against a sink", Gottlieb did not explain [the bruises'] absence
from the photos from Reid's own report, and from the many reports created to record
Mangum's frequent hospital visits."). Duff Wilson actually saw the photos as a result of
contact with counsel for David Evans priorto putting his story to press, which refuted any
such bruising. See id. at 263.
478.
Compare Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181
(responding to the again gap-filling nature of Gottlieb's notes by stating that "[b]efore
Sergeant Gottlieb's notes were turned over to the defense .... defense lawyers had argued
publicly that the woman's swelling and tenderness could have been caused by consensual
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accuser's four escort service jobs at hotels and motels on Friday
through Sunday 479 (including one in which the accuser performed with
a vibrator for one couple), 4 0 "jobs" that the authors had previously
(and hilariously) indicated were of an unclear nature. 48 1 They further
took at face value the accuser's driver's conveniently revised
recollection that the sex he had with the accuser took place not during
the weekend just prior to the alleged Monday incident, but the
previous weekend! 48 2 Lastly, they referenced the accuser's denial that
she had had sex that weekend and stated that no evidence
contradicted her 4 3-a hugely uncritical, non-skeptical conclusion in
light of the above factors and the accuser's mountain of credibility
issues.
The article's handling of the issue of DNA is particularly
fraudulent. The authors made only a terse, half-correct citation to
Nifong's original position that DNA was pivotal in showing
conclusively which lacrosse players were suspects while ignoring his

sexual activity in the days before the Monday-night party"), with Taylor, Witness for the
Prosecution?,supra note 364 (noting that the mild vaginal swelling could well have been
caused by "consensual sexual activities, including [her admitted recent] perform[ance] with
a vibrator"). Wilson and Glater failed to include a defense contention cited in an earlier
article that the swelling could have been caused by the accuser's menstrual cycle. See
Wilson & Glater, Prosecutor'sSilence, supra note 216; cf. TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1,
at 33 (quoting an expert forensic nurse who trains sexual assault nurse examiners as
stating that such swelling or edema could be attributed to several possible causes,
including sex within twenty-four hours; frequent sexual activity; Tricyclic antidepressants
such as Flexeril, which the accuser took; or other drugs with comparable properties, and
noting that the accuser fulfilled all four options); id. at 36-37 (faulting police and
prosecutors for failing to investigate "ample signs" that the accuser was a prostitute and
that the vibrator and multiple partners could account for the swelling found at the
hospital).
479.
See Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181 (noting that
the accuser had two of these "job[s]" on Friday, one on Saturday, and one on Sunday).
480.
See id.
481.
See Wilson & Glater, Prosecutor's Silence, supra note 216 (stating that "[tihe
exact nature of [her] meetings [with clients in various hotel rooms] was not disclosed"). But
cf. TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 24 ("Some call [four private hotel room
engagements with various escort customers] prostitution."). The authors took some pains to
quote the accuser's statements to police, explaining she was a stripper, not a prostitute:
"[S]he [said that she] had been to one event in the past where she thought a male at the
party was nice, so after the party they went out and had consensual sexual relations."
Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181. Again paraphrasing the
police statement, the authors added, "but just that once." Id.
482.
See Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181 (noting that
the driver's DNA was "the only positive match" with samples from the accuser). Of course,
this convenient revision avoided contradicting the accuser's statement that she had not had
sex for a week before the Monday lacrosse party. See TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at
159.
483.
Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181.
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bold, volte-face on this issue. 48 4 The article then quoted Nifong at
length the day following the release of non-DNA-linkage exculpatory
results about handling this the pre-DNA "old-fashioned way" via
witness testimony. 4 5 It cited Nifong's maybe-condoms-were-used
argument4 8 6 without disclosing that his own files (which the authors
claim to have reviewed) refuted this line of reasoning. 4 7 Moreover,
Wilson and Glater did not acknowledge or discuss the sheer
unlikelihood, if not near impossibility, of the absence of DNA evidence
connecting the accuser to the three accused in light of the forcible

484.
See id. (quoting a statement from Nifong to the court that DNA tests "would
'show conclusive evidence as to who the suspect(s) [were] in the alleged violent attack upon
this victim"'). The article's authors did not quote the other half of the Nifong statement to
the effect that DNA would "'immediately rule out any innocent persons."' Taylor, Witness
for the Prosecution?, supra note 364 (quoting the other half of Nifong's statement to the
court); see TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 266-67. This statement was contained in

Nifong's affidavit to the court for a nontestimonial identification order to get DNA samples
from all Duke lacrosse players. TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 59 ("This was nothing

short of an assurance that he (Nifong) would end the case and admit the players' innocence
if the DNA results proved to be negative.").
485.
Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181. The authors did
not "explain how blatantly" Nifong was behaving in shifting his position. See Taylor,
Witness for the Prosecution?,supra note 364. A lawyer's letter to the editor gave a brutally
incisive critique of Nifong's 'old fashioned way"' comment and the paper's credibility for
uncritical acquiescence therein:
There's a big difference between convicting a defendant without DNA evidence
because the technology did not exist and convicting a defendant when DNA is
available and the DNA results are negative. In the first instance, there would
have been no DNA evidence to counter the testimony of witnesses. In the second,
such DNA evidence exists and is exculpatory.
Thomas F. Schlafly, Duke and DNA Evidence, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2006, available at
http://www.nytimes.com]2006/08/29/opinion/129duke.html.
486.
See Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181. The authors
noted that the woman had "initially told" doctors and nurses that no condoms were used,
but then responded with Nifong's proffered contradictory explanations-maybe the victim
didn't notice, or maybe the rape exams had missed semen. Id. The authors added another
explanation-the "differing versions" as to ejaculations that the accuser had given to the
nurse and Officer Himan. Id. The authors then added the argument that "[o]utside experts"
say it is "possible" for a rapist to leave behind no DNA. Id But that statement is itself
suspect because it is not consistent with the facts of this case, which would have made such
absent DNA extraordinarily unlikely. See infra text accompanying notes 487-497.
Moreover, the selective reliance on "[o]utside experts" is itself deceiving. Surely, in light of
the extraordinary attention given to DNA in the post-O.J. Simpson era, including its
extensive use in capital punishment cases, the Times reporters had access to experts who
would have told them how extraordinarily unlikely it would be to have no DNA under the
circumstances alleged by the accuser. See infra text accompanying note 487. If the
reporters had such but did not use it, this would be a further example of their ignoring
contradictory evidence. See supra text accompanying notes 406-409. If they did not seek
such for fear that it would refute their "experts," this is another example of "purposeful
avoidance of truth." See infra text accompanying notes 525-534, 537.
487.

See TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 267.
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nature of the alleged rape in a confined space-a bathroom-over a
48 8
thirty minute period.
Having failed to tie any of the three accused to the rape
through DNA directly, the authors then flaunted other DNA pseudoevidence 48 9 that supposedly filled this Grand Canyonesque chasm.
They detailed police evidence of semen by a non-accused (and
presumably innocent) lacrosse player on the floor of the bathroom, the
same location where the accuser claimed to have spat semen. 490 They
further referenced a towel found in the hall that contained the
semen/DNA of one of the three accused and linked that to the
4 91
accuser's statement that her vagina had been wiped with a towel.
However, there was a huge hole in this DNA "evidence" large enough
to drive a queue of Sherman Tanks through-neither the floor-spat
semen nor towel-absorbed semen contained any of the accuser's DNA,
an extraordinary medical improbability (if not impossibility) 492 and
one which would have rendered such DNA useless as testimony. 493 So
either the accuser was lying, or the spitting/towel statements
488.
See TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 162, 169, 205, 266-67 (quoting Joseph
B. Cheshire, lawyer for David Evans, as saying that a three-person gang rape would have

left DNA even if they used condoms, and noting that there was "expert consensus" on point;
that after the release of the DNA test at a defense counsel press conference, "serious
lawyers became increasingly unwilling to put their credibility on the line" by defending
Nifong; and that Wilson and Glater had failed to quote any experts for the view that the
alleged circumstances would have resulted in "DNA evidence all over the place"); see also
id. at 96-97 (citing an article quoting the chair of the Department of Medical Ethics at the
University of Pennsylvania to support the conclusion that a lack of DNA under such
circumstances was "not merely unlikely" but "virtually impossible"); Anderson, Desperate
Times, supra note 384 ("[Tlhe Times fails to point out that had the attack gone as [the
accuser] described to the police, there is no way that there could have been no DNA traces
left on the woman. One cannot physically attack someone in the manner that Nifong has
claimed and not leave evidence."); Taylor, Witness for the Prosecution?, supra note 364
(summarizing the accuser's allegations, noting the Times' expert's statement about the
possibility of no DNA being left, and concluding that "it's hard to imagine the crime alleged
to have happened here leaving [no DNA]"); cf. Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape
Case, supra note 181 ("In her subsequent detailed accounts to doctors and detectives, files
show, the accuser said she was raped vaginally, anally, and orally.... [Sihe said the men.
.. had held, pushed and kicked her during the attack.").
489.
See Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181. But cf. id.
(conceding that the tests' "relevance is unclear").
490.
Id. But cf. id. (citing the non-accused's lawyer as saying such "had come from
other innocent sexual activity").
491.
Id. But cf. id. (referencing the lawyer for David Evans, one of the accused, as
stating that "th[e] towel had nothing to do with her accusation ... and that the semen
came from other activity").
492.
See Anderson, Desperate Times, supra note 384 for a scathingly brilliant
critique.
493.
See id. (noting that the bathroom semen was not relevant evidence); see also
TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 267 (noting that this was "evidence" that not even
Nifong viewed as relevant).
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contradicted Nifong's proffered statements that condoms may have
been used. 494 The Times and Nifong could not have its cake and eat it
'49 5
too. As one critic said, the paper's "dishonesty ... is breathtaking.
In sum, the DNA "evidence" that the authors supplied actually
provided further compelling evidence that the accuser was lying. 496 Is
there even a hint of this obvious conclusion-one that a competent,
open-minded, inquisitive reporter would draw? No, nay, never. And
the clear corollary? The Times "is not interested in asking obvious
questions that go to the heart of this case." 497 More generally, the
world's most highly touted and influential newspaper "does not ask
serious questions when clear discrepancies are raised. 4 98
Parallel problems arise when one scrutinizes the article's
handling of the identification/line-up issue. The core of the authors'
problem is that Gottlieb's magical recollection memo, which Wilson
and Glater admitted was "drawing intense scrutiny," 499 "closely
correspond[ed]" 50 0 to the descriptions of the three accused despite
contemporary notes of an accompanying officer 50 1 that boldly
contradicted these descriptions. Wilson and Glater acknowledged this

494.

See Anderson, Desperate Times, supra note 384.

495.
496.
497.

Id.
Id.
Id.

498.
Id. ("[It also tells us that when an agent of the state lies, and uses the
prosecutorial apparatus in a dishonest and abusive way, the agent can find refuge in the
New York Times if the desired outcome can validate the Times' politically-correct view of
the world ....
Having been burned once [by the Tawana Brawley story], the editors this
time apparently have decided that they will continue to press the lie no matter what the
truth may be. They will stand by their man, Michael Nifong, and stand by him to the bitter
end. But they will stand by him.").
499.
Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181 (explaining that
this scrutiny from defense counsel was the result of the fact that Gottlieb's notes
"strengthened" the prosecutor's case and had not been provided to defense lawyers until
after they "had made much of the gaps in the earlier evidence").
500.
Id. Without noting that Gottlieb's "descriptions" were recorded much later, the
authors merely stated that "the two investigators who interviewed her at home recorded
the conversation differently." Id. Gottlieb's notes were supposedly "more detailed and
correspond[ed] more closely to the men later arrested." Id. Of course, none of the three
accused bore any resemblance to the 260-70 pounder from Officer Hinman's notes. See id.
One of the accused, Collin Finnerty was six feet five inches tall and "rail-thin." See TAYLOR
& JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 261.
501.
See Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181 (noting the
widely varying description "recounted in one investigator's notes," and the fact that Officer
Benjamin W. Himan's contemporary handwritten notes described all three as "chubby or
heavy," including one of whom was "[h]eavy set [with a] short haircut [and weighing] 26070 [pounds]"). Of course, the authors do not note, or concede that notes taken during
interviews of witnesses, "imperfect as they are, tend to be the most reliable record of what
witnesses saw and heard." TAYLOR & JONSON, supra note 1, at 41.
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inconsistency,5 0 2 which others have termed "irreconcilable,"' 50 3 then
tried to bolster Gottlieb's credibility by noting that he was "by far the
more experienced [officer]. '"504 Of course, the "obvious inference" was
that Gottlieb lied. 50 5 But the authors treated him as the more
believable source. Incroyable.
Equally indefensible was the authors' treatment of the broader
evidence as to the other accuser-identification opportunities. They
mentioned, but did not emphasize or discuss, the implications of the
fact that the accuser did not identify one accused as an attacker
during her first opportunity5 0 6 or another accused as an attacker
during the second and third opportunities. 50 7 Indeed, she only picked
out two accused as attackers during a rigged 50 8 line-up that only
502.
See Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181 (noting that
"[t]he difference in the police accounts could not be explained"). Byron Calame, the Times
public editor, later criticized this "striking example" of the paper's decision to portray
Gottlieb as "more credible" and more "prominently listed" than Officer Benjamin W.
Himan. Calame, Revisiting, supra note 371. He noted also that Wilson had been informed
that Gottlieb "relied 'largely"' on Himan's notes. Id. This, according to Calame, was a
"flawed" judgment, "allowing critics to foster a perception of the paper as leaning toward
Mr. Nifong." Id.
Smolkin, supra note 143 ("I was really struck that [the Times reporters] used
503.
this report that I had seen, but they used it basically 180 degrees from how I was planning
to use it ....
") (quoting Joe Neff of the News & Observer). Neff was one of the few
journalists given high marks for professional and hard work throughout the Duke rape
case. See supra note 9.
504.
Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181. Of course, the
"obvious implication" was that Officer Himan "made a rookie mistake. Make that three
rookie mistakes. Big mistakes." TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 266 (emphasis in
original). Wilson and Glater then disclosed that Gottlieb was the subject of an unrelated
internal affairs investigation. Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note
181.
505.
See Taylor, Witness for the Prosecution?, supra note 364 (noting the
inconsistency between the descriptions of all three in Officer Himan's contemporaneous
notes and Gottlieb's "miraculous[] match" in his later memo to support the suggestion that
the Wilson and Glater article "avoids the obvious inference: Gottlieb's version was made up
to fit the defendants").
506.
See Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181. From a group
of twenty-four pictures which did not include pictures of Finnerty and Evans, the accuser
identified one of the three accused, Reade Seligmann, as at the party, not as an attacker.
See id. The authors quoted the accuser from Officer Michele Soucie's notes as saying that
the identification process was "harder than [she] thought" it would be. Id.
See id. Officer Benjamin W. Himan wrote in his report that the accuser was
507.
"unable to remember anything further about the suspects," and Officer Richard D. Clayton
stated in his notes that "[s]he again stated the photos looked the same." Id.
Interestingly, the Times (like most other media) ignored a detailed letter
508.
critiquing the identification debacle by Duke Law Professor James Coleman on June 13
[2006] in the News & Observer, in which Coleman also suggested that Nifong remove
himself and request that the attorney general appoint a special prosecutor. See TAYLOR &
JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 239-240. Even Wilson and Glater viewed the identification as
"one of the most hotly disputed elements" of the case. Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke
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included the forty-six white Duke lacrosse players. 50 9 Nor did the
article discuss the significance of the fact that one of the two identified
5 10
players (David Evans) was identified only if he had a mustache.
The authors did note that his (impliedly suspect) lawyers and family
refuted any suggestion that he had ever had a mustache. 5 11 Obviously,
the authors did not think it necessary (or advisable) to check the
readily available and widely circulated pictures 512 of the entire team
or
otherwise
investigate
this
extraordinarily
important
513
inconsistency.

Rape Case, supra note 181. They quoted Evans's defense lawyers as calling the process
"fatally flawed," and quoted one of the accused's unidentified lawyers, who disparaged it as

'a multiple-choice test with no wrong answers, a pin-the-tail-on-the-donkey
identification."' Id. Of note, in their earlier, skeptical article, the authors had also
attributed the claim that the identification procedure was "fatally flawed" to "[s]ome
experts." Wilson & Glater, Prosecutor'sSilence, supra note 216. The authors noted that the
identification violated both Durham and U.S. Department of Justice standards requiring a
minimum of five non-suspect persons for each suspect, and further noted that defense
lawyers had filed motions to bar the accuser's tainted identification at trial. Wilson &
Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181; see also Taylor, Witness for the
Prosecution?, supra note 364 (referring to the Nifong-arranged identification as "an
outrageously suggestive, pick-any-lacrosse player session that grossly violate[d] local and
state rules and (in [the author's] view) the U.S. Constitution"; and noting that this
defective identification process resulted in selection of a later-indicted defendant with "an
airtight alibi").
509.
See Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181. The authors
tried to bolster the accuser's credibility by suggesting that the transcript of the photo-byphoto identification "shows some precise recollections, three weeks after a relatively brief
encounter with a large group of white strangers." Id. What the comment more logically
does is show the anomaly of such in light of her previous inability to remember any details.
See supra notes 505-506. Of course, the authors drew no such negative inference, nor did
they disclose that the accuser made other significant errors, such as identifying one
lacrosse player as talking to her co-dancer in the front yard at a time when he was in
Raleigh, twenty miles away. TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 266.
510.
See Wilson & Glater, Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181.
511.
Id.
512.
See supra note 3.
513.
Nor did the authors ask any of the hundreds of coaches, fellow students, Duke
faculty and employees, etc., whether Evans ever had a mustache or had one on the date in
question. One would think any starting journalist would have pursued such basic inquiries,
but it was easier to minimize the gross anomaly of the mustache identification by imputing
the contradictory evidence only to defense lawyers and family, who were portrayed by the
authors as obviously self-interested parties of diminished credibility. See Wilson & Glater,
Files From Duke Rape Case, supra note 181; supra text accompanying notes 468-69. Maybe
it was just laziness that caused the authors to refrain from doing their own investigation,
or maybe they did not want to find such photographic-or other-contradictory evidence,
as such might pose additional problems for their accuser, their prosecutor, and their thesis.
See infra text accompanying notes 525-34, 537. The authors also ignored a corroborating
factor they cited in their earlier article following their discussion of the mustache
controversy: that Evans had passed a lie detector test by an expert his lawyers had hired.
See Wilson & Glater, Prosecutor'sSilence, supra note 216.
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In conclusion, the August 25 story provides a veritable treasure
trove of evidence of constitutional malice: (1) common law malice of a
preconceived story line reflecting the Times politically correct prism
515
and prejudices; 514 (2) deviation from accepted journalistic practices
and the paper's own standards; 5 16 (3) extensive evidence in the article
and in prior publications contradicting its pro-Nifong/pro-accuser
conclusions; 517 (4) the inherent implausibility of a questionable
accuser's accusations 518 absent DNA testimony; 5 19 (5) the widely cited
distortions, omissions, and understatements of contradictory or
refutatory evidence; 520 and (6) the extraordinary misconduct of Nifong
and police investigators that seemed highly probable 52 1 to all but the
"maimed[,]. . . the halt, and the blind," 522 i.e., the manipulable
authors 523 of the article and a manipulative, see-no-evil-of-the524
prosecutor editorial board.
In its most discursive analysis of constitutional malice, HarteHanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton,525 the Supreme Court
distinguished a failure to investigate from the scenario before the
Court, where the defendant avoided pursuing the most obvious

514.
515.
516.
517.
518.

See supratext
See supratext
See supra text
See supra text
See supra text

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying

notes 23-25, 363-400.
note 386-88; infra text accompanying note 540.
notes 365-370, 386-400.
notes 406-513.
notes 5, 434-35, 472-498.

519.
See supra text accompanying notes 380-384, 395-396, 409-410, 416, 416, 417,
420, 429-436, 471-497.
520.
See supra text accompanying notes 25, 363, 396-401, 409-412, 416 461-512 and
infra text accompanying notes 535-544, for examples; see also TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra
note 1, at 265-67 (detailing the "most misleading aspects of the article[:] ...its selective
presentation of evidence and omissions"); Smolkin, supra note 143; Taylor, Witness for the
Prosecution?, supra note 364 (noting that the Wilson and Glater article "highlights every
superficially incriminating piece of evidence in the case, selectively omits important
exculpatory evidence, and reports hotly disputed statements by not-very-credible police
officers and the mentally unstable accuser as if they were established facts"). See ELDER,
DEFAMATION, supra note 3, § 7:13, for a discussion on omitted matter and distorted or
slanted matter as evidence of constitutional malice.
521.
See supra text accompanying notes 1-5, 11-14, 18-20, 378-381, 382-384, 396-98,
409-449, 463-495, 498-512.
522.
Luke 14:21 (King James).
523.
See TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 120; supra text accompanying notes
365, 375-385, 396-513.
524.
TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 260 (noting that after stories by Newsweek
and by Joe Neff in the News & Observer-who had access to the 1,850 pages turned over by
the prosecutor-were hugely critical of Nifong's case, the Times assigned Duff Wilson, an
individual "very much a part of the journalistic pack committed to the now increasingly
discredited presumption-of-guilt approach," to "reassess, among other things, his own
work"); see also supra text accompanying notes 361-63, 370-85 396-513.
525.
491 U.S. 657 (1989).
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sources of verifying or refuting evidence. 526 In that case, the pivotal
issue was the credibility of a party to a series of disputed taped
The editors
conversations with plaintiff-candidate for judge. 527
directed its reporters to interview every witness to the conversation
except one, the source's sister-a delict the Court found "hard to
explain" in light of editorial discussions with both the plaintiff and the
source affirming that the sister could verify the charges. 528 The Court
characterized the reporters' decision not to interview her as "utterly
bewildering" 529 in light of the defendant's commitment of extensive
resources. However, if it had serious concerns about the source's
credibility but was "committed to running the story," then not
interviewing her made sense, as a denial "would quickly put an end to
530
the story."
The Court in Harte-Hanks also found that the defendant's
refusal to listen to tapes in its possession of an interview with the
5 31
pivotal source supported a conclusion of constitutional malice.
Much of what the source said was disprovable or provable by listening
to the tapes. Accordingly, the refusal to listen to them gave rise to the
inference that the defendant was "motivated by a concern that they
would raise additional doubts" 532 regarding their source's veracity, i.e.,
the "product of a deliberate decision not to acquire knowledge of facts
that might confirm the probable falsity"533 of her accusations. This
was clearly quite different from a failure to investigate-it was a
"purposeful avoidance of the truth."534
In the August 25 story, the authors and the Times editorial
staff did something measurably worse than the reporters in HarteHanks. They refused to pose the pivotal questions or pursue the
logical or obvious inferences, and tried to obfuscate the truth under a
thin veneer of false pseudo-neutrality.5 35 And the bloggers, much of
the journalistic public, and many of its readers saw the Times
coverage for what it was-at worst, a fabricated hatchet job to keep
Nifong and its huge reputational investment in him alive; 536 at best, a
526.
527.
528.
529.
530.
531.
532.
533.
534.
535.
542.
536.

Id. at 692.
See id. at 659.
Id. at 668, 682.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 692-93.
Id.at 684.
Id. at 692.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 458-462; infra text accompanying notes 540See supra text accompanying notes 375-85, 396-401, 410-513.
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"purposeful avoidance of the truth."537 Its readership and the body
politic deserved better from a company whose vaunted reputation and
courage gave rise to the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan rule, 538 which
frustrated Southern segregationist public officials' aggressive
attempts to bludgeon "outside agitators" 539 into silence under the
heavy weight of the common law of libel.
Maybe the aggressively politically correct Times and its equally
haughty emulators will return to the traditions of good old-fashioned,
fact-intensive journalism without partisan objectives. 540 Maybe they
will absorb the potent message of one of the defense lawyers who told
them what their lawyers and editors should have but didn't-that the
media erroneously believes that a "perverted notion"5 4 1 of "balance
requires them to report anything someone says, whether it's true or
not."542 Maybe they will take to heart the critique of one of their own,
that sometimes "simple decency" requires a rush-to-judgment media to
recognize a "more complicated reality" which, sadly, many were
unwilling to do. 543 And maybe even apologize. But try not to hold
your breath 544-you may asphyxiate on your sense of outrage.
IV. CONCLUSION
The abuses chronicled by Stuart Taylor, Jr. and K. C. Johnson
in Until Proven Innocent make for a mesmerizing read. Nifong has
been disbarred and universally vilified. Litigation against the City of
537.
538.
539.

Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 692.
See supra text accompanying notes 28, 35-36.
376 U.S. 254, 294 (1964) (Black, J., concurring).

540.
See Smolkin, supra note 143 ("The lessons of the media's rush to judgment and
their affair with a sensational, simplistic storyline rank among journalism's most basic
tenets: be fair; stick to the facts; question authorities; don't assume; pay attention to
alternative explanations."); see also id. (quoting Stuart Taylor's response to a question
about what the media could learn from the media's Duke debacle: "Read the damn [defense
counsel] motions .... If you're covering a case, don't just wait for somebody to call a press

conference. Read the documents.").
541.
Elder, Media Jabberwock, supra note 105, at 571 n.148.
542.
Smolkin, supra note 143 (quoting Jim Cooney, defense counsel for Seligmann).
543.
See Brooks, Witch Hunt supra note 396; see also Anderson, American Political
Culture, supra note 364 ("[Elven now the paper is loathe to admit that this entire case was
a piece of fiction that Nifong and the police hatched-and was aided and abetted by false
coverage from the 'Newspaper of Record."').
See e.g., Anderson, American Political Culture, supra note 364 ("[T]he Times
544.
has not editorialized any mea culpa even though it rushed to judgment."); Peyser, supra
note 364 ("Will the Times make reparations now? ... For shame."); Smolkin, supra note
143 ("The one thing I'm quite certain I didn't see was an apology [from the Times] ....")
(quoting Daniel Okrent, the Times former public editor); Sowell, New York Times Buried,
supra note 364 (noting the absence of any suggestion that the Times plans to apologize and
referencing its parallel failure in the Tawana Brawley case).
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Durham, Duke University, and selected employees may provide both
compensation to those injured and deterrence to those defendants and
others similarly situated in the future. So far, the media and its
supposed exemplar of virtuous journalism remain unscathed, except
perhaps (and importantly) in the courts of public opinion and history.
But can we assume that the media has learned anything from the
debacle they fertilized with a vengeance?
A thoughtful critic provides a sad commentary on the state of
modern journalism and the lessons to be learned from the media's
collective egregious misfeasance and malfeasance in mishandling the
Duke lacrosse fabricated rape charges:
All too soon, the next lurid crime story will explode into the headlines. The media
will have a chance to show what they learned from this fiasco. Will they remember
that sometimes the accused are innocent? Will they proceed with caution, combing
through the facts and avoiding sweeping generalizations? Will they remind
viewers and readers, "It looks bad now, but not all the evidence is in"?
Maybe some journalists ... really will apply more prudence and skepticism in the
future. But the media's collective memory is notoriously short, and competitive
pressures are awfully hard to resist. Official assurances-whether about the guilt
of privileged athletes or the existence of weapons of mass destruction-can
persuade, even when they shouldn't. Journalists in [Times Executive Editor Bill]
Keller's phrase, can get "sucked into the undertow."
So does another rush to judgment await some hapless citizen thrust into the
media's glare?
Almost certainly.

545

Does this mean that the law is powerless in the face of such a
jaundiced view of the inevitability of media "rush to judgment"
scenarios? Not at all. Even if the media miss the lessons from the
Duke lacrosse fabricated rape mess, the law need not.
It can
incorporate the lessons learned from the unconscionable media
mistreatment and maltreatment of the three Duke lacrosse accused
and the other maligned members of the team. How? By treating all
such involuntary participants, even those vigorously defending their
reputations, as private persons, not public figures. 546 By denying fair
report and neutral reportage protection to published accounts of
miscreants defaming future victims of media-generated and mediasensationalized witch hunts. 547 By appending the label "calculated
falsehood" 548 to media attempts to make fools of their readers and

545.
546.
547.
548.

Smolkin, supra note 143.
See supra text accompanying notes 36-140.
See supra text accompanying notes 141-362.
See supra text accompanying note 35.
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viewers by parroting under a false veneer of pseudo-neutrality lies fed
to them by co-complicit sources, whether governmental or private. 549
To ignore these lessons and discount the awful experiences of the
Duke lacrosse players would be the ultimate tragedy.

549.

See supra text accompanying notes 363-544.

